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

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RAND *[Page 25]*

About the Cover: Richard Nixon was not President when the slaughter at My Lai occurred, but since he assumed office better than twenty thousand Americans and many times that number of Vietnamese have died in Indochina. Vietnam is Nixon's war whether he admits to it or not, and this Administration will doubtless have My Lais of its own to be uncovered in the future. Therefore the Editors reiterate their endorsement of George McGovern (see RAMPARTS, September 1972), although realistically understanding the limits of his campaign and the Democratic Party.



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

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

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

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

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

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PERSPECTIVE

THE CRUEL RECONCILIATION

by david horowitz

"Compared to capitalist-nationalism and national selfishness, proletarian internationalism is like light compared to darkness. The road of revolution is full of fragrant grass and flowers. Opportunism is a stinking swamp."

Nhan Dan *editorial, Hanoi, 17 August 1972*

FOR MANY SUPPORTERS of the Vietnamese struggle, the curious role of Vietnam's great power allies, Russia and China, in their diplomatic negotiations with President Nixon, has been a source of confusion as well as concern. Some of this confusion may be dispelled now that several documents have come to light, which help to clarify the roles of the various actors in the struggle over the destiny of Vietnam.

Daniel Ellsberg, for example, has recently disclosed the contents of a plan of action for Vietnam, which was adopted by Nixon at the outset of his Administration. The plan, according to Ellsberg, was basically Nixon's rather than Kissinger's and "was recognizable to all as a scheme to continue and expand the war . . . unless the Thieu government were maintained indefinitely."

The proposed role of the Thieu regime in a postwar settlement has been the key to Nixon's strategy since taking office. For a settlement based on the Thieu regime, which is essentially a military and police apparatus created by Washington, clearly would not mean the withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam in any meaningful sense. That is why such a settlement is unacceptable to the Vietnamese and why—once Nixon committed himself to it—the escalation of the war became inevitable. Insofar as the Soviet Union and China are now urging the Vietnamese to come to terms with the Nixon government, as various reports indicate, they are in fact urging the Vietnamese to accomodate themselves to Nixon's fundamental goal, the maintenance of the Thieu dictatorship. This amounts to urging the Vietnamese to accept a veiled surrender of the chief goal of their twenty-five year struggle: the liberation of their country from the imperialist powers.

Back in 1969, Nixon laid out a series of eight escalating moves intended to force the Vietnamese into a position where they would be compelled to come to terms or risk an even greater loss on the battlefield. According to Ellsberg, these were:

"First, invade Cambodia; second, 'protective reaction' strikes; third, the Son Tay prisoner-camp raid; fourth, the Laos invasion; fifth, the renewal of the bombing; sixth, the mining of Haiphong; seventh, the naval blockade; and eighth, the unrestricted bombing in which we are now engaged."

(According to Ellsberg, the Soviet Union was informed in 1970 that, if the Vietnamese did not come to terms with Nixon, the harbors would be mined in 1972.)

It has now come to our attention that, at the same time this plan was being formulated, the RAND Corporation was asked to do an analysis of current options and operations in Vietnam. RAND's analysis was based on conversations with members of the American intelligence community during the week of February 10, 1969. One section of the RAND analysis, "Observations on Hanoi Options" by Stephen T. Hosmer and Konrad Kellen, provides some interesting light on the way Washington perceived the obstacles to its victory scheme.

Of all the options available to the Vietnamese, in the eyes of U.S. intelligence, the one least costly and risky to the Vietnamese themselves, and most laden with potential difficulties for the United States, was the response of their great power allies:

"Perhaps the largest and yet most uncertain range of options for the other side is in motivating—if it can—its allies to heat up elsewhere, partly to divert actual U.S. security forces, partly to frighten or tire out the U.S. public with an even more formidable multiple hydra image. If Moscow or Peking should go along, there is practically no limit as to what escalatory relief they can give to their ally (Mid-East crisis, crisis almost everywhere else, sinking or capturing ships, downing planes, attempted coups, etc., etc., or several such at the same time)."

Those on the left who have resisted the idea that either Russia or China could substantially increase the support they are giving to the Vietnamese should ponder these lines in light of the events of the past eight months. Those who think that any greater exertions by the Communist powers would necessarily risk World War III should ponder what follows:

"All these options could be exercisable well below the threshold of creating a genuine confrontation with the Soviet Union, or in the case of China, providing reason to bomb it."

In short, the "largest" range of options available to the Vietnamese, from the point of view of U.S. intelligence in 1969, was supportive action from the two great power allies of Vietnam, which they could undertake without substantial risk to themselves. (Even if there were such risks, how do they compare with the dangers incurred by a policy of appeasement which whets the appetite of men like Kissinger and Nixon?) Such actions would have been useful not only in diverting the mili-

(Continued on page 64)

David Horowitz is an editor of RAMPARTS. *His most recent book is* Empire and Revolution *(Random House).*

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

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NOTES ON THE NIXON CRISIS:

yankees and cowboys

by carl oglesby



WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

[MCGOVERN IN AUGUST]

I AM WRITING SHORTLY AFTER THE nomination of Nixon. McGovern could hardly look lower. His voice is forced, his popularity is slack, he seems isolated from his own intuition, his supporters worry about not only his chances but his positions, which have faded lately. Countering the standard illusions of standard politics, first he's off to Johnson of the Pedernales, who looks even more like a puppet master now with his Giapetto-like white tonsure curling out over his ears; then on to Daley again, who supports him—"supports"—by putting on his innocent face and saying that he likes all Democrats; then on to such a speech to the American Legion as almost had me wondering why he was for peace at all if it made him feel so ashamed.

What is McGovern's task if not the reduction and confinement of the political power of American militarism? And how can he overcome this power if he does not repeatedly assault and engage it? And how can he engage it if he allows fears of an unsympathetic hearing to make him hide what he's come for?

He would do better reminding himself of the truth as it has been revealed to him—namely, what he feels, others can feel, what he knows, others can learn, what convinces him can convince others. He has no other moral or political duty than to look into his heart and speak. There is no grand political strategy, of whatever brillance, that can suspend that duty. No one thinks it would have been easy for him to go before the Legion and tell them to start believing all of a sudden that the Pentagon will soon be the ruin of us all, but how else are the processes of transformation to be widened and hurried? I still can't believe this Legion speech. He and his staff had more than a month to prepare for this difficult but interesting audience, which might indeed have provided the perfect place for disputing in great detail the Laird-Connally attack on the "white flag" military budget. Instead we got the ritual gestures of campaign patriotism.

Surely McGovern doesn't suppose people miss his drift. There is some prospect in what he proposes of serious interruptions in the routine of American life. The right could rebel. But that possibility is itself a part of the problem McGovern rises to describe and deal with. And what sense is there in persuading yourself, if you have McGovern's job to do, that the people are afraid to hear about this? Or have not themselves felt it coming? Or are less capable than himself, the Kennedys, and the kids of seeing the situation through?



PHOTO BY STEVEN SHAMES/BLACK STAR

Besides which, if he wins, I do not see how he will be able to achieve his policy transformations without the support of an alert, informed, aroused, trusting, comprehending and active democracy willing to play a role in its own defense, if needs arise, against the threats of militarism, national chauvinism, and Pacific imperialism, which McGovern's program puts up against the wall.

I can't imagine what the situation will be like two months from now

Carl Oglesby is the author of Containment and Change *(Macmillan) and a past president of SDS. He is now teaching at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

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when this piece appears. If McGovern has worked off the bewilderment that surprised him after Miami, things could be good again. But if he's still —on whose advice, Mankiewicz?—mincing words and avoiding sharp confrontation on the painful issues, he will have to put on a good scratch just to stay afloat in the party.

[MCGOVERN ON THE WAR]

I think it must naturally appear to common sense that McGovern's policy on the war embodies something like the following propositions:

1. From the U.S. standpoint, it is all right if Southeast Asia now goes communist pretty much en bloc.

2. It is all right if U.S. military forces are retired from this major engagement without having accomplished the mission they were taught to regard as vital, the pacification of the rebellious countryside. In other words, it is all right if the U.S. cannot field a conclusive deterrent to revolution.

3. It is all right if the United States abandons the old white dream of an Oriental empire. It is all right to decelerate the forces of U.S. expansion.

4. It is all right for the U.S. if hypermodern Japan and meta-modern China start getting together, even if at the same time the U.S. is accepting a serious military frustration.

A key question for McGovern then is simply: Why are all these things, which never used to be all right, all right now? And for whom else are they all right? And why?

Radical ideas are often the source of liberal ideas. This observation invites us to pose the question: Supposing that its moral critique of imperialism was more or less complete and sound; what can we say of the new left's practical discussion of imperialism as white experience, as white history, as social reality, as a tangible human problem? And what did the left say about the mechanisms, directions, and prospects of social self-transformation from imperial society to some other less venal kind? In other words, how clear has the anti-imperialist new left itself been on these same four mysteries? For what the left cannot see, the left center certainly cannot explain.

Many RAMPARTS readers are familiar with the influential thesis of American history advanced by William Appleman Williams (as *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*). Boiled down to nearly nothing, as I understand it, the Williams thesis comes to this: The American energies that would otherwise be opposed in social class conflict—i.e., in revolution—are united in the general program of territorial expansion which is the spine of white American history. We meet a more general formulation of this same idea in Guido de Ruggiero's remarkable

George McGovern and Coretta King

1927 synthesis: "If it were necessary to provide conclusive proof that the class struggle has a strictly social and non-political character, and that the political sphere reunites the elements which are divided in society, it would suffice to reflect on the close affinity which connects the plutocratic policy of socialism." (*The History of European Liberalism.*)

Traditional American anti-imperialists have sometimes made nearly the same point. At the turn of the century, for example, the Yale conservative William Graham Sumner led the attack against Square Deal-style imperialism with the argument (it did not prevail) that imperialism implied militarism and militarism would ultimately strangle the democracy. Williams and Ruggiero elaborate the same general observation when they say that the democracy and militarism can co-exist because the naturally antagonistic social classes are united around a meta-project of continual expansion. If there are no wars there must be revolutions. The natural social conflicts which cannot be exported for resolution outside the circle of the larger family, at a mutual profit to family members, must be resolved within it, possibly at mutual loss. In U.S. history, external expansion is the condition of internal class unity. To limit expansion is to limit the basis of unity. Hence the predicament.

Does this *democratic imperialism* not mean in our time: If not China, then Korea, if not Korea, then Vietnam, if not Vietnam, then the war comes home? Is an inverted domino theory not already present in the radical analysis of imperialism?

We recall that the left has been saying of the war: "This is a project of ruthless domination." Only centrism denied this in its incredible tales of North Vietnamese aggression and Saigon patriotism. The right more simply says: "Dominate or submit. Conquer or yield. Only the strong are free."

But this voice was heard in the great war debates of the sixties only seldom and from afar (e.g., Johnson's 1965 speech to the troops when he spoke of the 3½ billion people in the world, 3 billion of whom want what we've got.) Mostly the new left had to argue against the voice of corporate liberalism, which seemed anxious not to confess the American empire's existence. We know now how little American policy depended on whose democracy was more genuine among the Vietnamese, or which of two resistances was not actually an invasion. The war hinged on a conception of American global interests a good deal less sentimental about revolutions and social justice. Speculatively, I would place the imperialist mentality in the following register:

"Indeed it's true," says my make-believe honest imperialist. "We racist, militarist, chauvinist, sexist, imperialist American pigs and paper tigers *do* run, do *profit* from running, and mean to continue to profit from running, a larger and larger lion's share of the world's functioning productive apparatus. And as you anti-imperialists say,

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we thus come to govern the lives of hundreds of millions to whom we are are in no way accountable, and who have no power to affect our lives or decisions.

"We are proud of this, not ashamed. We see America's currently precarious supremacy as a precious achievement.

"We won our Free World Empire—it's free enough at least to our own kind—by many means, not least among them military conquest. We struggle to secure and extend it against adverse powers in the same way. This is not dishonorable; it is what honor is about. The struggle for supremacy among the peoples is a modality of the struggle for survival. It is the only struggle our tradition recognizes as equally binding on all faiths, persuasions, and classes. Our way of life is rooted by its every root in the sovereignty of imperialism, ancient and modern, as the maximum mode of social organization."

Now a Cowboy Pericles interprets the antiwar position: " 'Forget Southeast Asia,' you say, 'forget South Asia next, then Asia as a whole. Permit the humiliation of our nation militarily. Most fatal of all, neglect your white man's sound instinctual apprehensions of a united, rising China.' This kind of advice shows up constantly in our history but never much alters the flow of events. The empire *does* beat down the republic, the strong state *does* surmount the democracy, as though by implacable natural law, and the forcing of the red continent *is* the innermost act of our history—that is, if genocide exceeds slavery as a weapon of development.

"Our European founders took head place at the table of American bounty, never promising regrets for what they might have to do to keep it. Should we blame the past for its daring and repudiate the longest tradition of all? Then where could we call home? Natural and human history alike show the universal necessity of the struggle principle. Have there been no African aggressors, Asian conquerors, Indian empires? Imperialism is merely this necessity expressed as survival."

So the new left rediscovered the empire, hence the logic of imperial consciousness. But we cannot say as confidently that we met and *answered* these arguments or overthrew the worldview circulating within them. Nor did we succeed in showing the way beyond empire from the standpoint of American civilization. We only said—I think very clearly—that empire was bad for the soul, and that to go beyond it, ever, the Cold War would first have to be transcended—"unilaterally," if you please. But McGovern cannot get much practical advice on this from the left. He must find both the "answer"—the plausible description of a way to move politically in these circumstances—and the political correlative of the answer, the social force that can make the answer move in the real world, within the structure of his coalition.

Which brings the discussion of policy to the discussion of the social composition of the Nixon-McGovern confrontation, the subject of the following two sections.

[YANKEES AND COWBOYS]

A recent analysis of the McGovern campaign's temptation of the movement, offered by the *Guardian* (8/23), noted "the necessity to take advantage of every rift and antagonism, however small and vacillating, that exists among the ranks of the bourgeoisie," but con-

(Continued on page 66)

McGOVERN AND THE MILITARY

by richard f. kaufman

MONEY, TO THE MILITARY establishment, is almost everything. The arms race runs on hard cash. The ambitions and perquisites of warlords and bureau chiefs depend upon the lavish use of public funds. The maintenance of unnecessary bases, the extravagant investment in military research and development, the procurement of "gold plated" weapon systems, the provocative and dangerous deployment of tactical nuclear devices, the continued buildup of strategic nuclear overkill capabilities, the fat logistical support tails that combat units drag around, and the top-heavy officer corps are all made possible by excessive defense spending. Slicing this kind of fat from the budget goes beyond the shortsighted objective of getting a bigger-bang-for-the-buck. Fundamental reform of military policy cannot be attained without significant reductions in military spending.

Those who believe that altering underlying assumptions by itself will inevitably lead to change are demonstrably wrong. One example is what happened when the Nixon Administration changed the two-and-a-half war strategy to a one-and-a-half war strategy. The former was once thought to be precisely the kind of basic assumption about military policy that had to be changed if any progress were to be made toward lowering America's belligerency quotient. Under it, contingency plans were prepared to fight simultaneously a major war in Europe, a major war in Asia and a minor war somewhere else. Nixon changed this assumption and adopted a new contingency plan to fight simultaneously only one major war in Europe or Asia, plus a minor war.

But this decision to change underlying assumptions brought virtually no change in the force structure or in spending, despite estimates that had been made by defense analysts show-

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ing such a change could result in savings of $10 billion annually. Military leaders quickly adjusted to the new contingency plan by announcing that they never had the resources to simultaneously fight two-and-a-half wars anyway, and that one-and-a-half wars was about right, given existing budgetary and force levels. One suspects that just about any other change in underlying assumptions, or strategies, or principles could be rationalized away as easily. The articulation of new doctrines by themselves, and without a successful campaign to cut the oversized defense budget, will lead to results that are bound to be equally disappointing.



Military policy after four years of the Nixon Administration is largely a continuation of the ideas, programs and budgets of Curtis LeMay, Robert McNamara and Lyndon Johnson, which is to say that not much has changed in a decade that has seen three Presidents, three Secretaries of Defense and four Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, an argument can be made that not much has changed in U.S. military policy since the end of World War II and that in its essence the Nixon Doctrine is no different from the Truman Doctrine.

Growth, redundancy, containment and intervention are the driving forces behind the official concept of national security and the defense budget. They help satisfy the demands of the military establishment as well as the short term needs of the economy, the claims of the aerospace industry and the requirements of multinational corporations, legitimate defense purposes and cynical political ends. Military policy under Richard Nixon seems to have reached a stage of overmaturation unknown in earlier Cold War periods. Senator George McGovern's proposals to change the defense budget and the structure of military forces should be evaluated from this perspective.

To the Pentagon the seventies promises what must appear to be an era of dynamic growth and political equilibrium. No more are the tensions of the Fifties when an ex-military leader in the White House forced it to live under fixed budget ceilings and turned service against service in sometimes bitter rivalries for missions and dollars. Gone are the tumultuous Sixties when a smart aleck Defense Secretary would challenge military judgments about arms strategy and impose the wills of civilian analysts on professional soldiers. Of course, defense spending rose steadily following the post-Korean dip, regardless of Eisenhower's wishes, and even he could be persuaded to authorize a military foray into Lebanon or a clandestine operation such as the overthrow of Jacob Guzman in Guatemala or preparations for the Bay of Pigs. Nor did the New Frontier mean exactly hard times for the Pentagon and its corporate allies. While Vietnam has damaged military relations with Congress and the public, it has been a classic testing ground for weapons and tactics, an excuse for spending well over $120 billion, a stubborn expression of containment and intervention theories, and deadly proof of the wisdom of balancing nuclear with conventional forces.

Nixon came to power at a critical moment in U.S. history. For the widespread anti-war sentiment and the old promises of a "peace dividend" that was supposed to materialize at the end of the war combined to create fears within the Pentagon of that nearly unmentionable postwar phenomenon called "demobilization." Not since the end of World War II had that dreaded prospect come to pass. After Korea defense spending was reduced by a tolerable 20 percent. The problem for the military in 1969 was to hold the line against demands for sharp cuts and to begin laying the foundations for the long post-Vietnam pull.

One measure of Nixon's success in pulling the Pentagon's chestnuts out of the Vietnam fire is that, as he drives for re-election, he can boast of having wound down the war, although it still rages, and of successfully managing the transition to a peacetime economy, although defense spending is at a wartime rate and has begun to climb steeply. In the quick shuffle the Pentagon gives to defense figures, it can demonstrate with the aid of an exaggerated deflator and some convenient budget categories that, in constant prices, spending has declined since the wartime peak of 1968. What the Pentagon neglects to point out is the intensive, and for the most part successful, struggle that it and the White House conducted to prevent the majority of the cuts urged by congressional critics, and that the official goal is now to increase outlays.

In the nine months from October 1971 through the end of June 1972, military purchases rose from an annual rate of $70.1 billion to $78.6 billion, a hike of $8.5 billion. This spurt confirms the planned increases implicit in the Administration's defense requests of the past two years. The Brookings Institution, on the basis of current spending, forecasts a $100 billion defense budget for 1977, and one estimate made by a high-ranking Pentagon official shows a $112 billion budget by 1980. Adding yet another feather to its military cap, the Administration has managed to negotiate an arms limitation treaty in Moscow at the same time it advocates more arms spending in Washington. The "peace dividend," meanwhile, has almost completely disappeared except perhaps, like the cheshire cat, for the smile that the phrase now evokes. The latest explanation from Defense Secretary Melvin Laird is that the funds that were to be made available for non-military purposes as the war was phased out

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had to be plowed back into the defense budget to pay the increased costs of military manpower. As Laird put it, "Almost the entire so-called peace dividend of Vietnam has been used in the last twenty-four months to pay these labor costs."

A look at the structure of military forces is as revealing as the expenditure levels that support the forces. Strategic nuclear capabilities, under the Nixon Administration, are increasing across the board through quality improvements, known as modernization. The number of land-based and sea-based missiles has not changed since 1968, but substantial improvements in their range and accuracy have been

made or are planned, and through the MIRV program there has been a tremendous expansion in the number of warheads those missiles can carry. Although the number of long-range bombers has declined since 1968, air-to-surface missiles have increased their warhead carrying capacity. The Trident missile submarine and the B-1 bomber are being developed to replace or supplement the existing submarine and bomber fleets.

Conventional forces appear to have been reduced in the past few years but the reductions have been mostly quantitative. Although the Pentagon has not made available current definitive data, there is a high probability that these forces too have been qualitatively upgraded. In his final posture statement, former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara showed the tremendous improvements made during his term of office in the firepower of ground weapons, payload capability of tactical aircraft, amphibious assault capacity and so forth. For example, according to his calculations, while Army light medium tanks were reduced in number, total salvo tons for the tank force increased by 39 percent, total salvo lethal area increased by 81 percent, and total range increased by 88 percent. There can be little doubt that the ability of our forces to kill people in conventional ways has been enhanced in the past four years.

Foreign military aid, not including government cash or commercial sales, has increased from about $3.5 billion in 1968 to an estimated $6 billion for the current year. In 1971 the Administration succeeded in raising the ceiling on arms sales to Latin America from $75 million to $150 million per year, and there is evidence that the government is stepping up its efforts to promote commercial sales of weapons to foreign customers. A Pentagon team was recently dispatched to Iran to demonstrate the virtues of U.S. fighter aircraft and the new "smart-bombs," and negotiations are underway with West Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland for the sale of aircraft and missiles.

In short, current military policy calls for greater expenditures and efforts, and expanded force in almost all areas. In Vietnam we see how the Administration views the correct execution of military policy and the employment of force in the third world, and how closely those practices correspond to Cold War ideology.

McGovern's proposals challenge the continuity of military policy in several vital respects. His alternative posture statement, "Toward a More Secure America," recommends a military budget for 1975 that would cost about one-third less than Nixon's budget for that year, meaning a cut of approximately $30 billion. This plan to scale down the cost and size of the military establishment is, in my view, the most important serious effort to change military policy in 25 years. Secretary Laird's knee-jerk reaction was to accuse McGovern of advocating a "White Flag Surrender Budget," a charge as predictable as it is foolish and untrue. More sympathetic voices, however, have expressed concern that cutting expenditures will not be sufficient to change military policy, that the elimination of fat and waste in the budget may only result in a leaner, tougher Pax Americana, because McGovern's program implicitly accepts the major premises of the arms race.

Such objections may be properly aimed at probing what appears to be the soft underbelly of a reform movement. But they miss the point about the significance of the defense budget, a point that is often missed in the highly intellectualized discussions of military and international affairs. Dollars are central, not incidental, to the military planning process, and to this extent the Pentagon's fears that a McGovern Administration will cut off its water are more realistic than the peace movement's fears that McGovern might sell out.

Ideally, defense cuts should be made in accordance with a rational plan to insure that the cuts will stick, and to lay the basis for possible further changes. McGovern's approach, as reflected in statements he has made up to now, is to place "realistic ceilings" on military spending and to urge specific modifications of the force structure requiring outlays that are within the ceilings. For strategic forces he would put an end to the further accumulation of overkill capabilities by stopping the MIRV program and phasing out of some of our older bombers and land-based missiles. The conversion of Polaris to Poseidon submarines

(Continued on page 48)

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

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HARD TIMES

JAPANESE COLONIALISM IN APPALACHIA

by james ridgeway

ONE MATTER WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON and Premier Tanaka did *not* discuss in Hawaii was the resurgence of Japanese imperialism. Perhaps it is a subject that strikes too close to home—for the Americans as well as the Japanese. For even as the Administration fends off Tokyo's economic incursion at the border, the Japanese are quietly boring from within, establishing the beginnings of a virtual colony in Appalachia.

It is difficult medicine for Americans to swallow—the idea that a foreign power, an Asian one at that, would turn the tables and stake out a resource colony in the American heartland. But that is precisely what is happening in the southern Appalachian mountains. The area contains the world's most valuable coking coals. Japan's dynamic steel industry needs that fuel to continue its expansion. As a result, during the past five years, Japanese trading interests have established their claim on the natural resources of the Southeast. This process has been greatly facilitated by the cooperation of U.S. oil and railroad interests, and the encouragement of such "populist" politicians as George Wallace.

To be sure, certain American interests benefit from the export trade in coal, which produces about $1 billion in revenues annually. Historically, U.S. steel companies have obtained their coking coal from their own "captive" mines, while a few corporations have specialized in selling coking coal abroad to steel mills in Italy, France and West Germany. In recent years, the trade with Japan doubled, then trebled, as the U.S. coal miners labored to produce sufficient supplies of coal to supply the Japanese steel industry.

(The coal export trade is substantial. In 1970, a bumper year, the U.S. exported 70.9 million tons of coal, worth $950.2 million. The largest single customer was Japan, accounting for 38.9 percent of all coal exports, valued at $407.5 million. The second largest customer was Canada, which took 26.3 percent of the coal. Most of that was less expensive utility coal, valued at $197.9 million. In other words, about half the coal export trade went to Japan. The importance of the Japanese markets was even more apparent in 1971, when, because of the slump in the Japanese steel industry, exports fell off by 25 percent, according to preliminary figures.)

This is a special, but important, trade, for not only has it had a growing influence in the economy of Appalachia, but it has also had serious effects on other parts of the U.S. Basically the export coal trade is organized by the railroads, and in particular the Norfolk & Western Railroad.

The N & W is among the most prof-

This article is adapted from The Last Play, *a study of the energy industry, by James Ridgeway, to be published by E. P. Dutton and Co.*

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itable railroads in the country. And through Pocohantas Land Co., a subsidiary, the N & W owns important tracts of coal lands as well. The railroad is prohibited by law from mining the property, so it leases the holdings to coal companies; it then services the mines with its railroad cars. The most important part of its business is hauling coal out of the southern Appalachian triangle to its pier at Norfolk, Va. There the coal lies in an immense rail yard, to be loaded aboard ships for foreign trade.

The other major coal-hauling railroad, the Chesapeake & Ohio, does the same thing, but hauls much less export coal. It also hauls to Norfolk, as well as to Philadelphia, for transhipment abroad. But the N & W has the largest pier facility and does the most business carrying coal to port.

Executives of both these railroads are constantly on the move abroad, attempting to stir up business for their railroads, and for the mines on the railroad property. And in this sense the railroads act as brokers for the Japanese steel industry, putting together deals. They can buy coal for the Japanese, arrange long-term contracts. Sometimes they will blend the coal—that is, mix high quality coal with low quality coal at Norfolk.

While the railroads, on the one hand, have played an important role in tying the southern Appalachian districts to Japan, the Japanese agents themselves are in constant operation throughout Appalachia. Representatives from one or another of the big trading companies visit mines. They go through them, make diagrams, take pictures, meet the employees. Then, with this information in hand, they return to Tokyo to work out a deal.

While it is hard to measure the real impact of the Japanese operations, and unwise to make generalizations about it, it is possible to observe the extent of this business by looking at recent agreements. Consolidation Coal Co., the industry leader, produces about 10 million tons of metallurgical coal a year, and of that total now sells 3.5 million tons to the Japanese steel business. Island Creek, a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum, is building one mine with Japanese financing, and is discussing a second mine in Virginia. The output in both instances would go

Appalachian coal miner

"It is difficult medicine for Americans to swallow—the idea that a foreign power, an Asian one at that, would turn the tables and stake out a resource colony in the American heartland. But that is precisely what is happening. . . ."

WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

President Nixon and Premier Tanaka

". . . the joint U.S.-Japan venture is only feasible because it is profitable. Those profits depend on existing colonial policies which insure that property taxes remain low, safety and health laws remain lax, and labor remains relatively cheap."

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to Japan under long term contracts. The Pittston Co., fourth biggest U.S. coal company, sells two thirds of its production abroad, and of that amount two thirds goes to Japanese steel companies. The Japanese are Pittston's biggest single buyer. Eastern Gas & Fuel, another major coal company, sells large quantities of coal abroad to the Japanese. In Alabama, U.S. Pipe & Foundry, a subsidiary of Jim Walters Corp., struck a deal to sell the Japanese large amounts of coking coal over a long term. George Wallace provided backing in the form of legislation to deepen the Mobile port so that the coal could be moved out.

Alabama has steadily increased shipments of its low sulphur metallurgical coal abroad. In 1970, 1.2 million tons were sold abroad, a 20-fold increase over the tonnage shipped during the 1960s. Coal executives were predicting sales might exceed 10 million tons by 1975. With some grades of coal selling for $21 a ton in Japan, compared to $9 a ton in the U.S., coal executives in Alabama were all aglow at the prospect of more Japanese business. President Nixon came down in the spring of 1971 to dedicate a proposed waterway linking the Tombigbee and Tennessee Rivers. Rivers now link the Mobile port with Alabama coal fields, but if this new quarter of a billion dollar project is completed, Mobile could also serve coal fields of Tennessee and Kentucky.

The influence of the Japanese business is difficult to gauge because of its subtlety. For example, TVA, which during 1970—the year of growing Japanese imports—was pushed hard to find sufficient supplies of coal, lost one of its suppliers because the Japanese had persuaded the company to drop the public power system and, primed with cheap financing, redirect its mining operations to the Japanese markets. Part of the difficulty for utilities in obtaining coal during 1970 was a shortage of railroad cars. On investigation it was discovered that thousands of cars were sitting on the sidings at Norfolk, waiting for the Japanese ships to come in and take off the coal. Those cars could have been used to haul coal from Appalachia to utilities desperate for fuel. In that same year, some coal companies did not meet their contract requirements with electrical utilities; because the export market was more profitable, they directed their activities at developing mines for those markets.

In early 1972, coal company officials in Virginia glumly speculated on a further slow-down in some mines and possible shutdown in others because of expected continuing declines in the Japanese steel industry.

Meanwhile, the Japanese incursion into Appalachia has other ramifications as well. David Francis, chairman of the Princess Coal Sales Co., Huntington, W. Va., ran up against the ecology movement when he sought to mine coal for the Japanese in 1970. After some initial exploring on the Shavers Fork River, Francis leased what he believed to be valuable coal lands, containing two seams of Sewell coal, and determined to open a mine. As he recalled the situation, "In May of this year [1970], we were approached by representatives of Nippon Steel Co., who expressed an interest in the joint development of large reserves of Sewell coal. When we explained that we had under lease about 100 million tons in 30,000 acres with a railroad there to serve us, they showed immediate interest. As a result of three months of intense discussions and negotiations in early July, we finalized a contract for the development of the Linan area. The Japanese agreed to lend us $1.6 million and we agreed to produce approximately 500,000 tons per year. The Japanese loan was for development of roads, mine sites, purchase of underground equipment, outside conveyor belts, bins, bath houses, etc. The Japanese intent was for us to develop Sewell coal production up to a rate of three to four million tons per year for their account."

Francis went on to recount how he called West Virginia Governor Arch Moore from the Japanese offices in New York to seek his permission for a water pollution permit. The Governor had recently returned from a trip to Japan where he had held talks with the president of Nippon Steel, who, the Governor later assured the press, had assured him the Japanese were anxious to buy up more West Virginia coal.

But because of protests by local ecologists, Francis did not get his pollution permit, and the proposal for the new mine ran down into a bitter local argument among the ecologists, on the one hand, worrying about stream pollution, and Francis, on the other, claiming the new mine would create more jobs for unemployed people. As a result, the mine project was postponed, while Francis appealed the pollution permits through the courts. Through a complicated, generally subtle, shifting of economic forces, the Japanese steel industry could affect the political economy of southern Appalachia.

And there are other dimensions to the Japanese influence in Appalachia. Among the most promising future markets for U.S. coal exports are Brazil and Argentina. In Brazil the steel industry is expected to double capacity by the middle of this decade. Such expansion will mean considerable growth for U.S. coal exports there. While the steel industry in Brazil is owned in the majority by the government, both Japanese and U.S. steel firms have minority interests in steel production. In this instance, U.S. and Japanese steel companies work together to influence the economy of southern Appalachia.

More ironically, U.S. Steel, which has its own captive mines, sold some of that coal to the Japanese in 1971. This seemed a particularly bizarre maneuver, since U.S. Steel coal became Japanese steel, which could compete with U.S. Steel products in American or other foreign markets.

While the U.S. coking coal is considered to be the most valuable in the world, neither the Japanese nor Europeans can afford to use it exclusively. Thus they blend the high quality Appalachian coals with lesser quality materials from western Canada, Australia or even South Africa. Along with southern Appalachia, the coal fields of these countries have been staked out as resource colonies by a handful of U.S.- or British-domiciled international corporations which have agreed to serve Japan.

In the past, Canada imported coal into Ontario from the U.S. Appalachian coal fields. In recent years, Kaiser Industries, encouraged by the Japanese, bought up land in western Canada and is constructing large strip mines whose entire output will be shipped out to Japan. In Australia, Peabody Coal, the second largest U.S. producer, and Utah International, a big U.S. coal and uranium producer,

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together dominate the coal business of Australia.

The alliances created between Japan and the multinational companies, most of them based in the U.S., raises unusual questions. In Appalachia, the joint U.S.-Japanese venture is only feasible because it is profitable. Those profits depend in turn on the skein of existing colonial policies which, throughout Appalachia, ensure that property taxes remain low, safety and health laws remain lax, and hence labor remains relatively cheap. Those policies, the historic cause of poverty in Appalachia, make U.S. coal competitive with the coal mined in South Africa.

There is deeper irony to the situation. U.S. workers in the coal fields are exploited to produce coal which is shipped on to Japan, made into steel and other products, and in that form reimported into the U.S. to undercut more expensive products made by other U.S. workers. In a very real sense, by tolerating the conditions in Appalachia, the U.S. labor movement is cutting its own throat.

In a narrower context, the same companies which are now promoting the energy crisis (i.e. Continental Oil, Occidental Petroleum, etc.) are themselves contributing to that crisis through direct export of fossil fuels, and by directing production away from U.S. markets, where the prices are not judged to be sufficiently high, to more lucrative foreign markets. ●

THE INDONESIAN CONNECTION

by steve weissman

POLITICS, IT IS SAID, MAKES STRANGE bedfellows, and among the strange people George McGovern has found in his bed is a certain Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, former Governor of California, Democratic stalwart, and the man who beat Richard Nixon for office in 1962. A former Muskie supporter, Brown was asked by McGovern to serve as his Western States Campaign Chairman following the Democratic Convention.

Little did McGovern suspect that, in extending the invitation to Brown, he was also bringing into his boudoir a group of people he has sworn to cut off from American support in the event of his election—namely, the military dictators of Indonesia. The latter, it turns out, have employed Brown for four years to represent their interests in the United States. Only recently Brown was in Indonesia on business, and he evidently does not view McGovern's campaign pledge to end U.S. support for military juntas as any threat to his clients. At present, the Indonesian dictatorship receives hundreds of millions of dollars a year in aid from the United States and U.S.-supported international lending agencies.

Brown first joined the generals in 1968, after they had overthrown the tottering nationalist regime of President Sukarno. To consolidate their victory, they incited the massacre of over 300,000 communists, peasants and local Chinese. They then took steps to make Indonesia, in the words of one business magazine, "the major focus of international companies in the less developed world."

From that time Brown's Beverly Hills law firm—Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown and Baerwitz—has provided legal counsel to the generals, and is now on record as a "registered foreign agent" for PERTAMINA, the generals' state-owned oil monopoly, which awards oil concessions to foreign firms. According to one of Brown's law partners, Bernard Elias, the former Governor handles most of the work on the Indonesia account himself.

Former Governor "Pat" Brown

In this role Brown works directly with both General Suharto, the top man in Indonesia's "New Order," and General Ibnu Sutowo, Director-President of PERTAMINA and one of the more successful of Indonesia's new soldier-tycoons. The Indonesian military now runs a vast array of banks, airways, mining companies, plantations, and insurance and trading concerns. In control of Indonesia's richest resource, oil, Sutowo actually pays the expenses of a large part of Indonesia's armed forces. Sutowo was also reported to have played an active role in the bargaining over Vietnam's offshore oil between the Thieu government and the international oil companies.

Brown helps the generals in several ways. Using his wide-ranging contacts, he introduces them to key officials in the American government and in the oil industry. Last year he conducted a group of businessmen on a tour of Indonesia, and his firm regularly sends out letters urging investors to put their money in the new Indonesia. According to his partner Elias, Brown is "enamored with what the generals are trying to do in terms of rectifying the mess Sukarno left." Known for his liberal sympathies, Brown finds the generals "honest and dedicated." Brown is also a director and legal counsel for two business firms involved in Indonesian oil—PERTA, a joint venture with the generals, and the United States International Investment Corporation.

Apparently McGovern knows nothing of the former Governor's links to the Indonesian dictatorship. Sources in Brown's law office knew of "absolutely no talks between Brown and McGovern on the subject of Indonesia." Yet it is now likely that the McGovern campaign chest will benefit from Brown's support through contributions from the executives of two of the California-based oil companies which do business with PERTAMINA —namely Natomas and Standard Oil of California.

What would such support buy? At present, the United States—directly and through the World Bank—provides the Indonesian junta with massive economic and military aid. McGovern's statements about "corrupt military dictators" would seem to signal a possible end to this aid. Yet Brown, who knows both American and Indonesian politics better than most of McGovern's supporters, evidently feels so certain McGovern doesn't mean what he says that on the day of his appointment as Campaign Chairman he flew off to meet with the generals in Djakarta. (AFS) ●

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WOMEN

HEALTH CARE HAS CHANGED radically in the last century, both in quantity and in kind. Seventy years ago, 80 percent of all health workers were doctors, in contrast with 12 percent today. Seventy years ago, roles were limited; today, there are over 375 different occupations in the health field. The number of health workers has also increased dramatically.

But some aspects haven't changed; doctors are still the stars of the show. Their wages, their skills and their prestige are high; 90 percent of them are men. Yet 75 percent of all health workers are women, for much health work reflects traditionally "feminine" functions: nurturing, caring, cooking, educating, cleaning.

The supporting cast of registered and practical nurses, dieticians, technicians, social workers, housekeepers and clerks find that most jobs are dead-end. Such low-paying, semi- and unskilled work has traditionally gone to women, especially Third World women.

There is wage discrimination as well as job discrimination. For example, female practical nurses make an average of $10 per week less than their male colleagues. In only one field are men's and women's salaries equal: medical technology. Throughout the medical system, women can expect less advancement than men. Yet with their numerical supremacy, women health workers are a powerful potential for change. (condensed from *Health/Pac Bulletin,* April 1972.) ●

The work of the Women's News Collective has grown out of a weekly radio program of women's news at KPFA in Berkeley. We welcome contributions.

OFFICIAL STATISTICS SHOW that the divorce rate in the United States is increasing to an incredible degree. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare reports that the rate of divorce is now nearing *half* of the new marriages in a given year.

Ms. Diana Dubroff, a New York lawyer, has proposed divorce insurance. She suggests that people take out divorce insurance when getting their marriage license. Then, "if a divorce occurs, payments from the policy would support the wife and children." And if the marriage survives, the policy could be converted into an educational fund for the children, or even into a regular life insurance policy. (ZNS) ●

JOB BREAKTHROUGHS for women occur in every field. According to a British security expert, a revolution in organized crime is producing a new variety of women gang leaders and urban guerrillas. "We can no longer assume that women are the gentler sex," private detective Peter Hamilton told the annual conference of the Council of International Investigators.

Women have taken leading positions as operators and planners in the underworld organizations of Britain, the United States and Germany. Mr. Hamilton was impressed that women gang bosses do not shrink from violence and added, "Women are among the strongest and most daring members of the Irish Republican Army." ●

LA RAZA UNIDA COMES TOGETHER

by rodrigo reyes

AMONG THOSE WHO WERE PLANNING to attend the first convention of La Raza Unida Party (LARUP) was a certain Ricardo Falcon from Colorado, a member of that state's delegation. On August 3, Falcon, his friend Florenzio Granados, and three others were en route to El Paso—the convention site—when their car's radiator became overheated. They pulled into a small service station in Oro Grande, New Mexico, to let the engine cool. The owner of the station, a man named Perry Brunson, was outraged that they would use his facilities and not make a purchase. He began to shout and Falcon argued back. Moments later Brunson drew a revolver and fired four shots into the unarmed Falcon, who died shortly thereafter. Arrested and charged with manslaughter, Brunson walked away on his own recognizance an hour-and-a-half later. When Falcon's wife, Priscilla, arrived and approached local authorities about the details of her husband's death, she was told she had no right to the information. More than once, officials simply slammed their doors in her face.

Such was the prelude to La Raza Unida's national meeting in El Paso, over Labor Day weekend. The convention, which drew four thousand delegates from seventeen states, established LARUP as an independent political party that will not support or compromise with either the Democratic or Republican parties.

In his key note address, Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales, founder of Colorado's Crusade for Justice, called on the people to stop voting for candidates who grab a taco and *mariachi* band every time election year rolls around and then forget the needs of

Rodrigo Reyes, a free-lance journalist, has been working on "Reflecciones de la Raza," a news program on KPFA-FM, in Berkeley.



PHOTOS BY STEVE RAMIREZ

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

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the Chicano once they get elected. He also warned that "we cannot base our freedom and our liberation on the dollar bill." (The Crusade for Justice is a multi-issue movement which produced *El Plan de Aztlan*, a political statement whose issues closely resembled those adopted as a platform for LARUP).

This theme—that Chicanos cannot trust traditional two-party politics—was sounded over and over in the course of the convention. In the preamble to its constitution, La Raza Unida Party accuses the two-party system of denying participatory democracy to the rank-and-file who support and do most of the work for the parties. LARUP feels that the direction and positions that the two parties take are heavily influenced—if not actually controlled—by the big money contributors who finance their campaigns. Such a system, in La Raza's view, serves only those who control it, while the needs of the people go unmet. The Democratic Party has traditionally received the vote of Chicanos, largely because they have felt they have no other choice. La Raza Unida aims to offer an alternative.

In Crystal City, Texas, where La Raza Unida was born in 1970, it *has* offered an alternative. The party has run candidates for sixteen political offices and has won fifteen of them. Since 1970, LARUP has conducted campaigns in Texas, Colorado, Arizona, California, Illinois, and Michigan. This year, it has entered a candidate, Ramsey Muniz, for Governor of Texas.

For a convention of its size, the El Paso meeting exhibited a high degree of unity. It elected Jose Angel Gutierrez national chairman on its first day. He, like all speakers, emphasized the need for unity: "We dedicated ourselves to the overthrow of oppression, political, financial or human . . . through the unification of Chicanos—young and old, left and right, rich and poor." Other speakers included candidate Muniz and Reies Lopez Tijerina, the controversial founder of the New Mexico *Alianza de los Pueblos Libres,* a movement which seeks to recover land belonging to early New Mexico settlers under Spanish and Mexican land grants. Tijerina stressed the necessity of unity before ideas, leaders, or organizations. He called for an increased awareness of brotherhood among all people. Cesar Chavez, founder of the United Farmworkers Organizing Committee, was initially invited, but his invitation was later withdrawn. Although La Raza Unida supports the struggle of the farmworkers, it strongly disagrees with the endorsement of Sen. George McGovern by UFWOC's leadership.

On its final day, the convention passed by acclamation some thirty-odd resolutions expressing the Party's priorities. These included measures which called for:

Support for neither of two major party candidates for President of the United States;

Support the right to strike and support of the Farmworker's Union;

Immediate withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and Indochina;

Guaranteed annual income;

Responsible support to La Raza women in their struggle for equal rights in all spheres of life;

Chicano community control of law enforcement agencies;

Elimination of U.S. economic and military intervention in Latin America;

Support Puerto Rican Independence;

An end to exploitation of illegal aliens;

Government subsidies to be shared with laborers who work for subsidized farmers;

End of right-to-work laws;

Redistribution of wealth and the break-up of monopolies;

Bi-lingual and bi-cultural education for La Raza throughout the education system;

Increased opportunities for Chicanos in higher education to have greater representation in the professions;

Adequate housing;

Free clinics;

An end to drug traffic in Chicano communities;

Active support of prison reform;

Free legal aid to insure adequate legal representation for La Raza;

Chicanos to serve in judgeships and juries at all levels;

Enforcement of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo;

Honor original Mexican and Spanish land grants;

Community control of social, economic and political institutions—Chicano self-determination.

A congress will be held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in late October to decide on strategy for the implementation of these party priorities. ●

RATES AND PROFITS

AS MOST EVERBODY IN WASHINGTON knows, the function of Nixon's Price Commission is to hold down wages while permitting corporations to increase their rates of profit. That may sound glib and cynical, but despite all the gush from the liberal economists, that's what the price controls come down to. Thus, as the Administration struggled to place controls on wages over $1.90 an hour, the Price Commission was granting one rate hike after another to private utilities which, under the price control program, are now making more money than ever before. Senator Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.) points out that during a three month period this year the Price Commission approved more than $2 billion in rate increases for 110 telephone, gas and electric utilities.

He further points out, "In 1968, net profits of the 100 largest electric utilities, which comprise the Nation's largest industrial group, increased 2.8 percent over the previous year. In 1969 they increased 3.4 percent over 1968. In 1970 the annual increase set a new record, 8.3 percent. Last year the utilities broke that record, increasing net profits by 11.6 percent The industry trade magazine, *Electric Light & Power,* which is the source of these statistics, stated in its June 1972 issue, 'The top 100 electric utilities reported an 11.6 percent increase in net income in 1971, to a record $3.67 billion, up from $3.29 billion from 1970. In total, 78 companies reported income gains, while 21 companies reported lower net incomes in 1971 than in 1970.'" J. R.

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THE RAND PAPERS

Between 1964 and 1969, the RAND Corporation conducted a major study of the National Liberation Front in Vietnam. Called the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project, *this study gathered raw data from more than 2,000 interviews with NLF prisoners, defectors, and refugees from free fire zones. The results were classified.*

In this issue of RAMPARTS, *we are presenting documents of this project—some of them still classified—to the American public for the first time. We are also able to show the hitherto unreported story of the key role which this project played in the escalation of the war in 1965, and in the decision to commit massive numbers of U.S. air and land forces to Vietnam.*

Of the many analyses that came out of the projects, those of RAND project-head Leon Goure in 1965 and 1966 were unique in that they spoke of weaknesses in NLF morale and strongly implied the impending collapse of the Vietnamese resistance. It was Goure's analyses that provided the scientific underpinning for the "light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel mentality" that was so crucial to the escalation of the war and the devastation that followed. In 1966, his work was identified by Carl Rowan as the "study which lies at the heart of President Johnson's strategy."

The implications of the Goure study are profound. For they indicate yet another aspect of that erosion of the democratic decision-making process that has attended every phase of the present conflict. For both the RAND interviews of NLF cadre—the most complete portrait available of the other side in this war—and the reports of Leon Goure, were classified and kept securely within the contract between the war-bent Executive and the private corporation, and thereby unavailable to the American people. (In fact, to this day Goure's reports are unavailable to Congress, which will have to read them in RAMPARTS.)

The problem is made even more poignant when one studies the actual interviews on which Goure's analyses are based. For it is obvious (and has become a source of embarrassment to RAND itself) that Goure has distorted the evidence in a manner that borders on fraud, in order to justify the air war that the Pentagon wanted. When it is realized that the U.S. Air Force is the chief financial supporter of RAND, we have the odor of a national scandal which cries out for investigation.

A second, and related, document which we are featuring in this issue is a memorandum by the head of RAND's Social Science Department, Fred Ikle, which was drawn up for President Nixon in February 1969, and lays down the stages of Nixon's subsequent escalation of the war to its present levels. This memorandum casts a revealing light on the "secret peace plan" which Nixon promised at the time, and since which his Administration has dropped 3,633,000 tons of bombs, or a Hiroshima a week for every week he has been in office. It exemplifies the continuing influence of RAND on the nation's destiny.—THE EDITORS

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BEHIND THE POLICY MAKERS: RAND & THE VIETNAM WAR

1. THE IKLE MEMORANDUM

THE SURROUNDINGS MIGHT AS WELL HAVE BEEN LIFTED from Ian Fleming and Double-O Seven: cold, antiseptic corridors monitored by closed-circuit TV and protected from the ouside world by a small army of full-time guards, the quiet and careful chatter of analysts who, at the sound of footsteps in the hallway, peered outward from behind a wall of locked file cabinets and security-classified vaults, the aura of seasoned detachment which always seems to pervade a gathering of veteran bureaucratic operators—in sum, the model of a modern intelligence agency: the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California.

And in the case of this particular scenario-maker, whose paper was calmly titled "U.S. Responses to Enemy Escalation in Vietnam: A Checklist of Issues," the detachment could not have been more complete. The author was, and still is, a prominent policy consultant, with direct access to important White House decision-makers. His *specialité*, the area in which he had gained his intellectual repute, was the art of diplomacy and negotiation. Yet in this undertaking, he had limited himself to a discussion of American military escalation in Vietnam, and his work was devoid of all but the most cursory diplomatic considerations. Absent, too, was any evaluation of the soundness or humaneness of American policy in the war; gone was any mention of whatever anguish and destruction the war had caused. As had always been the case, there would be no trace of emotion; gone, even, was the perverse sense of excitement which American policymakers of an earlier day had felt as they designed the scenario of escalation. One could not find in this paper any of the sharp and chilling metaphors—the turning of the screw, the tightening of the noose, the orchestrations of brass and violin, the crescendoes of air power—words which the policymakers had used through the mid-sixties to characterize their war against North Vietnam. Now, the options would be clicked off without embellishment:

1) *Bombing in North Vietnam:*
   a) a single strike,
   b) interdiction and close ground support within and a few miles North of the DMZ,
   c) interdiction up to the 19th Parallel; or with 1965/67 target restrictions,
   d) less restricted bombing of North Vietnam, perhaps with mining of Haiphong.
2) *Ground operations immediately North of the DMZ to interfere with an NVA offensive across DMZ.*
3) *Ground operations into* Laos, *single sweep or continuous.*
4) *Ground operations into* Cambodia:
   a) single air strike against enemy bases,
   b) continuous air interdiction as in Laos,
   c) single ground sweep,
   d) continuous ground operations.

Also, the U.S. could increase troop levels substantially (by calling up reserves). An invasion of North Vietnam (say, near Vinh) would then become possible. This build-up would take up to a half a year and is probably less relevant for the time being—except as a deterrent to further enemy escalation. (emphases in original)

All of which, by the way, is quite routine. With some modifications, this is precisely the ladder of escalation which any American official connected with Vietnam had long known would be followed with deepening U.S. involvement in the war, so that by the era of President Nixon—for whose Administration this paper was written—the scenario had become commonplace. What followed this perfunctory listing, however, was of more than passing interest. "To coerce the enemy," the writer noted with adroit ease, "the threat of punitive action is sometimes more effective than the action itself—and cheaper." And what threat would be most effective in deterring or limiting an "enemy" escalation in Vietnam? That was the central question to which the memorandum was addressed, and the analyst's answer was as follows:

One possible step to increase the credibility of this threat (apart from visible military preparations) would be for the U.S. to suspend the Paris talks. *This would make it clear to Hanoi that the United States is not deterred from responding by the fear that Hanoi would walk out of the talks. Because of Hanoi's long-standing position to refuse substantive negotiations while the bombing continued, and because of the eventual success of this position, a U.S. initiative to suspend the talks after an enemy escalation would make the resumption of bombing or another U.S. response a more credible threat.* (emphasis in original)

This was indeed an unusual scenario, one which was far from a commonplace at the time it was written, according to White House officials who served during that period.

David Landau is the author of Kissinger: The Uses of Power *(Houghton Mifflin), the first major work to appear on President Nixon's national security advisor.*

by david landau

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U.S. RESPONSES TO ENEMY ESCALATION IN VIETNAM: A CHECKLIST OF ISSUES

I. THE PROBLEM

The enemy might step up his operations in South Vietnam, by starting another offensive, through the introduction of new types of equipment, or through other forms of attack. The U.S. choice of response ought to be determined in light of several criteria particularly: (1) the desirability of countering the military (and perhaps political) effects of the enemy initiative, either directly, or by coercing the enemy; and (2) the desirability of preserving, or increasing, the overall limitations on the enemy's war effort and the support from his allies.

This memorandum seeks to identify the principal considerations for the U.S. response. It is addressed to the next few months only, assuming more or less the present negotiating position in Paris. . . .

III. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE ENEMY AND U.S. "ESCALATIONS"

The following possible enemy initiatives seem to be of most immediate interest:

(1) a major offensive;

(2) stepped up rocket (or mortar) attacks on cities;

(3) stepped up or particularly dramatic assassinations of U.S. or senior Vietnamese officials;

(4) a major increase in NVA force levels in South Vietnam;

(5) major main force attacks across the DMZ;

(6) introduction of advanced equipment, e.g.: anti-aircraft artillery in South Vietnam, SAM's in the DMZ (to protect a main force offensive), short-range missiles (e.g., to attack Saigon from the Cambodian border), offensive air (e.g., IL-28 against Danang or U.S. bases in Thailand).

For the U.S. response, among available options are the following:

(1) Bombing in North Vietnam:
  (a) a single strike,
  (b) interdiction and close ground support within and a few miles North of the DMZ,
  (c) interdiction up to the 19th Parallel, or with 1965/67 target restrictions,
  (d) less restricted bombing of North Vietnam, perhaps with mining of Haiphong.

(2) Ground operations immediately North of the DMZ to interfere with an NVA offensive across DMZ.

(3) Ground operations into *Laos*, single sweep or continuous.

(4) Operations into *Cambodia:*
  (a) single air strike against enemy bases,
  (b) continuous air interdiction as in Laos,
  (c) single ground sweep,
  (d) continuous ground operations.

Also, the U.S. could increase troop levels substantially (by calling up reserves). An invasion of North Vietnam (say, near Vinh) would then become possible. This build-up would take up to half a year and is probably less relevant for the time being—except as a deterrent to further enemy escalation.

IV. PURPOSES OF U.S. RESPONSE

In determining what response, if any, there should be to enemy initiatives, the following purposes appear relevant:

(a) To counter the direct military effects, if any, of enemy initiatives.

(b) To maintain the morale of U.S. troops, the GVN, RVNAF, and the Vietnamese public.

(c) To coerce the enemy to reverse himself. Coercive action would probably take the form of inflicting costs on the enemy, but might also increase our relative military effectiveness elsewhere—or some combination.

(d) To keep the war limited by maintaining the credibility of U.S. deterrence of still higher enemy efforts.

(e) To prevent a deterioration in (or even improve) our bargaining position. A lack of U.S. response could lead the enemy to expect that the U.S. will tolerate a continuing deterioration of its military position; hence, that concessions in negotiations are unnecessary.

(f) To counter the psychological impetus which might accrue to the enemy's movement and forces should the initiative go unanswered.

V. ISSUES REGARDING THE U.S. RESPONSE

A. Threat Vs. Action, Timing

To coerce an enemy, the threat of punitive action is sometimes more effective than the action itself—and cheaper. However, could the U.S. make a response (such as resumed bombing of the North) any more threatening *after* an enemy escalation than it is today? One possible step to increase the credibility of this threat (apart from visible military preparations) would be for the U.S. to *suspend the Paris talks.* This would make it clear to Hanoi that the United States is not deterred from responding by the fear that Hanoi would walk out of the talks. Because of Hanoi's long standing position to refuse substantive negotiations while the bombing continued, and because of the eventual success of this position, a U.S. initiative to suspend the talks after an enemy escalation would make the resumption of bombing or another U.S. response a more credible threat.

Timing: For enemy initiatives where the decision to start or to stop is followed closely by the completed action, speed in the U.S. response is of value. For instance, in response to rocket attacks, a quick single air strike or suspension of the Paris talks could induce the enemy to stop. But against an enemy escalation that has required long preparation and can be reversed only slowly, the U.S. need not rush a coercive response (though *direct* counteraction in the field may have to come swiftly). The enemy's inability to deescalate rapidly (or to escalate) is particularly important for infiltration.

B. Further Enemy Responses

One lesson of 1965-1968 is that a U.S. capability to inflict substantial costs and hardships on the enemy is not the same as a capability to coerce. Moreover, the upper limit of Soviet aid has, of course, not yet been reached. In the past, stepped up U.S. efforts have been followed by stepped up Soviet aid that left North Vietnam stronger than before.

Massive NVA and VC operations out of *Cambodia* would again raise the question of how the U.S. could inhibit enemy use of this sanctuary. (Of the infiltration into South Vietnam, 35 to 45 percent comes through Cambodia.) For the Cambodian government, the risk of becoming involved in the war must set limits to its permissive attitude toward the Communist forces. However, once the U.S. carries major operations into Cambodia, the Cambodians might obtain Soviet help and collaborate more extensively with North Vietnam.

C. U.S. Costs

Resuming bombing of the North, for example, would add about half a billion dollars and 50 to 250 additional pilot losses per year. Any substantial and continuing increase in costs would run counter to the U.S. objective of making the war more sustainable by reducing casualty and dollar costs. Indeed, Hanoi might want to force the U.S. government into more expensive types of operations.

Stepped up U.S. military activities outside South Vietnam, even though thoroughly provoked, are also likely to exact some diplomatic cost. Even sympathetic governments are to a degree hostage to the sensitized opinions of their own publics on this issue. . . .

Prior to any resumption of bombing, a decision should be made whether to give a full and explicit interpretation of the bombing halt agreement or whether deliberately to leave it vague.

Were bombing to resume, an important question is targeting. While Hanoi would suffer a political setback regardless of targeting, the impression that the same old ladder was being climbed (19th parallel, Chinese border, Hanoi-Haiphong off limits, all military targets), might not be optimal politically in the United States and not optimal coercively to Hanoi.

An important aspect is the relative effectiveness of "tit-for-tat" strikes as against sustained campaigns. The former have greater reversibility, are politically more defensible, and may have substantially the same coercive effect since they imply the threat of sustained bombing.

Closely linked to the last issue is the question of whether, as a relatively permanent posture, the U.S. prefers to be bombing North Vietnam, or not. Even though it is essential to clearly establish that there are limits beyond which Hanoi cannot go without triggering renewed bombing, how sensitive that trigger is depends on whether on balance a bombing or non-bombing posture is preferred. Finally, before resumption of bombing, it may be desirable to consider the degree of success or other conditions that would permit stopping it again . . . .

E. Resuming the Bombing in North Vietnam

The question of whether and under what conditions the U.S. should resume bombing raises in very compelling form the issues briefly outlined earlier.

U.S. political reaction to the resumption of bombing is uncertain at best. The presumption must be that it would be negative, perhaps seriously so. On the other hand, Hanoi has described the bombing cessation to its own people as a great victory; hence, its resumption would be a setback for Hanoi.

Closely tied to these political problems is the agreement reached for the complete bombing halt in October, whose public presentation is vague and general. There is little public awareness that certain actions by the other side might not only be deemed unacceptable by the U.S., but in fact violate an explicit agreement.

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V.C. M&M PROJECT INTERVIEW (EXCERPTS)

One of the most memorable experiences I had in Vietnam was the interviewing (through an interpreter) of a prisoner who had been an education cadre for the NLF. He had been with the Movement since 1948. The interview was conducted in the Spring of 1965 in the CIA-sponsored National Interrogation Center in Saigon, where high level prisoners were brought in from all over the country.

Over the years the memory of this man, whose name I have no record of, has remained vivid. Of the hundreds of interviews which I either participated in or read, this man stands out in my mind as personifying the essence of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. He is particularly representative of the struggle because his home village is in Cu Chi district, an area near Saigon widely known as the birthplace of the southern Movement.

The interview clearly shows my naivete at the time; thanks to this man, I was to become much less so. Years later when I, too, became a prisoner of the American government, the memory of his courage and determination helped me through the days. He certainly was not my enemy; he was my brother.

Cathay J Russo

RAND interview AG 132

How big was your village? How many hamlets were there? How many people lived in your village?
My village has the shape of the letter U. It has 8 hamlets. The population numbered about 4,000.

After you became active in the Front, did you visit your village regularly?
My village is located in a liberated area. There is not a single outpost there anymore; therefore, I could go back to my village very freely. But actually this was a rare occurrence because I visited my village only when I crossed it on my missions. . . .

Do you know how many people in your village have left to work for the Front?
At the present time, almost everybody in the village works for the Front. The villagers remained in the village but their hearts and minds are with the Front.

Do you know how many people in your village have left to work for the ARVN?
A number of young men had left the village a few years ago to do their military service. They had not yet returned. I do not know the exact number of draftees.

When was your village liberated?
In 1960. It still is liberated. Before 1960, about a dozen villagers were away doing their military service and another dozen served in the village militia. Since the liberation of the village, the militiamen have returned to their civilian life among the villagers. Generally speaking, everybody in the village works for the Front.

How was your village defended?
All the villagers took part in the building of the combat village. It had pit traps with bamboo spikes. It had grenade booby traps. It was surrounded by bamboo hedges. The villagers organized watch parties. The Front Main Forces did not stay in the village to defend it. They would stop in the village for one or two days and then would depart. The village was defended by about 20 village guerrillas. Each hamlet had its hamlet guerrilla force too. All the young men in the hamlet joined the hamlet guerrilla force.

Did these guerrillas often engage the ARVN?
The guerrillas fought the ARVN in small engagements whenever the ARVN came to the village. At first when the village was just liberated the ARVN came to the village every one or two months. Now it comes only twice a year.

Before you became active in the Liberation Front, how did you feel about your life?
I was unemployed. I was dissatisfied with my life then.

Even more remarkably, the entire sequence described in the paper was precisely that which the U.S. followed in responding to the North Vietnamese offensive last spring. Late last March, after intelligence reports of a massive North Vietnamese buildup above the 17th Parallel, the American representative in Paris, on orders from the President, walked out of the talks. Then, as the situation grew increasingly critical for the Saigon regime, the U.S. embarked on the standard ladder of escalation: bombing in the North, first above the DMZ and then at Hanoi and Haiphong, the mining of the harbors, and then the attacks on the dikes. (The invasions against Cambodia and Laos, of course, had taken place in 1970 and 1971.)

And yet, most remarkable of all, the memorandum was not dated early 1972, but *February 25, 1969;* it was written, in other words, not at a time when the Paris talks had dragged on for years and still shown little sign of success, but written only a few short weeks after the NLF and Saigon had sent delegations to Paris and had made four-power peace negotiations on Vietnam a reality. And this recommendation to cut off the negotiations in the event of increased "enemy" activity on the battlefield, did not come from some disaffected military official in the bowels of the Pentagon; its origin was the RAND Corporation, and its author was head of RAND's Social Science Department and a leading in-government authority on the Vietnam negotiations, Fred C. Ikle.

Now why, it may be asked, had it come to pass that a student of diplomacy should suggest the conditions under which the Vietnam negotiations might be suspended? Because the larger policy framework on Vietnam had already been defined, and Ikle, like any good RAND consultant, was willing to play servant to the masters of that policy. Nixon Administration leaders had long before ruled out a policy of unilateral withdrawal from the war, and had decided to seek from the leaders in Hanoi some guarantee that they would allow America's client regime in the South to survive for a period of time after the withdrawal took place. After this "face-saving" interval provided by the U.S. position, Hanoi would be given its opportunity to overthrow the government in the South. If the North Vietnamese agreed to negotiate on the basis of this position, a mutual withdrawal would take place and neither side would have to contemplate any escalation in the war. But if North Vietnam refused to accept the American offer of a "good crack" at Saigon some two or three years hence, then mutual escalation would clearly ensue. Because a negotiating position for the United States had already been fixed at a Presidential level, it was to the second contingency, the possible need for escalation, that the Ikle memorandum was addressed, and it was for that reason that an authority on diplomacy wrote a scenario for cutting off the Paris talks and re-escalating the war.

Under these circumstances, Ikle's own view of U.S. bargaining tactics was not an appropriate subject of his paper, which was written "assuming more or less the present negotiating position in Paris." Whether he agreed privately with U.S. strategy in the war was necessarily irrel-

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INTERVIEW (EXCERPTS)

Why were you dissatisfied with your life then? What did you want to do or become?
I felt I was not free living under the GVN. Further, I did not earn enough. My health was very poor. This was why I felt dissatisfied with my life. I wanted to be really free. I wanted to say anything I liked and to go anywhere I liked. I also wanted to end my state of unemployment.

Would you be more specific about your grievances toward the GVN?
For instance, the GVN hunted and arrested innocent villagers and forced them through cruel beatings to admit that they had taken part in political activities. Thus the GVN had a reason to imprison them.

Were you active in the Resistance?
Yes. I was a member of the Youth Group for the Salvation of the Fatherland (Doan Thanh Nien Cuu Quoc). I worked as an office secretary in the executive committee of the village chapter of the Youth Group for the Salvation of the Fatherland.

When did you join the Resistance?
In 1948. At first I worked as an office secretary for the hamlet chapter of the Youth Group working there until 1952 when I went to work for the French. . . .

Why did you leave the Youth Group?
At that time, the French Army came and built an outpost. Whenever the French came into the village they shot anybody they saw. Life was impossible in the village so I requested legal papers and went to work in Saigon.

Were you angry toward the French?
Yes, I was. The village did not belong to the French and nevertheless they came from France to kill our people. That made me resentful toward the French.

Why did you work for the French notwithstanding your resentment?
Because I would have died sooner or later if I remained in my village. Therefore I had to leave my village and look for a job in Saigon. I was out of work and stricken with TB. Therefore I accepted the place of secretary at the quartermaster service of the French Army to pull me out of the difficult situation I was in...

Would you give us a history of French activity in your village?
Before 1952 there was not a single outpost in the area. In early 1952 the French Army came back to operate. They French built outposts and watchtowers along the road. They forced all the civilians to come and settle down near their outposts and watchtowers. Those who had to work in the ricefields had to get authorizations. Those who remained in the villages were killed; therefore, everybody evacuated them. The French Army remained in the area until the armistice. . . .

What were your hopes after the armistice?
After the war, the French Army would leave my country, which would be divided temporarily. I hoped that life would be easier when the country was reunified. That was what I hoped.

Actually I saw that my life was not free; the GVN harassment prevented me from having an easy life. . . .

What did you do from 1954 until you joined the Front?
I lived in my village and grew rice and sugar cane with my family and relatives. In 1957, I went back to Saigon to look for a job. I could not find one, so I returned to my village where I joined the Front...

Before you became active in the Liberation Front, what did you think of the GVN?
I held the GVN responsible for not having observed the Geneva agreements. The agreements called for a general election to reunify the country in two years. While the North was demanding a general election, those in the South who did that were arrested and accused of being Communist. That made me dissatisfied.

Why were you dissatisfied? Did you actually have any adverse experiences?
Around 1955 or 1956 a number of people in my village signed a petition demanding a general election, trade relations with North Vietnam and peace. They were arrested and imprisoned. Some are still in GVN prisons.

What group organized the petition?
I did not sign the petition. The people in my village asked the school teachers to write it and about three to four hundred persons signed it. The school teachers and those who were the first to sign were arrested.

evant to the work he was doing, because, as he well knew, the officials at the top will hear only what they want to hear, and any recommendation from a subordinate, in order to be considered "constructive," must not challenge the assumptions by which policy is made; rather, it must adopt and conform to those assumptions. And what is equally as striking, Ikle and others in his position are willing and content to perform in their roles so long as they retain their inside status, their comfortable privileges in the policymaking world, and their continued access to those in positions of power—they are content whether or not they are in full private accord with what they themselves say to the government. Rather than take risks and challenge the prevailing view, the experienced policy consultant will sooner acclimatize himself to the terms and the language that his superiors have already deemed acceptable. Inevitably, the bizarre duet will play itself out: the people in power will take advice only from individuals who appear to be in basic agreement with them, and the advisors, who are ironically considered to be independent and free-thinking authorities by the people whom they advise, will consciously tailor their own performances in order to set themselves on "safe" ground and insure that they will continue to have an audience at the top. It is a duet whose cadences are intimately familiar to Ikle and the other staff members of the RAND Corporation, which is the most important and powerful consulting firm in the country today.

But it isn't simply a tragic tale of how able intellectuals must prostitute themselves and their talents to get a hearing inside the government. In large measure, Ikle and others at RAND wrote about the war that way *because they saw it that way*. Underlying almost all of RAND's work on the war in the late sixties and early seventies was the unquestioned assumption that the "enemy" in Vietnam would behave just like any other sovereign power at war, that he could be lured by attractive negotiating offers which fell short of his stated position or that, refusing to negotiate, he could be brought to the peace table with the threat and use of force. It was a universal failure to grasp the unique nature of the insurgency in Vietnam. They just would not understand that the leaders in Hanoi, who had been regularly tricked in negotiations with the West, and the fighters in the South, who had little but contempt for the Saigon regime—and far more popular support—would not relinquish their goals either in negotiations or because of threats. Hence, as in the Ikle memorandum, whatever the private differences on specific meaures the analyst might have felt vis-a-vis his patron-saints in Washington, there was fundamental agreement on the basic issue involved: the possibility of taming the Vietnamese insurgency by force. Given the shortage in the United States of reliable and truthful information on the situation in Vietnam, the lack of understanding about the war was explicable enough. But for those who served at the RAND Corporation, there can be little, if any, justification for self-sustaining delusions about the nature of the war. For those at RAND had unparalleled insight into the National Liberation Front and into the character of its struggle against the United States.

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INTERVIEW (EXCERPTS)

Who had the idea of writing that petition? To what organization did he belong?
It was the Movement for the Protection of Peace.

Were they formerly active in the Resistance?
Generally speaking, they were people who had lived in the Resistance areas.

What did you think of the local government officials?
In my opinion they were simply instruments of the central government. The latter was controlled and directed by the Americans who came to South Vietnam with the same purpose as the French before. I have no hatred for the American people. I have as much sympathy for them as for the Vietnamese people. In my opinion, the Americans here are taking the place of the French.

In your opinion, what are the Americans doing in Vietnam? Are they absolutely identical to the French?
In my opinion, yes. But the Americans are much more clever than the French. The French came with their soldiers and their public servants held every position all the way down their administrative ladder. The Americans are much more clever because they use the Vietnamese.

When did you form these opinions?
I had this opinion after I joined the Liberation Front. Before that I resented only the GVN for not having observed the Geneva agreements. The problem about the Americans had not arisen yet.

Why do you think the Americans have the same purpose as the French, i.e., to change Vietnam into a colony?
The purpose of the French was very conspicuous. They wanted to keep Vietnam as their colony. Whether the U.S. is going to change Vietnam into a colony or not is less conspicuous, but one thing is certain—the U.S. is using the GVN to fight against the Front. Concrete evidence can be found in the weapons and aircraft brought into South Vietnam by the Americans to serve their war purposes. the products brought into South Vietnam by the Americans in their so-called assistance program are not given free to the people. In the end the villagers have to pay for their drugs, sugar, pencils, fertilizers, etc. The barbed wire is used to fence the strategic hamlets in which people are miserable. The weapons and ammunition are used to kill Vietnamese. That makes the Americans identical to the French. I am not speaking of the American people, but only of those Americans who come to South Vietnam to nurture an evil dream.

In my opinion, the assistance products should be given free to the people. Only in this case can you speak of sincere assistance.

Recently, concerning the execution of Nguyen Van Troi (a terrorist who attempted to blow up a bridge scheduled to be crossed by Secretary McNamara on his way from the airport), I heard from Radio Hanoi that guerrillas in Venezuela had kidnapped a U.S. colonel named Smolens and had threatened to kill him if Nguyen Van Troi were executed. The U.S. government then ordered the GVN to call off the execution. After the release of Colonel Smolens the U.S. government again ordered the execution of Nguyen Van Troi. This proves the GVN receives orders from the U.S.

The Americans say they come here as advisers, but actually they are commanders. The ARVN unit which captured me was commanded by two Americans.

The above are only a few examples showing that the Americans have the same purpose as the French, but they are much more clever. If the Americans really wanted to build a truly free and unselfish regime in Vietnam, they would not tolerate the killing of civilians, the acute unemployment nor the expansion of prostitution that has taken place since they came here. I have not witnessed any good deeds. All I saw was evil.

Concerning the strategic hamlet program, it is contrary to the aspirations of the country people. The Americans have a direct responsibility in that program with their Staley-Taylor project. The country people really hate to go and live in strategic hamlets. They do not want to leave their houses, their ricefields and their orchards. If they did not comply, they would be arrested and beaten and their houses would be burned down. I have not seen houses being burned down, but I have witnessed the arrests and

2. THE VIET CONG MOTIVATION AND MORALE PROJECT

LAST MARCH, IN A COMPLETELY unpublicized move, RAND, in cooperation with the Advanced Research Projects Agency, made available to the public some 62,000 pages of transcripts containing interviews with NLF prisoners and defectors in South Vietnam. These interviews, supervised by RAND staff members and conducted with the aid of Vietnamese translators, had been taken between 1964 and 1969, and, especially in the early years of the war, supplied Washington policymakers and military officials with irreplaceable information on the structure and operations of the NLF. At RAND, the enterprise was called the Viet-Cong Motivation and Morale Project, or, for short, VC M&M. The interviews themselves are a remarkable collection of testimony by men who have fought in the NLF, an incredibly vivid, frank, funny, sad, often confused and tortured, sometimes tedious, but immensely instructive chronicle of a people at war. No unified picture of the NLF or of the Vietnamese revolution emerges from the body of interviews; unified pictures, after all, are the province of simple-minded historians or of official apologists. At the same time, the interviews shatter the cardboard-figure imagery with which Washington and, following in its footsteps, the American media have depicted the "enemy" in Vietnam.

The cadre of the NLF are not often seen as crass manipulators or as cold-blooded killers by those Vietnamese who talk to us through the interviewers; they are more often seen as heroes and as courageous fighters, adherents to a cause which commands far more respect and authority among the people of South Vietnam than does the regime in Saigon. And the Americans in Vietnam, after their arrival *en masse* in 1965, are shown not to be friends acting nobly and selflessly in the defense of a besieged ally, but rather to be a feared and despised invader whose methods are excessively violent when they are not unmistakeably criminal. So much for generalizations, which are not well suited to the material at hand; the reader will have to see for himself or herself. And yet it is precisely by means of generalization, remarkably distorted and transparent generalization, that RAND communicated the findings of the project to the decision-makers in Washington, and actually assisted high U.S. officials in carrying out a policy that the interviews themselves suggested was fruitless and terribly misguided.

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the beatings. If the Americans were sincere friends of the Vietnamese people they would not tolerate such harm being done to our people. I do not want to see our women sell their bodies to be soiled by the American soldiers. I feel this brings disgrace to our society.

Do you have something to add about the Americans' role in Vietnam? You are reminded that your answers are for purposes of academic research.

I believe your words, but I would tell you everything I did even if you were associated with the government. Please keep in mind that I am speaking of the Americans who come to South Vietnam and not of the entire American people. The Americans are responsible for all killings here. Who are hit by the bullets and the bombs if not the civilians? The Front forces can be seen nowhere and the bullets and bombs kill only civilians. That makes the people hate the Americans. In my opinion, the two sides can fight as fiercely as they like but let them not kill the civilians in the middle.

The aims of the Americans are very nice. They fight for freedom and equality. It is very nice to talk about a free world, but I have not seen any implementation. In fact I notice that the Vietnamese are not free. They are directed by the Americans. If the Americans really wanted to implement freedom they would not meet such strong opposition from the South Vietnamese.

You have mentioned the Venezuela incident. How do you see the world implications of the war in Vietnam?

As I see it, the war in Vietnam cannot be separated from world affairs. There are now many countries around the world which are rising to liberate their peoples as in South Vietnam. They are Venezuela and Algeria, etc. . . . Through their radios the peoples of Venezuela and Algeria learn about what is going on in South Vietnam. They rise to show their unity and sympathy with us. . . .

Describe your youth-proselyting work. What methods did you use to make contact with the youth?

First I would like to elaborate on my answer to your question of yesterday concerning America's role in Vietnam.

1. If the Americans sincerely want to help the Vietnamese, they should find out the aspirations of the entire Vietnamese people and not only of those who work for the GVN. The Vietnamese people want peace and neutrality. They do not want war. But when they make their aspirations known they are inevitably arrested. Why don't the Americans find out their aspirations instead of bringing into this country their bombs and bullets to kill the people and earn their hatred?

2. If the Americans sincerely want to help the Vietnamese people, their advisers should not imitate what the French did before. The prisoners are beaten in the same way as under the French. The Americans should stop that if they do not want to be identified with the French. I myself have been beaten many, many times. The Americans should not close their eyes to such bad treatment as did the French.

3. If the Americans sincerely want to help Vietnam become a prosperous nation, they should help the Vietnamese industries to develop. But they do not. Instead, the great majority of Vietnamese live on agriculture, and what do they get? Their crops are sprayed with chemical poisons by the Americans. According to them, the chemical poisons are to be used only to defoliate the jungle, but I have seen movie pictures taken in My Tho and Ben Tre (Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa provinces) showing crops, coconut trees and bananas destroyed by the chemical poisons. This is proof that the Americans are harming the Vietnamese people. The civilians are innocent people in this war. Why do they have to suffer from the bombs and bullets? Therefore I believe that the Americans who come to Vietnam have the same motives and behavior as the French, but they are much more clever.

Why did the VC start this war? Why do they use terrorism to kill women and children?

This is hard to say. In fact I have never witnessed in my area of operation any terrorism by the VC, any house burning or any killing of women and children. The only killings of women and children I saw were caused by the bombs and bullets of the ARVN under the command of the Americans. This is the truth I want

In April 1964, Frank Collbohm, a co-founder and the president of RAND, held a discussion with Guy Pauker, a specialist in Indonesian affairs and one of RAND's leading authorities on Southeast Asia. We don't pull our weight on Vietnam, Collbohm told Pauker. We should get involved in an issue where so much of the national interest is at stake. As a result, Pauker went to Washington to find out how RAND could assist American policymakers on Vietnam. At the State Department, he talked with William Sullivan, who was then head of the Vietnam Task Force (subsequently, he was Ambassador to Laos). In response to Pauker's inquiry, Sullivan listed a number of areas in which RAND might be helpful, and one of them caught Pauker's ear: Who are the Vietcong and what motivates them? That had an interesting ring to it; and, as luck would have it, the funding for the project came in short order. Across the river, Pauker talked with a friend at the Pentagon, Henry Rowen, who was then John McNaughton's deputy, and director of research in the Office of International Security Affairs. On hearing of the proposal, Rowen immediately promised to arrange for the money and said to Pauker, "Why, what a splendid idea for you to go to Vietnam."

U.S. officials were then interested in the RAND proposal, and would grow increasingly eager about it, because it would give them access to a source of information which they could not otherwise reach: NLF prisoners and defectors. Before the massive introduction of U.S. soldiers and personnel into the war zone, the successive regimes in Saigon had refused to allow Americans to interrogate the men who had been captured or had deserted from the other side. At the same time, Pauker found in the spring of 1964 that Saigon would be willing to permit RAND to conduct its interview project. Those on the RAND staff, after all, did not wear uniforms, and would not be identified as American military officials (an identification that could only have worked to the detriment of the Southern regime); and while RAND, which had been set up by the Air Force in 1947 and had depended entirely on official subsidies ever since, was effectively a government agency, it nonetheless drifted in the half-world of consulting and "management" firms and managed to preserve the aura, if not the reality, of political and intellectual independence. As the unfolding of the project would demonstrate, RAND's lack of epaulets did not inhibit its performance as a military intelligence-gathering operation in South Vietnam.

Though he had initiated the project, Pauker himself was not eager to spend any period of time in Vietnam. He had been there many times before, and his real interest lay in Indonesia. Instead, he left the running of the project to Joseph J. Zasloff, a professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh who was a RAND consultant. A Southeast Asia specialist, Zasloff had taught at university level in South Vietnam; arriving in Saigon in mid-1964, he staffed the new RAND project with many of his former Vietnamese students and associates. And his status in the then-fledgling American enclave in Saigon was extraor-

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INTERVIEW (EXCERPTS)

to unveil to the light of justice and not a biased defense caused by partisanship.

How do you feel about the recent terrorist bombing in Saigon which killed scores of women and children in the street?

I think it is very inhuman of the VC to kill deliberately women and children. But I believe that the bomb must have been placed in some official building or barracks, either GVN or US and that the women and children were not the targets. If a few people get killed from the blast, it is a risk of the war. As an active member of the Liberation Front for many years I have never heard of any Front policy which called for the killing of civilians. The Liberation Front is the benefactor of all the people. However in any war there are innocent victims.

(Note: At this moment the interviewer and the subject had a friendly chat for almost two hours with the purpose of building rapport and confidence. Samples of topics of discussion: the role of the Americans in Vietnam, the American help to Europe, South America and Asia, the civil rights movement, the interest of the American people in what is going on in South Vietnam. The chat proved to be very successful and the subject' attitude changed visibly....)

Describe and explain when, how and why you became active in the Liberation Front.

I became active in the Liberation Front in 1957 for many reasons. The main reason was the numerous injustices of the GVN. The working class composed 90% of the population, but it did not benefit from its work. The people were denied such elementary freedoms as ancestor worship. On the day of worship, people had to ask for a permit and were charged ten piasters. It was the first time in history that people had to pay taxes in order to worship their ancestors. Thus the people were first enslaved by the French and now are enslaved by the Americans. I joined the Liberation Front in order to liberate my people from slavery.

Besides the main reason for my joining the Front there was also a secondary one: I was unemployed because I lived in an unjust regime. I wanted to become active in the Liberation Front in order to have a free life thereafter. . . .

Describe in chronological order your activities in the Front.

I became a cadre at the end of 1957. At first I worked in my village for a few months. There, my mission was to spread the policies of the Front among the villagers. In April of 1958 I left my village to go and work as a clerical secretary at the province committee of the People's Revolutionary Party in Gia Dinh province. It was there, on May 19, 1959, that I was admitted into the ranks of the Party. I was elected to be a secretary because my comrades recognized I had a good educational background. My work consisted of keeping records of the mail and memos. When I still operated in my village, my work was very simple; I received orders and news from the village cadre and spread them to a few other persons. At the time, my village was still under GVN control and I had to work underground. I informed the villagers about such news as a demonstration by the inhabitants of a nearby village demanding a general election and normal trade relations with North Vietnam. I also urged my friends and acquaintances to demand more schools, more fertilizers and more drugs; or to demand a general election and trade relations with North Vietnam; or to demand exemption from the 10 piaster-tax paid on each ancestor worship ceremony. This was called "the struggle for the people's living." I operated only in my hamlet and was called a hamlet cadre. . . .

Where was your area of operation?

In principle it was the Saigon-Gia Dinh area, but in fact I operated only in the two districts—Cu Chi and Binh Tan of Gia Dinh province. Moreover, I operated only in a few villages, mostly in Cu Chi district. At first I was a member of the Youth. Proselyting section; then in early 1963 I was made its chief. . . .

How did you become a Party member?

Before I became a Party member I was told about the aims of the Party by a Party member. Then I volunteered to join the Party. Nobody coerced me into joining. I wrote a request for membership addressed to the Party chapter at the office where I was working and delivered it to the Party member I talked with.

dinarily exalted, one that is quite illustrative of the prominence which RAND commanded inside the decision-making structure. Like all other civilians then in Vietnam, Zasloff had to bear a military rank roughly the equivalent of his civilian status; the rank of each American non-combatant in the country, and that rank alone, determined where he could travel, what means of communication and transportation he would be permitted to use, what his living quarters would be like. (Then, as now, for a civilian to be ostracized by the U.S. military in Vietnam was tantamount to isolation.) Before Zasloff's departure for Saigon, an aide in Rowen's office called RAND and asked what rank the RAND representative in Vietnam should be given. Do the very best you can, it's a difficult project, and the higher we can get, the better, the aide was told. In a short time, the answer arrived from the Pentagon: Zasloff would receive the rank of general. And so on their arrival in Saigon, Zasloff and his young wife moved into a sumptuous villa at 176 Rue Pasteur, a brief walk from the military command down the street. The villa would later serve as the headquarters of a rapidly expanding RAND outpost in Saigon.

The project as originally conceived was supposed to be a simple six-month effort, and in view of the relative absence of a firm Vietnam policy in Washington through most of 1964, the enterprise was laden with few intellectual constraints. More than any other year in the sixties, Vietnam decision making took a back seat to simple inertia, because that was the year in which Lyndon Johnson was still learning to be President; in which he was also waging a campaign for his own re-election, so that any policy moves on his part would merely underscore what had been done in the past. And when the train of decisions began which led directly to the commitments of 1965—including the Tonkin Gulf reprisals and the decision to begin bombing in the North—there did not appear to lie behind these decisions any degree of Presidential forcefulness or determination. It is likely that, during this period, many of the key steps were inspired by those beneath the President—still a cautious mover—rather than being fixed by the President himself. Johnson still had not become the master, properly speaking, of his own policy; he was more tool or instrument than a source of decisive action. Among other things, then, 1964 was a year of considerable bureaucratic independence for those preoccupied with Vietnam, a time at which the so-called "options" were still somewhat open and official attitudes on the war had not yet begun to harden.

That sense of relative independence was strongly reflected in the work of the RAND project. What emerged from more than one hundred interviews with NLF prisoners and defectors was a full-fledged political and military study of the liberation movement in the South, of its strength and its sources of support. Late in 1964, Zasloff, with the aid of Pauker and John C. Donnell, an anthropologist from Temple University, summarized the findings of the project in a paper which stands out even today for its intellectual clarity and brilliance. It is one of the few official documents on the American side of the war to

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Did you know the names of other Parties in the Front?
I knew of the People's Revolutionary Party, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party. The Front grouped under its organizations many religions—Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholics, Buddhists—and other social classes such as students, intellectuals, bourgeois and even those who had cooperated with the GVN.

Did you attend a political training course before being admitted to the Party?
No. I was told about the aims of the Party and its rules by the Party member I talked with.

What did you know about such Communist heroes as Karl Marx?
I have heard about him, but I do not know his biography very well.

Is Karl Marx a primary hero in the Front?
The Front does not glorify him, but he was glorified by the Party.

What about Lenin?
Lenin was a former leader of the Soviet Union.

Were you given lectures about Lenin?
No, but I read about Lenin in magazines and books.

What was in the magazines and books?
I read about the doctrine of Marx and Lenin. I learned that Marx had led the struggle of the proletariat and that during the Soviet Revolution his thoughts were implemented by Lenin. The outcome was Marx-Leninism which is now in realization in all the Communist countries. That is all I know. I do not know their biographies because I worked as an underground cadre and did not have many opportunities to read books and magazines. Those materials were for the Party; in the Front, Marx and Lenin were not mentioned.

Who are the major heroes in the Front? Ho Chi Minh? Mao Tse Tung?
The Front never mentioned Ho Chi Minh or Mao Tse Tung. It mentioned only the Chairman of the Central Office of the Liberation Front, Lawyer Nguyen Huu Tho.

Have you met him?
No, because he worked at the Central Office. But I have seen his picture. . . .

While you were a cadre in your village, how did you spread news and rumors to your acquaintances? Did you tell the same thing to each of them?
At that time I had to work in secrecy and I could not stand up in a rally of people and introduce myself as a cadre. But while chatting I would casually insert some news or I would urge them to struggle for fertilizers or a maternity house. I spoke only to acquaintances and they would relay the word inadvertently to other people.

Did you ever ask your acquaintances to join or to work for the Front?
No, because I took care to hide my status as a cadre. I spread the news and rumors by pretending I had heard them from someone else. . . .

What did you tell them specifically to make them join the Front?
I would tell them about the reasons that led to the creation of the Front. I would show them the need to liberate the people from slavery. I would give evidence that the Americans are replacing the French in South Vietnam. Our country is supposed to be reunified by now, but what happened instead? The Americans brought in Ngo Dinh Diem to wreck the Geneva agreements. The work of liberation cannot be successful with one man, but it would be if everybody from all religions and social strata was unified under the Front. I also told them if they wanted freedom of movement, freedom of speech or freedom of worship, they should join the Front and struggle for them. . . .

In what circumstances were you promoted to be chief of the Youth-Proselyting Section?
I was assigned to the Youth-Proselyting Section in early 1960. At first I was only an apprentice cadre. Then the chief of the section was killed in an ARVN operation in 1960. Another cadre was killed in 1961 or 1962. In 1963 the cadre who was supposed to be the chief was assigned to another field of operation and I was made chief of the section in early 1963.

How many men composed the Youth-Proselyting section at that time?
Four men including myself.

depict the insurgents in the South as an authentic national liberation movement. And the musical-chair succession of regimes in Saigon is said by the study to be a weak, inefficient, corrupt, and brutal source of authority to most of the people living in the South. Even those who defect from the NLF, the RAND authors tell us, "come out primarily for personal reasons rather than as a response to an attractive competitive political appeal from the GVN [Government of Vietnam]." And as for those who enjoyed more popular support, the study asserted that

> *As security in the countryside deteriorated after 1960, and the VC influence spread, those with means fled to the province towns and Saigon, leaving the poorer element as almost the sole dwellers in the countryside. The poor came under the control of the Front, and the war became in a real sense a class war . . . The bulk of [the Front's] ranks is composed of poorer peasants who see the rich as their enemies."*

In a remarkable passage, the authors summed up their view of the NLF as a whole:

> *In their struggle to establish independence, the VC, especially those of an older generation, see themselves as the legitimate rulers of an independent Vietnam. They look upon the Diem regime and its successors as puppets of American imperialism. They certainly do not regard the present war as a struggle between North and South Vietnam, or between Communists and anti-Communists, but as a struggle between the legitimate leaders of an independent Vietnam and usurpers protected by a foreign power.*
>
> *Another fundamental set of goals for which particularly the hardcore VC fight can be summed up under the rubric* social justice. . . . *Our findings give the lie to the old cliché, still frequently intoned by Saigon intellectuals, that all the Southern peasant wants is his* petit lopan de terre et qu'on lui fiche la paix *(little plot of ground and to be left alone). We found in our sample many poor peasants with no formal schooling who were eloquent in the expression of their aspirations for education, economic opportunity, equality and justice for themselves and, especially, for their children. They were equally eloquent in expressing their indignation at the injustices they knew.*

The implications of this study for U.S. policy were little short of devastating. And no less remarkable was the RAND authors' willingness to state their conclusions so bluntly. There was a frankness which would not often be evinced in later RAND studies. Yet U.S. officials did not pay much attention. The writers used their study in briefings at a number of levels in Saigon and Washington. After they reported their findings to Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton, whose office had sponsored the project, McNaughton replied, "If what you say is correct, then we have joined the wrong side." And yet the briefing never went to a higher level. We may presume that McNaughton passed word of the briefing on to his boss, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; yet McNamara never

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INTERVIEW (EXCERPTS)

How did they operate? Describe a typical day of work.

We usually gathered the young men in the hamlet at night and spoke to them about the duty of the young men in time of war. We also organized them into cells of Liberated Youth groups.

How often did you make speeches?

There could be no set pattern. During harvest time or plowing time we could not organize rallies because the young men were busy with their field work. We would gather the people only at leisure time or when no urgent work was being done.

Give some examples of urgent work.

For instance the work of building a combat village. We should talk first with the people before asking them to build the combat village.

What did you do when you were not making speeches?

When not making speeches I would stay among the villagers and help them with their daily work.

How did you prepare your speeches?

It depends on the subject. About the building of a combat village, for instance, I would build my speech around the following lines: The duty of the youth in time of war is to protect their villages, to be in the front lines as models for other people. The main lines of the discussion were then brought before the assembly of young men to be discussed in a free atmosphere. The assembly would discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the combat village. After the matter had been discussed I would make a conclusion based on the decision of the majority. I had a very small part in these rallies. I only suggested the topic for discussion and let the men ask questions of one another. When the decision was reached I would stand up and summarize the views of the majority.

What were some of the other subjects which you discussed?

I campaigned among the youth and exhorted them to volunteer to become soldiers and to build up the strength of the armed forces. I also urged them to take part in civilian work such as the transportation of paddy or ammunition for the armed forces. Those were the only important subjects regarding the young people; particularly important was the problem of joining the armed forces. There was also the subject of exhorting the youth to take part in games, sports or shows . . . .

What are the advantages of a combat village? Did you speak of the same advantages to different villages?

I did not speak to the young men about the advantages of the combat village. They found out by themselves in their discussion that if they wanted a quiet life in their village they should erect fences around their houses and their hamlets. With the fences and the combat trenches the ARVN would be prevented from entering the village and the guerrillas would have opportunities to fight back. Without the fences and the combat trenches the ARVN would be able to go anywhere in the village to arrest and to kill the young men, the guerrillas would have no cover and would not be able to resist the ARVN.

Why were the young men killed or arrested?

It is the truth that the ARVN in my area arrested or killed any young men they saw. Therefore all the young people fled to avoid the ARVN soldiers when they came to the village.

What kind of ARVN soldiers are you speaking of? Militia? Civil Guard? Or regular troops?

Since the villages were liberated the militia and the Civil Guard dared not come. The regular troops came every five or six months. When they came they met only elderly people or young children. All the young men and women had either joined the guerrillas or fled to the fields.

What are the disadvantages of a combat village?

Every combat village has pit traps laid with bamboo spikes, grenades set in booby traps, and high and thick fences. The traps are indicated by signs reading "Danger, Death site" which are taken away when there is an alert. People know all the dangerous places and avoid them. I do not see any other disadvantages.

asked to speak with the RAND analysts, and by the time a written version of their findings had appeared in March 1965, the import of their work had largely been undone by the opening of the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam.

The crucial shifts in U.S. policy in Vietnam, which began with the decision to bomb the North and culminated in the commitment of ground troops early in 1965, were central in fixing the course of RAND's work on Vietnam. No longer would U.S. officials subsidize or tolerate a disquisition of such speculative issues as the political strength of the NLF or the balance of popular forces in Vietnam; for Washington had now decided to *win* the war, and any paper or briefing on Vietnam, in order to get attention or to be "effective," had to conform to the implications of that decision. The NLF was the enemy and the Saigon regime needed to be strengthened; the enemy could be defeated and a viable anti-Communist regime could be established in the South. All of RAND's work on Vietnam after that time had a "how to" orientation about it. Gone was any sense of intelligent probing or questioning; skepticism could not be allowed. And RAND's Vietcong Motivation and Morale Project, which had begun with such lofty objectives, became a prescription for demoralizing and defeating what proved to be an unbeatable foe. As one senior RANDsman recently commented ruefully on the direction of the project after early 1965, "You hire an architect to build a bridge from here to San Francisco. He says it can't be done. So you fire him and get someone else. The question, from the President on down, was 'How do we proceed to *win* this war?' RAND, like everyone else, was in the business of getting things done." And RAND's submission was as willing as it was complete.

After finishing the March 1965 paper, Zasloff and Donnell went back to their campuses, Pauker returned to his Indonesia studies at RAND, and the project should have ended. But another senior RANDsman, having recently become interested in Vietnam, was anxious that the project continue. He was Leon Goure, a veteran Sovietologist and an avid foe of Communism. His parents had left Stalinist Russia when he was a young boy and had settled in Weimar, Germany; and then they had been forced to flee the Nazi holocaust to France, where Leon took his schooling. In the United States, he was the prototypical European intellectual, one whose work was underlaid by an abiding skepticism and hatred for the ideological forces which tore the world asunder in the 1930s. Still, he had made Soviet Russia his life's work, and he was the sort of man who could proclaim with unmistakable disappointment, as he recently said to this writer, that "I waited all my life for Molotov to write his memoirs, and he never did." He had become involved during the early sixties in RAND's vast network of counterinsurgency studies, and in mid-1964, he was part of a three-man team sent by RAND and the Air Force to Vietnam to investigate the subject of reconnaissance and counter-insurgency from the air. On that trip Goure spent six weeks in Vietnam and talked to many high-ranking officers of the South Vietnamese army, including Nguyen

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How was the chief of the Youth-Proselyting section killed?
He was surprised in an ARVN ambush and order to surrender. He refused to surrender and was killed.

How was he surprised in an ambush? What identified him as a VC?
He was carrying a rucksack on his shoulders and that identified him as a VC because civilians did not carry rucksacks. Moreover he fled when ordered to surrender. . . .

How was the second man in the youth section killed?
He was killed by a fragment from an artillery shell which exploded about ten meters from him. He was sleeping at night in the house of a villager and the shell exploded right in front of the house. Two civilians were also injured in the shelling of the village.

Why was the village shelled?
I do not know. But it was not a rare occurrence for villages in that area to be shelled now and then.

How long after he was killed were you promoted to chief of the youth proselyting section?
He was killed around 1961 or 1962 and I was made chief of the section one year later, in early 1963. . . .

Did you give orders to the entire Saigon-Gia Dinh area?
I could not. Nominally my area of operation was the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. In fact, I operated in only a small part of Gia Dinh province.

How did you choose a particular village for your operation? Did you work hand in hand with the troops? Did you base your choice on intelligence reports?
I went to a village whenever my help was needed or when the village was chosen as an experimental place.

When was a village chosen as an experimental place? What kind of programs or solutions did you put to use?
Let us take the example of the Front campaign to persuade the young men to join its armed forces. We would choose a village with a large number of young men who had not joined the armed forces yet. We would come and campaign and learn lessons to be used in other similar villages.

What methods did you use? Leaflets? Loudspeakers?
We used both. We would organize meetings for discussion, stage shows, songs, sports events, e.g. soccer, volley ball, high jump, etc. . . During the discussions, we would suggest the subject of joining the armed forces as an obligation for all young men.

What lessons did you learn from the experiment?
The lessons about the subject of military service have not been compiled yet, but I have noticed some points about that subject.

1/ It was advisable to persuade concurrently all the three categories of persons in a village: the young men, the women and the farmers. (Interviewer's note: make simultaneous propaganda targets of the young men and their parents). If we put emphasis solely on the young men, the following might happen: the young man would be willing to leave for the armed forces, but his parents or his wife would not let him go. It would be easy if all three categories got along.

2/ Our work was much easier in areas where the ARVN often came to hunt young men for their draft. In such areas the young men were easily persuaded to leave for the liberated areas and to join the Army of Liberation.

3/ On the day the young men left for the armed forces we would organize a send-off ceremony in which they were given gifts by the elderly people of the village. Our work did not end with their departure. We still had to persuade the people at home to come to the families whose sons had left and help them with their field work.

4/ Forcing them to leave for the armed forces was not recommended. On the contrary, we should bring up the subject, let them discuss it and let them volunteer to join.

Why did the young men prefer to join the Liberation Front instead of the ARVN?
I do not know, because they did not tell me. But in any war both sides suffer casualties and this war they thought they had a greater chance for survival with the Front. Anyway death in the Front was more glorious.

Cao Ky, the future Premier, then a general in the Air Force. Already a friend of the Air Force and an advocate of air power as a weapon of counterinsurgency—according to his colleagues—Goure became convinced as a result of that trip that the Vietnamese guerilla movement could be destroyed from the air.

While in Vietnam, Goure had also become interested in RAND's ongoing Motivation and Morale Project, with whose findings he would soon take keen issue. Late 1964 was a time of intense speculation and activity in Air Force circles, because it seemed likely that air power would soon come to play a prominent role in the exercise of U.S. policy. There were endless discussions about what effect certain types of air power would have on the insurgent movement, about how reliably bombing and firepower could contain a guerilla force on the ground. It was in such discussions that the continuation of the RAND project under Goure's leadership was sealed. Goure himself describes the genesis of his mission as largely accidental: he says it arose when, on a number of separate occasions, Air Force officials engaged him in conversation on how useful air power might be against the opponent in South Vietnam. Instead of theorizing about it, why not ask the Vietcong, Goure suggested. A fine idea, the Air Force Chief of Intelligence told Goure. We'll have our people out there do it. At which point Goure reminded his listener that U.S. military officials were not permitted access to Vietcong captives and deserters, but that RAND already had authorization to interview captives. The Air Force Chief of Intelligence was impressed, Goure remembers. "By the strings he pulled, he assured continuation of the project."

In procuring the project for Goure, the Air Force had a reasonably decent idea of the results it would yield. RAND's new head of mission in Saigon was an unabashed supporter of the "air war" concept, and even before he held forth at 176 Rue Pasteur, he had earned the affection of many Air Force officials. In this respect, he was even more accommodating than the other Air Force-connected people at RAND. The prevailing RAND view of the ideal air war, enunciated by Frank Collbohm, was that it would be more effective to fight guerillas with slow-flying planes and helicopters, and then to use firepower instead of bombs, rather than bomb indiscriminately and destroy entire villages. Massive bombing, it was thought, would merely galvanize the population on the side of the insurgents and cause the other side to fight harder and more ferociously—much the same effect as the Allied bombing of Nazi Germany in 1944 and 1945. Collbohm himself, in fact, was against bombing of the North, feeling that it could never stop the flow of supplies and that it would only toughen the other side's morale; he was one of the few who were privy in late 1964 to the secret deliberations leading to the decision to bomb the North, and he told this writer recently, "I did everything I could to keep it from starting." Most people at RAND, in fact, had attempted not to be cheerleaders in their relations with the Air Force, and their ideas on the air war posed a small challenge to Air Force thinking. At the same time, virtually all the important peo-

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INTERVIEW (EXCERPTS)

Why do you think it is more glorious to die for the Front than for the GVN?
Because everybody views the ARVN soldier as a traitor serving an illegitimate cause. On the other hand, the Front soldier serves an honorable cause which is to fight for peace, for the liberation of the people, and for the reunification of the country; therefore, it is more glorious to serve in the Front. . . .

Have you heard of the government's Chieu Hoa program?
I have read the leaflets dropped by aircraft.

What did they say?
They coaxed the Front followers to return to the GVN. They said that life with the Front was hard, that the VC lacked food and drink, that we should return to the GVN like birds returning to their nests, that the ralliers would be welcomed and helped to get a job.

What did you think of the leaflets?
I agree that they speak the truth about the hard life with the Front and the comfortable life with the GVN. But you cannot compare the two lives. I had a hard life while in the Front, but I felt happy when I thought of the future freedom of my people. If I left and went to the GVN, my own life would be comfortable but my people would still have a hard life.

What did the people you knew think of the leaflets?
My friends thought as I did. They would have a hard life rather than live in shame. It is a disgrace to live a comfortable life while the people are enslaved. I have not met any ralliers but they must have rallied out of dissatisfaction over some disciplinary measures by the Front. I believe they still have the same view as mine. . . .

When did you last see your wife and children? When do you expect to see them again?
The last time I saw my family was over a year ago when I visited my village during the Lunar New Year of 1964 (February 1964). Now I am a prisoner and it is impossible for me to see my family. My family still does not know about my situation, whether I was killed, captured, or am still living with the Front. I hope to be released and to be able to see my family again. . .

How were you captured? (Fourth session)
I had just arrived in Tan Thanh Dong village to organize a campaign to persuade the young men to join the armed forces. The ARVN came to the village the next morning under the command of two Americans. I was captured during that operation. It was November 19, 1964.

How did they know you were a VC?
Because I was carrying a P.38 pistol and many documents. When they came, I failed in my escape and was caught.

As an expert on youth, what sports did you practice? What sports did you like best?
I was not good at sports. But I played everything in company with other players. In artistic activities I liked singing very much, particularly the chorus together with the young men. I did not act in stage shows. . . . There are also poems which condemn the calamity of war and sing the glory of peace. I like these poems very much.

Could you give us a sample of the poems you like best?
The following is a poem that I like best. I recite it whenever I feel downhearted and it never fails to cheer me up.
(Translation:)

The Disgusting War
War, cease! Peace, reappear!
Let the millions of young trees
sprout their leaves and stretch
their limbs,
Let the barren land turn into
bountiful farmland,
Let the poisoned crop return to
life again;

War, cease! The deadly game!
Let the frightening slaughter vanish,
Let the farmers walk their contented
feet to the paddy field,
Let the paddy ears drink ecstatically the milk of the dew;

ple at RAND supported the fundamental principles of the air war; they were quite happy to see the project continue under Goure's leadership, and frequently praised the quality of his work. It was, after all, RAND's way of staying in the ball game.

Once in Saigon, Goure and his staff began immediately to undo the work of the earliest project members. Most important, the interview questionnaires, which before had focused on all characteristics of the NLF, on strengths as well as on weaknesses, now concentrated almost exclusively on how the insurgents could be most badly hurt: what weapon do you fear the most, what kind of military engagement is particularly demoralizing? This change occurred partly because of the policy pressures generated by the increasingly military nature of U.S. involvement in Vietnam: the military, the air and Pacific commands, would say to Goure, Since we're unauthorized to ask questions of these men, could you find out what is the effect of this or that weapon or bomb? And if there was occasional balking from any of the project members, as there was sometimes from the younger men on the team, then the military would quickly become annoyed and say, Fine, if you people want to be long-hairs, if you want to ask philosophical questions, go ahead. We, of course, are out here to win the war, and if you want to cut any influence you'll help us do just that. RAND, for the most part, was happy to oblige. "We didn't do in-depth studies in the field," Goure recalled to this writer. "We didn't do research studies. You designed the questions to get the needed input."

Yet every bit as central to the change in the approach to the interviews was Goure's unshakable belief that "enemy" morale would deteriorate with increasing applications of force. He would insistently correlate inferiority of fire-power with disintegration of spirit; and where the opponent evidenced remarkable strength and unity, he would instead see the spectre of totalitarianism and harsh discipline. Goure's principal assistant in Vietnam, C. A. H. Thomson, remembers that both men felt Donnell and Zasloff had "romanticized" *kiem-thao*, "criticism/self-criticism" sessions which were a routine for NLF cadres *en marche*. The earlier project leaders had felt the practice contributed greatly to the spirit of the other side's fighting men, that the open discussion of mistakes by members of an NLF unit, and the feelings of comradeship which the discussion fostered, in turn fostered a sense of confidence and inner purpose which any amount of firepower would be hard put to eradicate.

Kiem-thao [the authors wrote] *appears to be an effective means of reducing all kinds of psychological tensions arising in this style of life, so fraught with physical deprivation and focused so intensely on the subordination of the self to the group. Our interviewers commented that it was difficult to bear a grudge against any comrade after these sessions, because open discussion of dissatisfactions and anxieties tended greatly to clear the air.*

Goure and Thomson saw the matter differently. In their confidential memorandum of August 1965, they state:

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War, cease! Let the prisons open
their gates,
Let the sweet hand stroke gently the
young hair,
Let the people live in peace and
abundance,
Let the fresh smile blossom on the
young lips;

War, cease! and Ben Hai River,
Let the millions of hearts know the
joy of reunion,
Let everybody visit all of our
fatherland,
Let the North and South enjoy the
day of Reunification.

What about the stage shows? What are the themes? How are the shows performed?

The shows all take the real facts of life onto the stage. On the subject of persuading the young men to join the armed forces, the show would picture the damage done to the villagers by the ARVN soldiers, e.g. the burning of houses, the pilfering of fruit, vegetables and poultry. This bad behavior sows hatred in the hearts of the young villagers who want to volunteer to fight the plunderers. They ask their fathers and mothers for permission to go and leave their wives and children. The mothers and wives courageously brush aside their love and ask their sons and husbands to join the armed forces. The show would also depict the send-off ceremonies and how the people at home help the families whose sons had left. . . .

Another show is entitled "Whom is this sword going to kill?" A father has a son. The son is unemployed and very sad. A friend who is a GVN spy coaxes him to be one with a salary of 3,000 piasters a month. He was told to return to his village and to help arrest the Front cadres there to get additional rewards. When he returns to his village he is ambushed and killed by a Front cadre. When the father learns about his son's death he whets a sword and swears to kill the murderer. Every day he worships his son's picture. One day both the Front cadre and the GVN spy come to see the father. The old man asks them: "Who killed my son?" The GVN spy points to the Front cadre and tells the circumstances of the killing. The old man raises his sword and prepares to take the life of the cadre but then he stops and asks: "Why did you kill my son.?" The Front cadre tells the story from the beginning. The father turns to the GVN spy and says: "He did not kill my son, you killed him!" Then he kills the GVN spy with the sword.

How did you organize these presentations?

We erected a stage like in the theater houses. But the stage was set on a soccer field. The Propaganda and Indoctrination Section took charge of organizing the representations. The stage shows were held on the occasion of big victories or some other celebrations.

How was the morale of the Front when you first joined the Youth-Proselyting Section and when you were captured? Did it go up or down? Did it change many times?

I am going to speak the truth and not try to give you propaganda. The truth as I see it with my own eyes is that the morale of the Front and the people is always on the rise. The people realize by themselves that the Front has more frequent victories, the number of liberated villages grows larger and larger, the number of ARVN outposts grows smaller and smaller. At first the bombing and strafing of villages caused some worries, but now there is no problem. There is talk among the cadres and among the villagers that the ARVN dares no longer to go into the liberated villages; therefore it has to call in the aircraft. At first the ARVN soldiers came in every month; now they come only once every 6 months. Evidence of the high morale of the people can be found in their enthusiasm to build combat villages, to provide food for the armed forces which pass through their villages.

INTERVIEWER'S COMMENTS. The subject was a high level cadre and he appeared to be well informed. He was very cooperative, particularly after the second session. He seemed honest in spite of the fact that he is strongly indoctrinated. His intelligence is definitely above average. He is very polite and soft spoken and appeared to enjoy the interview, which allowed him to speak to an American.

"Many Viet Cong soldiers, as the interviews indicate, fear to show signs of demoralization since to do so often leads to public criticism of the culprit by the cadres, and can even result in his being sent away for "re-education" or transferred to a distant food-growing area. The majority of the interviewees stated that fear of punishment was an important factor in ensuring compliance of the soliders with the orders of the cadre. In many cases the respondents indicated that this fear was more important in keeping the men in the Viet Cong than political indoctrination.

The interviews, as a unitary body, do not yield any crystal-clear picture on any of these issues. As for *kiem-thao,* some men will say they found it burdensome and embarrassing, the punitive arm of an authoritarian structure, while others will say that it helped them understand more fully their role in the struggle and that it lifted their spirit. And, of course, the interviews cannot be treated as completely truthful even as accounts by individuals; under the stress of war and battle, men will exaggerate certain aspects of their own histories at the expense of other experiences, and will often tell outright lies. But then, if any bias in the interviews can be regarded as authentic, it is the bias toward the NLF, because the men being interrogated are in the hands of the Saigon police, and while there are considerable pressures under the circumstances to lie in favor of the South Vietnamese government and the U.S. war effort, there can be no incentive whatever for the interviewee to praise the NLF. Yet the interviews as a whole present such a vast and often self-contradictory maze of information and perspective that they are compliant material in the hands of one who wishes to make them say what he would like to be said. Zasloff and Donnell used them to demonstrate that the NLF was a strong and popular insurgent force; Goure manipulated them to demonstrate that the other side was quickly crumbling under the pressure of America's mighty military forces. The man who succeeded Goure as the RAND project leader, Col. Bill Jones, said recently of the interviews,

If you wanted me to prove that the VC are going to attack Saigon using hot air balloons, I could probably do it. The major problem in the use of the interview is that you choose to extract those things that catch your eyes; they're easy to find—and legitimate to use.

And that, during a period when the project was at the height of its influence on U.S. policymaking, is precisely what Goure did. Where one interviewee would express fear of B-52s and napalm, where he would invoke an ordinary human emotion, Goure would see the rapid destruction of morale. Praise for the NLF resulted only from excessive indoctrination and fear of NLF reprisal; a good word for Saigon and for the Americans, despite the presence of U.S. intelligence agents and South Vietnamese police, would be treated with complete seriousness. In one passage, from the summary of findings in his classified memorandum of June 1966, Goure stated his principal conclusions, most of which are undercut by the vast majority

(Continued on page 60)

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ZASLOFF, ET.AL., 1965 AND 1968 REPORTS

"Although living conditions are harsh, they do not appear to have lowered Front morale appreciably. In fact, morale seems to have improved over the long run."

"Although their own arms had been improving in quantity and quality, they believed they would overcome ARVN with its superior weapons and its air-power by dint of their higher morale. They said, 'ARVN troops fight as mercenaries and run when the fighting gets hot. We fight for a cause!' "

"We found in our sample many poor peasants with no formal schooling who were eloquent in the expression of their aspiration for education, economic opportunity, equality and justice for themselves and, especially, for their children. They were equally eloquent in expressing their indignation at the injustices they knew.
"The struggle for social justice aims also at putting an end to the abuses by government civilian and military officials. Members of the Front frequently refer to the venality and arrogance of the local government authorities, and compare the latter with the Front cadres whom they regard as honest, self-sacrificing, and gentle in their relations with the population. On the minds of nearly all of the prisoners we interviewed was a desire 'to end brutality.' "

"One aspect of these processes which is striking in both the Chinese and Vietnamese cases is the extent of egalitarianism and fraternity in the armed forces and their impact particularly on a man who has served earlier in the more traditional armed forces of the Chinese Nationalists or, in Vietnam, the ARVN."

"ARVN soldiers are slapped and beaten, particularly by their non-coms, and some of the VC in our sample who had observed such incidents expressed shock at their methods, not only because they affront human dignity but mainly because the VC consider them ineffective when compared with their own methods."

"The VC say, 'When one innocent peasant is killed, ten rise in his place; when ten are killed one hundred will rise up. First the relatives, friends, and neighbors of the victims are outraged; then the anger spreads to neighboring villages.' They further maintain that the liberation youth organization in the village becomes markedly more militant and widely supported by the younger people, and that after a time, recruitment into the VC military units rises commensurately."

"All the VC interviewed wore a high gloss of nationalist idealism over whatever degree of communist ideology they had absorbed. Indeed, the central political theme of this movement, one which the VC preach convincingly to their supporters and the people generally, is that it is a revolution by and for Southerners, with only some welcome assistance from Hanoi."

"The evidence suggests that although casualties may keep a unit out of action for a certain period, they do not seem to affect significantly the VC's faith in ultimate victory. They tend to respond to this situation with the familiar statement that 'the government has airplanes, armored personnel carriers, and better weapons, but ARVN troops fight only for pay. We will beat them because we are fighting for the just cause.' "

[All of the above from: Donnell, J. C., Pauker, G. J., and Zasloff, J. J., "Viet Cong Motivation and Morale in 1964: A Preliminary Report," RM-4507/3-ISA, March 1965, The RAND Corporation.]

"Aware of the potential threat from former members of the Resistance, the Diem government in 1955 embarked on a program designed to identify and control communist enemies. As enforced at the local level, especially in the rural areas, its victims perceived it as a campaign of terror."

"Their knowledge of the fate of Southern cadres between 1954 and 1960 and the ferocity of the present war would probably lead them to expect a blood bath for their Southern supporters if the Saigon government were to gain complete control."

"Their cadres, convinced that any such settlement would be a threat to their lives, might at that point go so far as to disobey Hanoi's instructions."

[Zasloff, J. J., "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The Role of the Southern Viet Minh Cadres," RM-5163-2-ISA/ARPA. The RAND Corporation, May 1968.]

GOURE, ET.AL., 1966 REPORT (EXCERPTS)

"The deployment of U.S. combat forces to Vietnam has radically altered the balance of military power there. It has had an adverse effect on VC morale and expectations of victory."

"The Viet Cong now appear increasingly as ruthless exploiters of the people and as a constant source of danger to them. Control over the villagers is coming more and more to depend on intimidation and terror rather than on persuasion and voluntary cooperation."

"The survey of interviews completed in the spring of 1965 noted that the intensification of Vietnamese government (GVN and U.S.) military activities had had a significant adverse effect on Viet Cong morale, operations, and expectations of victory. The interviews also indicated that the Viet Cong were losing the sympathy of the rural population as a result of their heavy taxation, introduction of a forced draft of villagers for military service, stricter population control measures, and growing insecurity in the villages. These trends have continued, and some have intensified. The interviews of June-December 1965 indicate that the Viet Cong are facing greater military, political, and economic problems, that in the experience of those questioned VC morale has become more brittle, and that the combat effectiveness of some units seems to have declined. The tendency of the rural population to try to disassociate themselves from the Viet Cong has become more pronounced."

"The interviews strongly indicate the need for the earliest possible launching of a major pacification campaign, which would not only demonstrate that the GVN is indeed winning the war, but would also hold out the promise of a return of security to the countryside. Every success in recovering territory should be widely publicized to create the image of a GVN moving ahead to re-establish its control and thus offering hope of a return to peace and security in other areas."

"In the opinion of many interviewees, the increased number of aircraft, especially jet aircraft, has noticeably boosted the offensive power of the GVN and has 'shaken' the self-confidence of the VC soldiers."

"The most noticeable addition to the air threat was the introduction of B-52's into Vietnam. While their main impact has been felt especially in the VC-designated war zones, rumors and stories about them have been circulated among Viet Cong interviewees and refugees reported having actually seen B-52 attacks or having been exposed to them, many more expressed anxiety about the possibility of being attacked by them."

"The devastation caused by B-52 attacks to VC underground structures and to vegetation was reported by interviewees to have made a profound impression on both the VC and the civilian population. Refugees and VC soldiers from areas attacked by B-52's were unanimous in stating that the depth of the bomb craters and the size of the uprooted trees led them to conclude that their shelters and tunnels could not protect them against such attacks."

"Further improvements are needed in the content, responsiveness, and levels of effort of psychological warfare."

"It must also be clearly recognized that the existence of a large number of refugees presents a major opportunity to pacify an important segment of the population and this should be taken into account in designing the program."

"The villagers' reactions to attacks, which often cause more damage and losses to civilians than to the VC, vary with their experiences. Generally, conditions of village life and protracted insecurity appear to have made death a commonplace and to have led the villager to a fatalistic attitude."

"As part of a program to deny food to the VC, and also to control the movement of refugees, it may be desirable to spray, at least selectively, the crops of villages that have been largely or completely abandoned by the inhabitants."

[Goure, L., A.J. Russo and D. Scott, "Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study: June-December 1965," RM-4911-1-ISA/ARPA, June 1966, The RAND Corporation.]

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GOURE-THOMPSON 1965 REPORT (EXCERPTS)

"The available evidence suggests that continuous day and night harassment of the Viet Cong amounts to a form of interdiction, and has a major impact on their morale, combat effectiveness, and rate of defection."

"The interviews strongly suggest that sustained harassment could become a major threat to Viet Cong military effectiveness."

"Time and again the interviewees have expressed a hopelessness caused by what they have come to see as the Viet Cong's inability to overcome the widening weapon gap."

". . . the interviews appear to indicate that the sensitivity of the Viet Cong to intensified GVN and U.S. activities may have increased and that there may exist growing soft spots in Viet Cong morale which, if effectively exploited, could under certain conditions result in desertion and defection on a much larger scale than hitherto, and contribute to a decline in Viet Cong combat effectiveness."

"The interviewees suggest that the Viet Cong tend to rely mainly on shelters for survival in air and artillery attacks. It would seem desirable to use munitions that would tend to deprive them of their faith in the value of their shelters. Some improvement in air munitions may be desirable to increase their effectiveness against troops in shelter or dense jungle. The interviews appear also to indicate that the intensive seeding of suspected areas of Viet Cong concentration and operations with delayed action weapons may be useful to disrupt the activities, movements and operations of Viet Cong forces."

"The frequency, before February 1965, of contemptuous references to low ARVN morale and fighting ability have considerably declined in the more recent interviews."

"According to some interviews the cadres were said to have noted that the attacks on North Vietnam boosted ARVN morale."

"Defoliation was reported to have made operations more difficult, because the Viet Cong have 'lost many places where their troops could hide.' "

"The interviews indicate that intensive crop spraying leads the affected Viet Cong units to increase their demands on the population for food, and may force them to move to a new area. Some units were reported to have gone hungry as a result of the spraying. In other instances, the spraying has forced the population to take refuge in GVN-controlled areas and thus to deprive the Viet Cong of a source of labor and food. Crop spraying seriously aggravates the already difficult food supply problem of the Viet Cong."

"According to many captive and rallied Viet Cong military cadres and soldiers from Main and local Force units who were questioned in various parts of the country, the frequency of moves has a major adverse effect on the soldiers' health, morale, and combat effectiveness."

"Even for Viet Cong with advanced warning ground sweeps aggravate living conditions and increase the frequency of moves."

"The interviewees give the impression that night air and artillery harassment was not sufficiently frequent or intensive to constitute a major problem for the Viet Cong."

"The interviewees suggest the desirability of intensifying night harassment by air as well as artillery bombardment to disrupt Viet Cong movements, and rest, cooking and training activities. They also suggest that at least small bombs should be used in conjunction with flares to force the Viet Cong to take cover or to disperse."

"Thus air attacks deprived them of the opportunity to exploit their successes."

"The interviewees reported that many units became demoralized after suffering losses or defeats."

"The intensification of GVN and U.S. military operations is reported to have had a considerable effect on Viet Cong morale."

"An increasing number of defectors who rallied to the GVN during this spring mentioned air attacks as one of the factors that caused them to defect to the GVN."

"As far as the facts permit, GVN propaganda should stress that the terms of battle in this or that area are turning against the Viet Cong; that the Viet Cong are not able to protect themselves against GVN/U.S. attacks; and that the villagers should therefore do everything they can to reduce the fighting effectiveness of the insurgents, so that the ARVN can take over again."

"The interviews, in our opinion, confirm the importance of interdiction by air and ground harassment, and the need for still greater intensification of such operations. The effects of harassment can be exploited and significantly increased by appropriate psychological warfare programs."

"It is possible that the Viet Cong may not be able to maintain for a long time their present demands on their troops and pressures on the population, especially if these do not result in major military or political successes."

"The villager, the interviews indicate, has become increasingly aware that no area under Viet Cong control can be completely secure from GVN air, artillery or ground attacks. Furthermore, the Viet Cong often try to prevent the population from leaving the attacked villages and thus incur the onus of exposing them to danger. It seems likely that, with or without GVN encouragement, the flow of refugees will increase as the tempo of the war quickens."

"The interviews confirm earlier impressions that GVN air and artillery attacks on villages do not ordinarily have a major adverse effect on the villagers' behavior, even though they may lead to criticism of the government or of the Americans. No interviewee in the sample said he had joined the Viet Cong because of these attacks."

"The inability of the Viet Cong to protect villagers was also said to have an increasingly adverse effect on their attitude toward the Viet Cong and to lead them in some cases to ask the insurgents to leave or to stop shooting."

"Many villagers seem to be resigned to attacks because they appear to be unavoidable in a war, or they express the wish that the government would secure the area quickly so that attacks would no longer be necessary."

"We see what may be the start of a shift in the rural population's attitude from one of relative indifference to increasing resentment of the Viet Cong and preference for the GVN in a number of areas. The popular discontent may spring from a broad change in Viet Cong strategy."

". . . the interviews appear to indicate that some of the fighting men have less confidence in their chance of survival as the war becomes increasingly intense, and many have lost faith in a Viet Cong victory."

". . . there would be great value in increasing as much as possible the Viet Cong impression of the weapons gap. . . ."

". . . the more knowledgeable interviewees indicated an increasing tendency among the villagers to blame the Viet Cong for drawing such attacks upon them, especially when the attacks occurred as a consequence of the presence of Viet Cong units in the villages . . . [and] by their failure to remain concealed."

"This increased economic burden on the population under Viet Cong control appears to have had a significant adverse effect on the morale of Viet Cong soldiers in some units."

"GVN propaganda should exploit the desire of the villager for peace by pointing out that he can help bring the war to an end sooner by providing information to the ARVN rather than to the Viet Cong."

"Our data suggest strongly that there is need for a statement, comprehensible and plausible to reasonably unsophisticated people, about why the United States is making such efforts and spending so much of its resources without an apparent prospect of tangible economic gain."

[Goure, L. and C. A. H. Thomson, "Some Impressions of Viet Cong Vulnerabilities: An Interim Report," RM-4699-ISA/ARPA, August 1965, The RAND Corporation.]

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

LOOKING BACKWARD: RAND AND VIETNAM IN RETROSPECT

by ANTHONY RUSSO

THE WAR IN INDOCHINA PRESENTS A HORRIFYING image to the military-bureaucrat: the image that human spirit can outstrip his machines of war. When a Third World wall poster depicting a militant human face is counterposed to an ad from the electronic warfare magazines, the story is told. Body and spirit versus the bomb is what the Indochina war is all about. Not surprisingly, therefore, a central feature of American war policy in Indochina has been its focus on "the enemy's" morale, from the fighting spirit of the rank-and-file soldier to Hanoi's will to carry on. American generals have puzzled over it and the RAND Corporation has studied it, but neither has been able to really appreciate the spirit of Vietnam's resistance. For to appreciate the phenomenon of Vietnamese revolutionary *élan* is to know the criminal nature of America's aggression in Southeast Asia and the eventual fate of America's imperial mission.

When Maxwell Taylor observed in 1964 that "the Viet Cong units have the recuperative power of the Phoenix," he spoke for many high-level bureaucrats in the Departments of State and Defense. Naturally they were extremely curious about who "these Viet Cong" were. So, after Diem was assassinated, they sent the RAND Corporation to Vietnam to find out. Diem would never authorize American contact with NLF prisoners or defectors (a curious and, perhaps, very telling fact), but after Diem's death, Guy Pauker and Stephen Hosmer of the RAND Corporation were able to go to Saigon and make arrangements for the study of NLF motivation and morale which was to commence in the summer of 1964.

The first phase of the RAND project lasted from summer until year's end. Zasloff and Donnel, the two political scientists who directed the RAND project during that period, came back to report the idealism, commitment and high moral character which they found among the cadres of the NLF. Dissatisfaction with the Zasloff and Donnell team was fairly immediate and precipitated their replacement in January 1965 by Leon Goure and his assistant, Charles Thomson. These two men did their best to discredit the work of Zasloff and Donnell, while completely turning the project around. From then on, project reports spoke highly of the effectiveness of the U.S. military effort (especially the air war, then in its infancy), and gave the indication that there was indeed light at the end of the tunnel. NLF morale, according to the Goure project reports, was falling and villagers were turning against them. These conclusions bore little relationship to the interviews with the NLF cadre, but McNamara, Rostow and LBJ loved it and Goure's project flourished.

I first met Goure at his Pacific Palisades home in February 1965, just before leaving for Saigon. Charles Thomson, a craggy snow-haired man in his 50's, who recruited me to the project, took me to meet him one Saturday afternoon. Goure was warm, affable and very charming. A

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Vietnamese refugee with Anthony Russo

Frank Collbohm (left) and Leon Goure (right)

handsome man, in his forties, graying at the temples, with a Parisian accent, Goure was the stereotypical continental professor. I found him to be very warm and talkative, and the twinkle in his eyes denoted an unmistakable *joie de vivre* (a phrase many used to describe him). I genuinely liked him and looked forward with excitement to working in Saigon with this man of the world. I had no inkling that, later, working under him would become oppressive, anguished labor.

Thomson, on the other hand, had the imperious air of a stern schoolmaster and was clearly chafing at not being number one on the project. He never stood a chance, though; Goure had it all over him as a salesman, which is exactly what the Air Force liked. He sold the air war with more enthusiasm than an auctioneer.

The visit with Goure at his home was the last I saw of him for weeks. He was constantly on the go between Washington, the RAND office in Santa Monica, and the RAND project office in Saigon. Meanwhile, Thomson and I left Santa Monica for Vietnam.

The RAND office in Saigon was housed in a comfortable villa very near downtown Saigon on 176 Rue Pasteur; it was frequently the scene of small, intimate cocktail and dinner parties at which "the situation" was endlessly discussed. Very few Vietnamese attended these functions but most of the higher level American bureaucrats found their way there at one time or another. The social affairs were an integral part of the operation. The RAND villa came to be a prestige stop for American visitors like Henry Kissinger; for high-level Americans it was a curiously in-group place to go. The people who came were the people who "ran" Vietnam. They were the men who were the assistants to the top military and embassy brass. Every phase of the Vietnam War was discussed in great operational detail. The thing I always found interesting was that the Vietnamese were seldom mentioned; it was as though the Americans were not advisers at all, but in direct command. AID ran its economy, the Air Force bombed and sprayed it, the Marine Corps and Army rearranged it, the Embassy conducted constant cable talk with Washington, and Goure sold the air war.

Goure made his pitch via four media: the cocktail/dinner parties at the RAND villa, the briefing circuit, the research memoranda, and the special "quickie" consultation where advice was furnished on the spot.

The research memoranda (RAND's main product) were hastily written promotion pamphlets pushing the Air Force, RAND's main contractor. Three of them appeared between March 1965 and June 1966—the period when the war was being escalated to major proportions. The research memoranda were distributed throughout American military and civilian agencies in Saigon, Honolulu, and Washington—the entire chain of command up to and including Walt Rostow, LBJ's right-hand man. The first Goure report was prepared quickly in March 1965 in order to offset the dovish Zasloff report. It was superseded by a lengthier 94-page version in August 1965. Both research memoranda were exercises in double-think. Goure would use caveats like "the data do not provide information on the war as a whole or allow us to assess how the war is going." But on the very same page he would write,

> *Throughout the year, the VC continued to lose the sympathy of the rural population as a result of their heavy taxation, introduction of a military draft, stricter control measures, and the growing insecurity of life in the village. . . . The intensification of military activities by the GVN and U.S. forces has had an adverse effect on VC morale and combat effectiveness.*

All of this came pretty much off the top of Goure's head.

PHOTOS COURTESY OF ANTHONY RUSSO

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RAND interviewer with Vietnamese refugee



ARVN soldier preparing to interrogate villager



PHOTO BY JAMES PICKERELL/BLACK STAR

". . . the Hanoi regime is perhaps one of the most genuinely popular in the world today. The 20 million North Vietnamese, most of whom live in their agricultural cooperatives, like it there and find the system just and the labor they do rewarding. . . . Without a doubt the greatest source of strength for the Hanoi leadership in its struggle against us has been the morale and motivation of its soldiers . . . the vast bulk of prison statements over the years (over 1000 interviews) in RAND's files show clearly that the VC or NVA soldier has maintained a surprisingly high level of morale throughout, a level of morale not equaled by the Nazi soldiers in World War II or the Chinese soldiers in the Korean War. . . ."

—Konrad Kellen, 1971 and Beyond: The View from Hanoi*

He had done no systematic analysis of the interviews. He would say things like,

> *Control (for the NLF) over the villages is coming more and more to depend on intimidation and terror rather than on persuasion and voluntary cooperation. . . . They tend to be more afraid of VC punishment than of the GVN.*

Such things simply were not true; no systematic analysis of the interviews would support such claims.

The briefing campaigns would usually precede the publication of a research memorandum. Goure would brief the Air Force, the Army, and the Embassy before leaving for Honolulu where he would brief CINCPAC (the Commander in Chief for Pacific Forces); then he would procede to the RAND office in Santa Monica where the briefing would be polished up for the final round in Washington.

I attended only a few of Goure's briefings; they were very much like the television ads in which the physician in a white smock peddles a new brand of toothpaste. Goure would warm up to his audience gradually, having them in the palm of his hand by the end. The military was a sucker for the continental professor talking glibly about how the pressure they were exerting was beating back the "Viet Cong." Goure's briefings on "Viet Cong" morale were largely fiction, but he did a lot for the morale of Air Force brass.

After the briefings military officers would crowd around asking specific questions: "What was the effect of anti-personnel weapons?" "Did the Viet Cong use water buffalo as pack animals?" "What is the best approach to take in psywar?" Goure had an answer for everything or, if not, would promise to get back with material within a week. Goure had a field day with the military because they had no idea what their weapons were doing. The Air Force, for example, expended 90 percent of its ordnance on "targets" that went unobserved; this practice was called "harrassment and interdiction" as opposed to "close air support" where troops were on hand to observe the results. In the person of Goure the RAND Corporation supplied rose-colored glasses to the blind military giant.

Goure's pitch sounded so good that USIS began send-

(Continued on page 52)

* The RAND Corporation, June 1971. (Unclassified and available to the public.)

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WAR IN THE BACK PAGES

BY TOM OLIPHANT

ONCE A MONTH, THE RITUAL BEGINS with a phone call to the Southeast Asia section of the public information office of the Defense Department. Phone, peace, and other freaks would perhaps be interested in the phone number—202-OX7-5331.

Usually, Specialist Bragg answers the phone, but sometimes Major Kane is in. Despite scores of telephone calls, over six months, I've never felt relaxed enough to breach the formality of the ritual long enough to ask these perfectly polite fellows what their first names are.

The question is always the same: Have you got the number yet?

It all starts each month on the tenth, and for as long as two weeks after that, the answer, twice a day, is No, and they never know when they'll have it.

Then one day, anywhere from the tenth to the twenty-fifth of the month, they have it, and after five or, more often, six digits are called out over the telephone wire, the ritual ends until the next month.

Specialist Bragg and Major Kane, at least as far as I know, do not operate the policy game in their wing of the Pentagon. The ritual we go through every month involves another number—the total tonnage of the bombs that have been dropped on Indochina during the previous month.

To those unfamiliar with the ways important official information is dispensed in Washington, the tonnage ritual must appear odd; at least it did to me when I was first exposed to it back in January. It would be natural to assume that, for a number like this, the script would call at least for a news release from some recognizable name in Saigon or Washington, if not for a press conference, complete with charts showing all the latest trends and breaking the number down in every possible way.

But this is the Nixon Administration, and the subject is the Indochina war, or, more specifically, the Indochina air war, so maybe the tonnage ritual isn't that odd after all.

For the simple fact is that, if you want to bury a fact so no one will really pay attention to it, the most effective technique, in Washington as well as in every state house and city hall, is not to announce it. At least 90 percent of every daily newspaper is composed of "information" that has been dispensed at a psuedo-event—a press conference, an official report, or a simple news release. If you don't tell this country's press people about something, the odds are excellent that they won't write about it, at least not regularly, and it is only those things that are written about regularly that make their way into the public consciousness.

All this, of course, is gospel at the White House and Defense Department—hence the tonnage ritual. What it boils down to is this: the United States government does not tell the public what it is doing to Indochina from the air. All it does is add a number once a month to those already on file in the information office, without in any way letting it be known that it is available. If no one bothers to call to get it, and hardly anyone ever does, it doesn't get reported.

As it is, no national newspaper, no broadcast network, and no wire service sends out a story each month that begins: The United States and its allies dropped X thousand tons of bombs on Indochina last month. If I hadn't stumbled into a self-righteously naive reaction to the tonnage ritual in January of this year, there would be no monthly record of "the number" at all in the public press.

Tom Oliphant is Washington correspondent for the Boston Globe.

U.S. warplane beginning bomb run

Vietnam landscape



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And what a meaningless number it is. All it tells you about is Indochina. In the entire history of the overt air war since 1965, there has never been released a number for a month or a year which refers individually to South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.

The number is made even more meaningless, from the standpoint of giving people a regularly available yardstick for measuring the scope and intensity of the bombing, by its monthly "release." The society which gave the world the weekly body count is fully capable of collecting, and indeed it does in fact collect, weekly bomb tonnage statistics—not just by country, but by fighter wing and bomber squadron, and even by type of bomb. Not one of those numbers has ever found its way into print.

To belabor the obvious for a moment, all this happens, or doesn't happen, by design. Ever since Nixon made his first decision on the war early in 1969—namely, not to end it on any but his own terms—the Administration has steadily worked to enhance the secrecy around it, beginning with the post-Inauguration action to classify the annual cost of the war.

That, in turn, suggests a fatal flaw in the great Indochina war cliche mouthed so often by Nixon's minions: to wit, that the American people will accept an indefinite conflict as long as only a handful of Americans are being killed and wounded in it every week. What the Administration at the highest levels really believes is that the great cliche is only accurate as long as hard information about its horrifying, brutal, but de-personalized war is successfully suppressed.

Reduced to a somewhat over-simple sentence, if the air war ever got the kind of saturation coverage the American ground war got—on the tube, in the papers, day in and day out—the apathy Nixon needs so desperately could be transformed.

Time out from loading bombs



That, ultimately, is why only one tonnage number a month is sneaked into the public record. And even that amounts to only one small part of the whole story, for virtually every scrap of useful information about the air war is effectively suppressed.

The entire process begins in that citadel of suppression, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Each day, in what the Defense Department insists is an orgy of openness, the Saigon people will say how many attack sorties (missions by a single plane) have been flown in South Vietnam; and on a monthly basis, sortie figures in the South are available for fixed-wing planes—broken down further into attack and "other combat" (usually a euphemism for B-52s) categories—and helicopters, with sub-totals for attack and combat assault sorties.

But that's it. No tonnage figures, the most graphic of all non-visual descriptions, are given out. Moreover, in its daily announcements, the command in Saigon will not even say where air strikes have occurred, but only that such-and-such an air strike occurred, say, in Military Region I—useless information to a newsman who, for example, might like to check out an area right after an announced bombing raid to investigate the extent of damage to non-combatants and civilian property.

As for the countries to the west, Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pentagon's day-to-day PR man, wrote in a letter to anti-war Rep. Robert L. Leggett (D-Calif.) earlier this year that "air operations in Laos and Cambodia are announced daily in Saigon."

In a sense, he's right, but to see how this policy is carried out you have to read a typical daily announcement, like this one, which may be found in MACV evening press release #70-10, dated March 10 of this year: "Yesterday, U.S. aircraft, including U.S. Air Force B-52s, continued air operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. In addition, U.S. aircraft flew combat missions in support of Royal Laotian forces in Laos. Yesterday, U.S. aircraft, including U.S. Air Force B-52s, continued air operations against enemy forces and their lines of supply and communications in Cambodia."

That's it, two sentences a day, for one of the most brutal military actions in the history of man.

The air war on North Vietnam is far more secret than is generally realized. Let's pass up the "protective reaction" period and move right to the spring of this year, when Nixon ordered resumption of round-the-clock, unlimited bombing of the North.

(Continued on page 62)

PHOTOS BY JUDITH COBURN

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

Moving In

CAPITALIST REALISM BY NORMAN ROCKWELL

FOR YEARS, NORMAN ROCKWELL has been a representative American. His vision of middle America, eternalized on hundreds of *Saturday Evening Post* covers, became as much a part of the temper of the times as old Mail Pouch signs painted on barns. It was America before the apocalypse, America as it would like to see itself: white, middle-class, untouched by carnal or other knowledge, droll and warm-hearted.

He wavered uncertainly between being camp and simply being embarrassing. To be a Rockwell partisan was immediately to mark oneself off as a part of Mencken's boobosie. As America discovered guilt, the painter became identified with the product: a self-righteous old fool whose job it was to create whimsical lies. This was as wrong as the other view, but the art critics went one step further and triumphantly pointed out that the supreme realist cowered in his studio, painting from *photographs*.

Norman Rockwell is having a second coming. A sixty-year retrospective of his paintings is now touring the nation's museums. It is a moveable feast of wonder, wholesomeness and fantasy. There could be no surer sign that the 1960s was merely a brief interlude connecting the '50s and '70s than the Rockwell retrospective. His later work contains attempts at a greater "relevance"; but his is one world where nothing has really changed. Rockwell is Rockwell, possibly the only one who sincerely believes in his vision of things. This retrospective is vintage nostalgia. It holds up a mirror to America; not the America that was, or the America that should have been, but the sugar coating that sweetened the bitter pill.—MARSHALL SINGER

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

Apollo 11 Space Team (detail)

Top of the World

Our Heritage

Abstract and Concrete

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

The Golden Rule

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McGOVERN *(From page 14)*
would be suspended. This would leave us with a strategic force of 200 bombers, 1,000 land-based missiles (a number of them MIRV'd with three warheads per missile) and 24 Polaris and 20 Poseidon submarines (the Poseidon subs have 16 missiles, each MIRV'd with an average of 10 warheads per missile). The Trident program would be limited to research and development and the B-1 bomber would be stopped. Bomber defenses would be reduced by about half. Containing strategic forces at this level would not instantly solve the problem of nuclear overkill, but it would prevent the problem from growing worse and open possibilities for additional restraints.

In the conventional forces category, total manpower would decline from the present level of 2.4 million to 1.7 million; more than half of the U.S. troops in Europe would be brought home, and air wings allocated for a possible war in that area would be substantially reduced. All U.S. troops would be removed from Vietnam, the remainder of Indochina, South Korea and Thailand. Speaking of Asia generally, McGovern has concluded "there is no immediate threat of aggressive military action requiring or justifying the retention of U.S. land forces in the theater." Aircraft carriers would be reduced from 16 to 6 and similar cuts would be made in Navy tactical fighter squadrons and escort ships needed to protect the carriers. Work would be stopped on the F-14 and F-15 fighter programs and fewer submarines would be built than are now planned.

In explaining his proposals, McGovern has stated that they do not require major revisions in American commitments or a major scaling down of real security interests. His program "only changes the manner in which those interests are served, and moves on more practical assessments of when and where U.S. forces might be involved in combat." Critics have seized upon such statements to charge that McGovern offers no alternative to prevailing doctrine. I would argue that, while it is too early to begin looking for the text of the McGovern Doctrine, certain of its characteristics have emerged, and that the choice offered is quite clear.

McGovern is not only the first major presidential candidate to make excessive military spending a campaign issue; he is the first to openly recognize some of the elementary truths about military policy that have been carefully hidden from the American people. His position on ending the war, for instance, is based on the view that it was wrong for us to intervene initially, not merely that the effort is hopeless and it is time to get out, and that in all such disputes the U.S. should seek resolution in the United Nations. He maintains the belief that the purpose of an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union ought to be to



reduce military spending and slow down the arms race. He points out that by exercising restraint we could have prevented both Soviet and U.S. MIRVs, and he rejects the bargaining chip gambit whereby new weapons are built without regard for military requirements so that in future negotiations they can be used to strengthen our bargaining position.

His desire to stop the MIRV program is based on the sound reasoning that, because it was started as a method for penetrating a Russian ABM system that Russia has not built, there is no reason for our going ahead with MIRV. This rationale might be called a variation of the legal maxim that once the reason for a rule disappears the rule ought to disappear: once the military requirement for a weapon disappears the weapon ought to at least be placed in mothballs. Spending billions of dollars on weapons for which there are no military requirements makes us weaker, not stronger. "The plain truth," McGovern has said, "is that the major dangers to American society are not threats from abroad but the deterioration of our own society from within. We have been so obsessed with the fear of international Communism and have spent so much of our energy and resources to feed that fear that we have robbed and weakened our domestic society."

Still, it is wise to reserve a large amount of skepticism for anyone seeking the power of the presidency. Presidents tend to add to our misfortune. It would strain historical and immediate experience to imagine that even a benign and enlightened ruler could unscrew the screwed-up condition of American society or U.S. relations with the rest of the world. It has taken a good deal of courage for a man running for national office to talk about dismantling the military-industrial complex and to put forth proposals for dealing with what Eisenhower termed "the disastrous rise of misplaced power." But already political imperatives are having their effect on McGovern. Israel seems to be receiving greater military commitments from the U.S. through campaign statements made by both presidential candidates than she could through direct negotiations. McGovern may be softening his early hard line towards aerospace companies who might not be able to survive on their own private enterprise during a period of defense cutbacks. Compromises on issues as basic as military commitments and economic conversion could shrink the breathing space and the room for military and social reconstruction that a McGovern Administration now promises.

McGovern no doubt is fully aware of the serious constitutional crisis that faces the American people. As a legislative man he ought to be sensitive to the excess of executive power, the dangers of a new kind of militarism and the necessity for democratizing the national decision-making process. Perhaps this is why he believes the chief test of the next President will be "whether he can stand up to the military—and I don't mean the Russians or the Chinese—I mean our own." But, then, Richard Nixon was once a legislative man himself. ●

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POOR DEREK'S ALMANAC

by derek shearer

YOU DON'T HAVE TO BE A MARXIST to agree that an understanding of economic structure and behavior is important, if you're interested in changing America. It is remarkable how little the schools teach about the subject, even to the point of avoiding the term capitalism for some euphemism such as "the free enterprise system." You would think that capitalism, the name of our economic system, is somehow a dirty word or an ideologically loaded term.

Not calling things by their proper names usually leads to avoiding recognition of basic facts about the U.S. (For example in the military sphere, where the Strategic Air Command proclaims, "Peace is our Profession." And for years, Americans avoided the basic facts about their economic system.

Recently, however, this situation has begun to change significantly. Incisive books and articles on income, ownership, and work have appeared; an organization of radical economists has been founded; and many liberal economists and journalists have begun to concern themselves with basic economic issues.

This work—the understanding of how the American economy actually runs, the consequences, and the possibility of developing new economic structures—provides a base upon which we can build politically.

As a primer on wealth and income in the U.S., a new pamphlet published by the Cambridge Institute is your best bet. Compiled by Nancy Lyons and Letitia Upton, the 30-page booklet is entitled, *Basic Facts: Distribution of Personal Income and Wealth in the United States*. Copies cost $1, plus 20¢ for mailing. (Write: Cambridge Institute, 1878 Mass. Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.)

Another important demystifying work is the new book, *Myth of the Middle Class: Notes on Affluence and Equality* (Liveright), by Richard Parker. The author describes how at least one-third of the population lives in or near poverty, and how 35 million blue-collar workers (who think of themselves as middle-class) enjoy a precarious prosperity based on the installment plan. Parker's book is full of facts and examples useful for pamphlet and poster-making.

Two other slightly heavier books on wealth and income: *Rich Man, Poor Man* (Thomas Y. Crowell, $3.95 paperback) by Herman P. Miller, an economic statistician in the U.S. Bureau of the Census; and *Wealth and Power in America* (Praeger, $2.25 paperback) by Gabriel Kolko.

In addition to these sources, you should look at material on the dynamics of the American economy. Some of the best work is being done by members of the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE), a four-year-old organization of over 1000 economists, economics writers, and community organizers.

For example, the August 1972 issue of URPE's journal, *The Review of Radical Political Economics,* is entirely devoted to articles on Nixon's New Economic Policy. A special Summer issue of the *Review* deals with women's role in the economy. There is also available a 1970 issue on "The Vietnam War and its Impact on the Economy," and a two volume collection of course outlines and suggested readings on such topics as economic history, racism, urban economics, etc.

URPE has chapters on most large campuses and in most areas of the country. Membership, which includes a subscription to the *Review*, costs $15 a year. Individual copies of the *Review* are available, as well as copies of the "Readings in Political Economics." (Write: Union for Radical Political Economics, 2503 Student Activities Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48104.)

The single best introduction to the American economy that I know of is the collection of readings entitled *The Capitalist System* (Prentice Hall paperback), edited by Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich, and Thomas E. Weisskopf. The authors have all been members of the Harvard URPE chapter.

In addition to URPE, there are a few other organizations publishing useful information on economics. Taxation with Representation (Tax Experts Representing the Public Interest), a group based near Washington, D.C., promotes tax reform. The *Taxation with Representation Newsletter* reports on the activity of such groups as the "Tax Advocates," its affiliated public interest tax firm. The monthly newsletter costs $15 a year—student subscriptions $5. (Write: Taxation With Representation, 2369 North Taylor St., Arlington, Virginia, 22207.)

Every month the Labor Research Association publishes *Economic Notes,* an 8-10 page summary of economic events, compiled from business and government publications. The *Notes* is very informative, especially if you don't have the time or the inclination to keep up on daily and weekly publications. Subscriptions cost only $2 a year. (Write: Labor Research Association, 80 East 11th St., New York, N.Y. 10003.)

Finally, there is the new Public Interest Economics Center at 1714 Massachusetts Ave., Washington, D.C. 20036. According to Byron Kennard, the Center's secretary, it acts as a resource on economic information and analysis for citizen groups around the country concerned with issues such as consumer protection, environmental defense, and racial and sexual equality. The Center's director, transportation economist Allen R. Ferguson, was active in the fight against the SST. Write

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or call the Center for more information.

Of course, if you do a fair amount of reading each week, the best sources of up-to-date economic information are the *Wall Street Journal* and *Business Week*. Written for businessmen and government officials, the reporting is straight-forward, in-depth, and usually free of the Chamber of Commerce cant which fills speeches and messages aimed at the general public.

Beyond these periodical sources, it might be worthwhile to check out a few new books in political economics: for example, *Economic Concentration* (Harcourt Brace Janovich) by John M. Blair, former chief economist of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly. Blair was the man-behind-the-scenes in Sen. Kefauver's famous hearings on monopoly in the Fifties. His is one of the definitive works on monopoly and the possibilities for decentralization created by new technologies. Robert Heilbroner, one of the more lucid political economists writing today, has a new book of essays entitled *Between Capitalism and Socialism* (Vintage paperback). Also worth a look: *Modern Capitalism and Other Essays* by Paul M. Sweezy and *The Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism* by Sweezy and Harry Magdoff (Monthly Review Press).

Most of the Sweezy and Magdoff essays appeared first in the magazine *Monthly Review*, which they edit. This independent socialist journal has been appearing since 1949, and if you are not familiar with it, you should pick up a copy. (Subscriptions $7 a year, *Monthly Review*, 116 W. 14th St., New York, N.Y. 10011.) For over two decades now, MR has kept up a sophisticated, yet unshrill, analysis of economic issues from a socialist perspective. ●

News of political work, including publications, films, slide shows, etc., should be addressed to Derek Shearer, RAMPARTS *Magazine, 2054 University Ave., Berkeley, California 94704.*

THE LATE NIGHT SHOW FROM MUNICH: A REVIEW

by peter collier

THE TWENTIETH OLYMPIAD WAS to be an international celebration of peace. The good people of Munich were determined to stage these games so scrupulously that lingering memories of Berlin, 1936, when Hitler's soldier-athletes had tried to emblazon the swastika over the interlocked Olympic rings, would be effaced forever. Then it had been Teutonic gods of war that were being supplicated; but now, thirty-six years later, it was to be the milder dieties of Mt. Olympus, as thousands of the world's greatest athletes gathered in gentle Bavarian surroundings to return the Olympic ideal to German soil. Although competing in futuristic, computerized surroundings, they were to be the very incarnation to an ancient drama: defying gravity, venturing into the unpredictable environment of water, and challenging the iron law of physics with nothing more than grit, muscle and grace, they contended not as nation against nation, or even man against man, but as man against himself, each athlete pushing himself to the breaking point to discover hidden truths about his own and others' humanity.

This—or something like it—was the message of the American Broadcasting Company, which had outbid the other networks to gain rights to the games. It was a message given out repeatedly and in dozens of ways, by several different voices, and from a variety of camera angles and speeds (including commercials with grainy footage of pseudo-athletes in a mime of competition) during the more than sixty hours the Olympics were on the air, not to speak of the weeks when they were still a coming attraction. This would be a modern epic, and it would unfold in unprecedented detail before the wondering eyes of millions of Americans to whom it otherwise would not have been available. For if Munich was to be a showcase for the greatest athletic competition of all time, it was also to be sportscasting's finest hour. For weeks before the nations had even assembled at Olympic Village, ABC was boasting how it would match their verve and daring with an equally dazzling technology and reportage. (The network was a little like the U.S. team itself—so certain of success that it took along three employees whose only job would be to make up daily press releases in Munich showing the ABC landslide in the previous night's Neilsen ratings.)

ABC goes to Munich. It was a collision of the ridiculous with the sublime. But such contrasts between those who compete and those who capitalized on them had long since become an enduring feature of this event. The Games had over the years become a sort of moveable host inhabited by growing numbers of parasites. For what semed like an eternity, 85-year-old millionaire Avery Brundage and the gerontocracy sitting on the International Olympic Committee had capriciously controlled the fortunes of young athletes like jaded Renaissance princes. And for all that had been said about the attempt to make the Berlin Games a eugenics laboratory for the Third Reich, Hitler was hardly the last to inject politics into the Olympics. Especially since the Soviets had burst dramatically into the international sports scene in the fifties, the Games had become a sort of dumb show for the Cold War.

Miraculously, however, the athletes managed every four years somehow to keep some small part of themselves and their art immune from these forces; they managed to retain a vestige of purity and magnanimity although surrounded by cynicisms. Thus it was posible to look forward to the beginning at the Munich Olympiad believing that the Games still had a sort of mystery at their core, and that indeed it was one place where an individual's will and adrenalin might for a brief moment overcome the political world which routinely uses athletes as shabbily as everyone else. In addition, ABC had spent millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours in Munich. Perhaps the network would seize this unparalleled opportunity to cut through all the petty nationalism and breathe some sanity into what had become far closer to the bread and circuses of Rome than the Greek ideal.

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But even before the Arab murderers entered the sanctuary of Olympic Village to slaughter half the Israeli team, it had become clear that television was not going to offer solutions to the difficulties that have plagued the Games; instead it came to exemplify the problem.

From the onset it was clear that ABC's vaunted team of experts had gone to Germany determined to report the happening as if it was all a tedious squabble in a U.N. Security Council meeting. In retrospect it is astonishing that the network was able to assemble a group of reporters so unanimously at odds with what they kept puffing up as the "Olympic ideal." Anchorman Chris Schenkel was the least offensive of the group only because he was farthest from the competition and because there was something almost endearing in his intimidation by the electronic juggernaut he was supposed to control, and in the fact that he seemed never so confident as when announcing station breaks. It was the field men who were in charge of injecting the propaganda into the coverage. Howard Cosell alternated between covering the boxing matches as if he were Edward R. Murrow reporting the Blitz from wartime London, and grilling American athletes and coaches who had "failed" as if they were heretics, and he was leading them through the *auto da fé*. Jim McKay, who habitually referred to the most polished women athletes in the world as "girls," reported on track and field like an aging cheerleader, and the only thing Keith Jackson's coverage of the water sports lacked was the soundtrack from *Victory at Sea*. If anything, the former athletes providing the "inside" dimension were more competent and dignified than the pros, although, even so, one of them managed to refer to a Polish wrestler as a "Polack"; and Erich Segal provided the ultimate absurdity in informal interviewing by trying to talk to distance runners while jogging along bowleggedly beside them, quite out of breath.

ABC never intended to cover what actually happened in Munich; instead they were there to stage a happening of their own. The cameras and commentators were sent to the Games on



STEVIE LIPNEY

an assignment not unlike the one Hitler gave filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl in 1936. They were mandated to record what was to be another athletic summit meeting at which America would inevitably dominate—not to the extent that it had in the past, perhaps (for as one of the U.S. women's swim coaches said in Munich, the rest of the countries have caught up with us in missiles, standard of living, and practically everything else, so why not sports?)—but still come out ahead. Largely ignoring the sports and events where Americans were not expected to do well, they instead positioned their cameras to record the moments of triumph. But instead there was defeat—inexplicable defeat for a nation that has spent a history coping only with victory. And if a note of petulance entered the voices of some of the American athletes, with ABC it became a crescendo of hysteria. For they did not have the option Leni Riefenstahl adopted when things didn't go according to Hitler's plan: scrap the propaganda film and create a work of art. As things went badly for the Americans, ABC's coverage went from propaganda to polemics. The lessons of the bloodshed it covered live and up close were lost on the network itself.

For a while they toyed with voodoo as an explanation; the U.S. "failures" were a sort of hex, a bad athletic karma afflicting the team for reasons that couldn't be fathomed: Eddie Hart and Rey Robinson not getting to their 100 meter heats on time; Cathy Rigby sacrificing her chances for an individual gymnastics medal to aid an already doomed team effort; Jim Ryun tripping near the final lap of his 1500 meter quarter final; Wayne Collett and Vince Matthews being barred from the 1600 meter relay because of the bad posture Avery Brundage decided was a victory stand protest.

Along with this series of inexplicable misfortunes went the network's sudden discovery of politics in the Olympics—not the star-chamber politics that decides which nation "gets" the next Games, or the authoritarian politics of Brundage, which favors allowing racist regimes like South Africa and Rhodesia to compete, and which not only barred Collett and Matthews from the 1600 meter relay but excommunicated them from the Olympics *forever*—but the mundane politics that have come to rule much of the competition itself. Thus Howard Cosell began to rave about bad boxing decisions, even though U.S. boxers got more than their share of good breaks (and one of them, gold medal winner Ray Seales, appeared actually to have lost at least three of his bouts). Keith Jackson kept hammering home the fact that East European countries sent judges to the Schwimmhalle who blatantly favored their own divers (and indeed, they did rig the scoring, but so did the single American judge in the men's platform

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event). And finally, in post-mortemizing on the judging of the gymnastics and wrestling, the ABC consensus was not that some means had to be found to purge such politics from the Games, but that more Americans had to get involved in the international committees appointing the judges, presumably thereby being able to get in on the fix themselves without having to depend on free world allies. The hysteria mounted from day to day until the U.S. basketball team lost its disputed game to the Soviets, when the implied connection between the bad luck of the U.S. competitors and the politics clicked into place: we were being robbed.

If the first casualty of all this was the truth, the second was the athletes themselves. ABC picked up the central hypocrisy of the Games: that the U.S. team is a group of easy-going, talented amateurs making a gutty stand against nations that unloose a legion of driven professionals from behind the Iron Curtain every four years. This was the rationale for an almost xenophobic attitude toward East European athletes. (Even "little" Olga Korbut, the Russian gymnast whom Jim McKay patronized, was de-personalized into a "cute," fey creature somehow not part of the grey menace of the Soviets). For instance, one of the most remarkable achievements of the Games, the Russian Nikolai Avilov's performance in the decathlon, was downplayed; when it became clear that he might break the record in the last of his ten events but that no U.S. competitor would be close enough to challenge him, Jim McKay arranged for an American—1968 winner and record holder, Bill Toomey—to be the shadow competition as Avilov ran the final 1500 meters. When Wolfgang Nordwig won the pole vault, it was noted that the East Germans worked full time for years to gain their expertise, and instead of Nordwig's victory, the emphasis was on Bob Seagren's "unfair" defeat. The Soviets were robots; the East Germans a new athletic Wehrmacht. But the fact is that the U.S., which sent over 400 participants—the largest contingent in Munich, and, with 111 "officials," probably the largest group of hangers-on as well—does not lack for a system of rewards to goad its athletes on to victory. When Mark Spitz (whom ABC helped apotheosize into the American "ace" of the Games with seven gold medals) finished his last race, he could hardly wait to vault out of the water and get about the business of parlaying his hero's status and marketable face into a career estimated to be worth $5 million.

American athletes suffered too—Spitz with his mind-bending malapropisms, among them. Time and again the commentators worked them into their jingoistic act, placing them in a crossfire where it seemed that the only choice was between being a fool or a crybaby. Certain moments stand out vividly; cooperating in building up heavyweight boxer Duane Bobick as the next great white hope and a likely winner in the Games, only to have him get badly beaten in his second match; showcasting mammoth wrestler Chris Taylor as a kind of ursine, good-natured freak; catechizing 800-meter winner Dave Wottle about why he didn't take his golfing cap off when on the victory stand, only to let him off the hook by saying that actually it was alright because the American people had noticed that his hand was over his heart; condemning the IOC's vendetta against Collett and Matthews even though ABC itself had banished the two black runners from its nightly summary where all other gold medal winners were featured; insisting on one more demeaning interview with a distraught Jim Ryun, who God knows has already been used enough by sports and sportcasters.

In spite of all this, there were great moments, of course—the *élan* of the Japanese women's volleyball team, the grace and sportsmanship of boxer Jessie Valdez, the great victories of the Finnish distance runners—which not even ABC could banalize. But in the last analysis, these moments came too seldom to save the Olympics from the omnivorous eye of the television camera. Events started to melt into each other—the 1500 meters, the murders at the airport, the boxing semi-finals: it was a marathon meal where each course looked different but tasted the same. The only thing of importance was the fact that the U.S., by hook or crook, was faced with becoming a second-rate sports power. It was as if the killing of the Israeli athletes was somehow subliminally connected to a larger athletic tragedy.

The Games are over now. While television writers praise the ABC coverage, sportswriters wonder if there should be another Olympiad now that blood has stained the Olympic flag. The question is natural given the horrendous events that night at the airport. But the fact is that it should have been asked even if there had been no carnage at Munich. For the Arab assassins were not, as ABC and everyone else claimed, an alien intrusion into an otherwise peaceful and cooperative atmosphere. They were more the final apocalyptic acting out of the vicious nationalism that has now been permanently ingrained as an enduring feature of this spectacle. The medium was the message, and nothing the athletes could do would change that. ●

RUSSO *(From page 42)*

ing American reporters to the RAND villa to get the inside dope. They even had Goure present "Backgrounders" to newsmen; these are briefings where the source cannot be identified. Out of this came news reports such as Jack Foisie's of the Los Angeles *Times*, who in 1966 (without identifying RAND or Goure) said that Goure's work

> *indicated a decline in the morale of the enemy and a belief the communist forces have lost the Vietnamese War. . . . The findings of the survey supported allied military tactics in almost every respect, and gave an encouraging overall picture of progress in the ground war.*

Denis Warner called it, "A work of tremendous importance." Carl Rowan, writing in a column in 1966, referred to the Goure study as "this secret study which lies at the heart of President Johnson's present strategy. . . ." He finished his column by saying.

> *It is this study that reportedly has convinced President Johnson that, as long as Hanoi refuses peace talks, he has no alternative to continuing the bombing and the military pressure. The hope is that, sooner rather than later, the communists' morale will descend past the breaking point.*

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This, no doubt, was a result of Goure's briefings of Walt Rostow.

In the summer of 1965 I left Saigon and went for a vacation to Bangkok, where I was greeted by a headline in the Bangkok *Post* (an English language daily) which said "VC MORALE PLUMMETS." Goure had been giving "backgrounders" to newsmen: the Saigon American Embassy knew they had a good thing going.

Tying NLF morale to bombing was the chief contribution Goure made to the aerial genocide campaign. In 1965-66 there was a "great debate" in official American circles in Vietnam. Some people felt that bombing infuriated the Vietnamese so much that it only stiffened their resistance. Goure argued against this, using the authority of the RAND image and the interviews to back it up. According to Goure the bombing didn't cause a backlash at all. In fact, it tended to separate the villagers from the NLF: "The more knowledgable interviewers indicated an increasing tendency among the villagers to blame the Viet Cong for drawing such attacks upon them. . . ." This statement is absolute hogwash; Goure gave the impression that interviewers' statements were neatly collated as to their knowledgeability. Nothing like this was ever done.

Neither Goure nor Thomson knew much about Vietnam; they weren't interested in reading outside material. This represents a curious aloofness that seems quite common to people with official security clearances. They have an air of being in on the really important affairs of state, a kind of priesthood which disdains the attitudes of outsiders as though to say, "How could you have an attitude if you don't know what's really happening?"

Goure spent virtually all his time flying back and forth between the U.S. and Saigon and talking to Americans. Thomson spent most of his time in the RAND villa; he went home shortly after RAND president Frank Collbohm visited Saigon in May 1965. Collbohm was given the VIP tour of the battlefield. He was briefed, flown around, and helicoptered into a battle zone to inspect a cache of captured weapons. He left pleased as punch with Goure; the project sailed merrily on.

My own job on the Motivation and Morale Project was to supervise three to four of the Vietnamese interviewers of which there were around ten. Traveling around the country on American airplanes was impossible for Vietnamese alone so it was necessary for me to accompany them. Generally Americans didn't trust Vietnamese and considered them all to be "VC" until vouched for by Americans. Prisoners were held in all parts of Vietnam in provincial jails. The higher level cadre were sent to Saigon where they could be found at the CIA-sponsored National Interrogation Center or the Military Interrogation Center run by the Vietnamese. Every third week or so I would arrange to take my group of interviewers on a trip to the provinces where we would stay for three or four days conducting interviews. Invariably the trips would turn up some kind of adventure, anything from terrorist bombings to fire fights to the discovery of esoteric Vietnamese dishes that were not available in Saigon. On my first trip in the spring of 1965, four of us went to Qui Nhon, a port town on the coast of central Vietnam which came to be controlled by the notorious Korean troops. We stayed in a small hotel and borrowed a Land Rover from the local AID contingent to use in going back and forth to the prison. One evening, as we were leaving the hotel for dinner, Thang, an interviewer, opened the door to the Land Rover, shouted, and waved us back. Someone had placed a North Vietnamese coin on the front seat; it was a Ho Chi Minh piastre (bearing his likeness) which, unofficially, was worth about ten Saigon piastres. Thang was afraid the Land Rover had been booby-trapped. We checked it thoroughly and found nothing. The Vietnamese were convinced it was a warning from a terrorist and spoke uneasily of it for the rest of the trip.

That very day we had attempted to interview a man alleged to be one of the terrorists who had bombed the American B.B.Q. in Qui Nhon about two months before, for which, according to the Pentagon Papers, the U.S. launched reprisal raids on North Vietnam under the code name of Flaming Dart II. The interview had not lasted

OSS

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long because the man had been beaten so badly. He wept throughout the interview and kept asking us if he was going to be executed: "Are they going to kill me tomorrow?" His thumbs were swollen very badly; the man had been hung from his thumbs and beaten while suspended. This was my first brush with the effects of torture. Later it would become apparent that virtually every prisoner was tortured.

I wasn't quite sure that the American advisers knew this kind of thing was going on, so after we finished the interview I walked across the courtyard and told the American captain who was my contact about the fact that prisoners were being tortured. He responded by acting busy and hastened off. Later that night over a beer, I found him unwilling to discuss anything that was going on in Binh Dinh province; he kept talking about how much money he was saving up and how, when he got back to the States, he was going to take it all out of the bank in the form of cash and buy a Corvette. Repeatedly he imagined the look on the salesman's face when he would, as he put it, pick out a Corvette and pay for it on the spot with cash and the correct change. After being treated to this fantasy about three times I excused myself and went back to the hotel. It occurred to me that the Corvette dream grew out of the captain's feelings of powerlessness: at the time, the U.S. Army advisers listed every village and hamlet in the province as being NLF-controlled. In retrospect it occurred to me that the reprisal raid of Flaming Dart II grew out of the same feelings of powerlessness.

The first field trip to Qui Nhon was loaded with omens. When we went out to the airport we were almost killed by American rockets. An L-19 (the small spotter plane) pilot had accidentally hit the fire button while taxiing down the runway and two smoke rockets had soared off over our heads, missing us by a matter of a few feet (inches?). We immediately hit the deck, not knowing exactly what had happened but feeling sure the airport was under NLF attack. After lying there a few minutes while nothing more happened we got up to check out the explosion. After hearing what had happened we celebrated our continuing good health with soft drinks from a machine and waited until the C-123 transport took off for Saigon on what was called the "milk run." Later on during my stay in Vietnam, after several other near-misses, it occurred to me that the only honorable death for an American might be an absurd one like being shot by another American. Most of the death in Vietnam, in any case, is absurd. And most of it is perpetrated by Americans.

Several months later I ran into an American adviser in Saigon who was stationed in Qui Nhon; he said both the rockets that had nearly hit us had soared across the town, one landing in the water off the beach and the other striking a sandbagged emplacement outside the U.S. Army compound that sits by the beach, badly burning an American M.P. He also said the town had undergone a mortar attack the week after we left, with one of the shells landing in the street in front of the hotel where we had stayed.

HE REALLY DID

"An Evening With Richard Nixon" by Gore Vidal is a bird's eye view of Nixon's career from the beginning...this is accomplished with the help of Kennedy, Eisenhower, Washington, Agnew, Humphrey, and the like, acting as advocates pro and con, commenting on the "action" (so to speak) of Nixon's political aspirations. All that Nixon says, he has said in real life, nothing has been invented, nothing has been taken out of context. Gore Vidal, in researching this play, carefully footnoted each of Nixon's statements for time, origin, and nature of the speech. An annotated bibliography is available on request.

remember everything that he said on this record
he has said in real life.
Interesting listening on ODE RECORDS

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The field trips I took in Vietnam revealed a lot about the war. Everywhere the American advisers seemed hassled, powerless, and isolated from the Vietnamese, as they stuck together in their compounds. I felt much more in touch with the country than most of them because I traveled with Vietnamese, stayed in Vietnamese hotels (which averaged about fifty cents per night before inflation hit), and ate in Vietnamese restaurants. The food was delicious; I had never dreamed there were so many varieties of rice. Usually, after we arrived in a place, I would leave the Vietnamese to the interviewing and explore the area, talking to Vietnamese and American officials and going out into the countryside whenever possible. I felt the presence of an American would have a questionable effect on the interviews so I limited my participation as much as my curiosity would allow.

We interviewed three categories of people: prisoners, defectors, and refugees. Defectors were easiest to interview because security was lax at the *chieu hoi* camps. *Chieu hoi* means "open arms" in Vietnamese and is the name the Saigon government gave the defector program. The theme is that the government welcomes its errant children back to the "just cause" with open arms. Every province town has a *chieu hoi* center where the defectors stay for a period of several months after turning themselves in. Generally, when we got to a *chieu hoi* center, we would chat with the director for a while in an attempt to find out which people might be the most interesting to interview. Sometimes we would take the interviewees to cafes or back to the hotel where we would sip beer and develop better rapport. Generally those who deserted the NLF ranks did so because they could no longer stand the hardships, rather than because they became disenchanted with NLF aims. Everyone we interviewed, in fact, spoke of the incredibly difficult living conditions Front people had to deal with: about marching long distances almost every day and then having to dig in, about constantly being bombed. Few, if any, had illusions about the Saigon government; many were frank enough to say they still thought the NLF had the best program for Vietnam.

Generally the atmosphere around the *chieu hoi* camps was that of a group of anywhere from ten to a hundred people loafing around a courtyard. Many Americans saw the *chieu hoi* programs as being "rest and relaxation programs for the V.C." No doubt many of the defectors would rejoin the NLF via the route they had taken the first time around because in rural Vietnam "all roads lead to the NLF," but most were men broken in spirit and would not. Generally the defectors, as would be expected, did give more pro-Saigon responses than did the prisoners; for example, on the question of whom villagers blamed for the air attacks, the defectors were much more likely to say the people blamed NLF units for drawing the attacks. The prisoners, on the other hand, almost unanimously said that villagers blamed the Americans and their client government in Saigon. The approach of counting the noses of who blamed whom borders on the absurd and was part of the obscurantist dialogue started by Goure, who wanted so much to calm official fears of air war backlash. Actually, if some villagers did blame NLF units for drawing fire, it was a matter quite distinguishable from expressing anger at the Americans and their Saigon puppets, because the spirit of criticism/self-criticism is deeply imbued in the NLF; its day-to-day relationship with the villagers constitutes its *raison d'être*. The point is that the NLF cadre encouraged the villagers to be openly critical of them.

A fundamental aspect of the Vietnamese Revolution is its dialogical nature, and that, most importantly, means dialogue with the people based on the principles of *kiem thao* (Vietnamese for criticism/self-criticism). If the villagers were not critical there could be no dialogue. This does not mean the NLF should be completely idealized in the eyes of Americans; they have had their share of ego-tripping cadres, too, who at times lord it over the villagers. But *kiem thao* grew to be an

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integral part of the Revolution because it was absolutely necessary. There is no doubt that there were times when guerillas were soundly criticized for drawing fire, but it was the kind of criticism reserved for "little brothers," which is how the people referred to the hamlet cadre. The words of a young NLF woman give the sense of how villagers felt about American aerial firepower:

In Bau Ban the villagers had already complained to the Ben Cat District headquarters because GVN [the Saigon "government] had fired repeatedly on innocent villagers instead of on the forest, where the "VC" purportedly lived.

What do villagers do in case of air attack?

They run away. They hide themselves in the forest. Only the old people stay in the village.

Who do the villagers think fly the aircraft and helicopters?

Mostly Americans—especially in the attacks in which the shooting is ferocious. They thought only Americans could shoot like that—"like asses," they said.

Just as "only Americans could shoot like that," only Goure could rationalize the air war in the way he did. The glib obscurantism, the apologia delivered to civilians in support of the Air Force, all amounted to a whitewash of genocide at a time when the Air Force was straining not to become irrelevant in the context of guerilla warfare in the jungle. "The devastation caused by the B-52's has made a profound impression," Goure would write in a classified report in 1966, and in the very next sentence say, "Nevertheless the interviews indicate no widespread or deep-seated popular hatred for the GVN or the Americans as a result of air and artillery attacks." This boiled down to justification of genocide, cloaked in the quite influential mantle of RAND social science. In an article about the RAND project in *The Reporter* in December 1965, Denis Warner, without identifying RAND or Goure, quotes "the analyst" (*i.e.*, Goure):

We ought to increase our night-time interdiction of the waterways in the Delta and maintain the B-52 attacks on Vietcong base areas. Interference with mobility will break the Vietcong's back . . . Don't just kill. Interfere with the Vietcong.

In the body of this article Warner wrote:

. . . to ignore the opportunity (created by refugees abandoning liberated areas) would be to discard the only practicable and immediately available means of dividing the Vietcong from the population. . . .

He ends his article on a note of high praise for the RAND project, which he sees as having

revealed much more about the Vietcong than we have ever known before . . . there are guidelines for action and a whole body of information on matters that until now have always been either a matter of guesswork or woefully inadequate intelligence. We are getting to know the enemy.

The Americans were not getting to know "the enemy." In fact, with RAND's help, quite the opposite effect was being achieved. Americans were repressing what they sensed to be true and thrashing away at the rural environment with all the technological sadism they could muster, while at the same time they ignored the outright torture (not just mistreatment) of NLF prisoners.

Prisoners were tortured as a matter of course, even those who tried their best to be cooperative. The men we interviewed could not understand why torture was so widespread, for it was imprudent aside from the fact that it was inhumane. In the ranks of the NLF it was well-known that if you were captured you would be tortured. Knowing this they would be more likely to carry the struggle to the death rather than surrender. I constantly spoke of this with Goure and other American officials, both military and civilian. If I got a response it was likely to be the kind of racist interpretation that pointed to cruelty as an attribute of Asians.

Torture of NLF prisoners has a special poignance in the present political climate because of the way Nixon has manufactured a phony issue out of the plight of American POWs in North Vietnam. He has accused Hanoi repeatedly of withholding the names of prisoners, while throughout Vietnam I found one prison after another that had no record of the people caged up inside. Even more outrageously, he complains of mistreatment of American prisoners when throughout South Vietnam, in the nearly two dozen prisons I visited, the prisoners live an indescribably inhumane existence. When I hear Nixon talk about American POWs I think of the American who worked at the CIA interrogation center in Saigon; he told me on numerous occasions in great detail how prisoners were tortured. One prisoner, he said, was hung by his feet in a tree while a piano wire noose was slipped around his genitals. He was told to talk or the noose would be pulled tight. The CIA man said the prisoner never did talk; he grinned as he added the punch line. On another occasion this same man told me about his treatment of a student arrested in Hue for alleged activity with the NLF:

I didn't hurt him [he said]. *I just told him I was going to find his mother and kill her. Next I'm going to have his mother sent down here from Hue* [the woman was in jail there] *and I'm going to tell her I'm going to kill her boy if he doesn't talk. Then I'll let her visit him.*

THE RAND INTERVIEWS were classified until the spring of this year. This is an example of how the object of the secrecy system is to keep information away from the American public; there is no conceivable way these interviews could aid the "enemy," but they could educate the American public, and the more the public knows about the Vietnam situation, the more likely it is to oppose U.S. policy. The classification of the interviews has helped keep the Vietnamese depersonalized in American eyes.

Along with having made the interviews partially public, RAND has issued the official party line on the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project in the form of a report entitled *User's Guide to the RAND Interviews in Vietnam*, R-1024-ARPA. The *Guide* gives a history of the project and tells a little about the processes integral to

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its purposes. Generally, however, it is RAND's bland way of saying "it never happened"; just like the Party in Orwell's *1984*, the *Guide* is an exercise in the mutability of the past. The most telling fact about the *Guide* is the existence of a counterpart version which is secret. The secret version is a history of the VC M&M project written by Al Goldberg of RAND's Washington office; it is available on a "need to know" basis only. Could Goldberg's history help the "enemy?" It might give the Vietnamese a good laugh but nothing else; it is simply another example of how the public is kept in the dark. The very existence of Goldberg's history proves that the *Guide* tells much less than the entire story.

The *Guide* was written by W. Phillips Davison, RAND consultant, professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia, and member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Davison is a liberal, tweedy pipesmoker who commutes to the classroom in Morningside Heights from his country home just outside fashionable Princeton, New Jersey. Davison spent the summer of 1965 in Saigon subbing as director of the RAND project while Goure was back in Santa Monica and Washington giving his air war sales pitch. A quiet, easy-going and kindly fellow, and never one to rock the boat, Davison has delivered up a slick whitewash of the RAND project. One thing in the report is helpful, however; Davison documents the fact that the U.S., though loudly criticizing Hanoi for not providing timely lists of POW-MIA's, does not have lists of the prisoners it takes either:

> *"The most serious drawback (in finding knowledgeable prisoners to interview) was that no comprehensive or reliable lists of either prisoners or defectors could be found in Saigon."*

It's not often that RAND is so helpful in proving Nixon to be a hypocrite but there it is—in black and white and stamped with the RAND imprimatur. But that is about as far as the report goes in getting to the real essence of things. Davison never mentions Goure but shows again that RAND's position is defensive on the matter. "If anyone had inferred from the interview reports that the Viet Cong movement was about to crumble," writes Davison, "the error owed to a misinterpretation of the data, not to faulty data." Davison knows perfecly well what impressions were being given by Goure, but none of this is ever discussed.

Davison portrays the project as having had three phases. Goure's phase (the second) is euphemistically described as having "inquired into the Viet Cong's military organization and conduct of operations" and as having dealt with "the way the Viet Cong responded to South Vietnamese and U.S. efforts to crush them militarily." That's about as far as he goes. In discussing working conditions in Vietnam Davison complains that ". . . few Vietnamese or American officials in Saigon ever really understood the purpose of the project. Most of them seem to have regarded it as an intelligence-gathering undertaking rather than a long-range study of political, social, and psychological factors." The "Vietnamese or American officials" were quite hip in this regard because intelligence gathering was precisely what the project was all about. Goure used to say around the office, "We got the best damned intelligence in the war!"

In the preface (apparently not written by Davison) to the *Guide* it is stated that any information that could identify the interviewee is excised because it could lead to reprisals. "Researchers have an ethical responsibility to ensure that no one suffers from having been a subject of research," it says on the very first page. In the light of what Goure did with the project the hypocrisy of that statement needs no discussion. Actually, books are already in print which cite RAND interviews by the name of the person interviewed. The *Guide* says, "No material other than the above described deletions (i.e., material identifying the person interviewed) has been removed from the interview reports being released." That statement is a lie; material on torture of prisoners or brutal treatment of civilians by Americans, Koreans, or Saigon troops was removed when the


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interviews were being typed up in Saigon. The policy, set by Goure, was the subject of bitter disagreement between him and me; I would never remove any material from interviews that went through my hands, nor would several others, but most complied with Goure's censorship policies.

The story by James Otis ("Seoul's Hired Guns") in the September 1972 RAMPARTS refers to a RAND study entitled "Mention of Korean Troops' Activities in RAND Interviews" and gives quotations from the interviews describing the barbarous behavior of the Korean troops in the central Vietnam provinces of Tuy Hoa and Binh Dinh. This report was put together quickly by Goure in December 1966 in response to a special request from General Westmoreland. Most if not all the quotations had been censored out of the RAND interviews, giving the report a distinct bias on the subject of war crimes. American atrocities appeared in the interviews and were likewise censored. American troops, My Lai to the contrary notwithstanding, tended to do their killing from greater distances. As a North Vietnamese lieutenant (a defector) said:

". . . every time they planned to attack somewhere, they would first bomb and shell the place until it was completely demolished; only then would they dare to come."

(It is unusual for a northerner to defect. I didn't interview this man, but I saw him in the Binh Dinh province defector center. He looked as though he had been through absolute hell.)

But RAND was not all Goure, Thomson, Collbohm, Pauker, Hosmer, Zasloff, Donnell, and Kellen. The reports they wrote will end up in history's incinerator, with the exception of Kellen's. The interviews will stand, however, because with all their faults (and there are many) they are still a good representation of what the Vietnamese said about the war, the Americans, the glories of liberation, and the crimes of oppression. The interviews were brought back by the team leaders—my peers on the junior staff level who, for whatever reasons, risked their lives repeatedly over the course of months and years. Some did it because they didn't seem to fit anywhere else and the money wasn't bad, but most of them, if not all, did it because they felt it was important to bring back the truth about this war.

One of the team leaders, John Harbut, was permanently disabled in both a leg and arm when a mortar shell exploded against a cinderblock wall, while he was huddled against the other side of it during the TET attack on Saigon. The neighborhood where he lived was occupied by NLF troops for several days. The shell which exploded the cinderblock wall, sandblasting John, very likely came from a U.S. Air Force mortar tube on Tan Son Nhut air base. John lost a finger and suffered severe permanent nerve damage in one of his legs. This happened four and a half years ago. I saw John last spring in Chicago; he walks with a very bad limp and keeps his hand in his pocket. RAND paid for his operation and then fired him. A sentence in Davison's *Guide* says ". . . *no* interviews or *team leaders* were actually injured as the result of military action, although there were several terrifying near misses." [emphasis added] Is this sentence the result of Davison's shoddy research? He is a pro and probably gets at least $200 a day. Or is it the result of RAND's lawyer's advice. John should, after all, be receiving a full pension, but he's not. I wonder whether or not Goldberg has a section on personnel in his secret study of the project; it's hard to see how he could neglect John's case, because the project director after Goure, William Jones, devoted considerable effort to it.

Perhaps RAND fired John because they are sensitive to accumulating bureaucratic fat over the years. They desperately want to stay young and lean. If the State Department is an obese senior citizen, RAND is a young jackbooted soldier who can't carry excess baggage on his mission.

RAND HAS SPENT MILLIONS of dollars on Vietnam research that has ranged from the design of weapons, to the study of Montagnard tribesmen, to a project on the organization of Vietnamese student movements. When I was in Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, a liberal, easy-going gentleman by the name of Ted Britton was in Saigon, occupying a huge villa, doing a study of Vietnamese students as a RAND consultant. His house became one of the principal gathering spots for Saigon students. Britton, who never talked about his work much, was a frequent visitor to the RAND villa at 176 Rue Pasteur. He was the butt of considerable criticism from RAND personnel because, as of 1968, he had never gotten around to writing up his study. Although little was said specifically, the criticism of Britton was muted by the fact that some people credited him with pacifying the Saigon student movement: "If he keeps those kids off the streets he will have earned his keep by that alone." Britton, a professor of education at Sacramento State College, has the easy-going demeanor of a Scout Master and seems capable of playing such a role. In the summer of 1966 he organized a "peace corps" type operation designed to put about ten thousand Saigon students in the countryside to work with pacification programs. He was also a close friend of General Nguyen Chanh Thi, the controversial I Corps Commander who figured prominently in the 1966 Buddhist crisis. Thi is now in exile, living in Washington, D.C. Britton is the epitome of the "Quiet American" and seems to have been something of a second-string "Ed Lansdale" figure.

In 1970, a RAND study authored by one of the original organizers of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project, Stephen T. Hosmer, received an important splash of publicity concerning the "bloodbath" issue. Hosmer, who is as close to the Air Force as Goure and just as biased on the Vietnam question, speculated that 100,000 would be executed if the NLF were to come into power. The Nixon Administration, along with other opponents of self-determination in Vietnam, seized upon the Hosmer study as evidence supporting their position. Actually the "bloodbath" of most significance was the one perpetrated in the years following the end of the first Indochina war, when Colonel Lansdale provided the support needed by Diem in putting down the rebellious religious sects and instituting the campaign of repression against the ex-Viet Minh. The

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RAND interviews show that Diem's bloodbath was a central factor in stoking a rebellion that grew into the second Indochina war. The bloodbath that is most presently relevant is the one that continues daily. Even Hosmer acknowledges in his report that, were the PRG to come to power via negotiations and a coalition government, the chance of a bloodbath would be greatly mitigated. His bloodbath of 100,000 was based on the assumption the PRG would take over by force, something they would prefer to avoid.

Still as contract-hungry as ever, RAND continues its research on Vietnam and other parts of the American empire. Its involvement in the current air war is no doubt extensive. By providing elaborate justification for the Air Force's role at the beginning of the major escalation in 1965, Goure helped put the Air Force generals firmly in the saddle for implementing a new kind of punitive foreign policy: nation busting for those Third World countries who want none of the "nation building" farce that serves only to harness them to corrupt military governments. The advance in air war technology has given Henry Kissinger, a man close to RAND over the years, the kind of independence from Congress, the bureaucracies, and the public that he wants in order to continue carrot-stick methods of big power diplomacy. Air war technology has made it possible to take the war out of the public eye. Reporters don't go along on air strikes and don't see the victims; they become themselves victims of official secrecy. This is how Nixon is able to continue the war the American people voted against in 1968. The more RAND improves Air Force technology, the more "efficient" and centralized the process of Presidential decision-making becomes; the soldiers are brought home to pull the triggers from the laboratory. The more complex the technological process, the more insignificant the individual feels as he or she becomes a clerk in the process of murder. Eventually the entire operation could be managed by a bank of computers at RAND while the President deals with the messy problems of authorization and legality. The body politic will have become irrelevant. The time is quickly approaching when the Orwellian equations—War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, and Ignorance is Strength—will be universally accepted. Nixon is at the point now where he can escalate the air war behind the cloak of executive privilege (which makes Kissinger *et al.* immune to congressional subpoena) and executive order. (The whole system of classified secrets is based solely on presidential decree; it is not backed up by congressional statute).

The air war, equivalent to a war by robots, can be turned on and off at will by Henry Kissinger and his boss, as been demonstrated this year in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Air war technology is the most efficient way to practice the modern strategy of tacit bargaining, the brainchild of RAND consultant Thomas Schelling (also of Harvard). Fundamental to tacit bargaining is, ironically enough, the concept of credibility which, according to the tenets, is promoted by signalling threats to other nations through concrete acts rather than words. Kissinger, an adherent of this approach, has convinced his boss of its utility, as evidenced by Nixon's statement last spring; "Watch what I do, not what I say." Thus Nixon "talks" to Hanoi with bombs.

Recently it has come to light that the Pentagon has been using weather modification as a military weapon in Vietnam and is engaging in extensive research to expand and refine that practice. The implications of that are stunning; seen in the context of tacit bargaining, the President will become a kind of god-king, parceling out floods, hurricanes, and other "acts of god" to nations recalcitrant about joining the imperial club, while sunshine and blue skies are the reward for the obedient. RAND, of course, has been involved in atmospheric environmental research for a long time. The implications for secret work in this area are obvious; the corporate power structure which commands such a powerful influence on the environment now could end up seizing control of it, especially if research in that area continues to be withheld from public discourse.

All of this serves to indicate that

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

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RAND, and other organizations like it, are serving to hasten the trend to political absolutism, i.e., no substantive popular participation in social planning or decision-making. "Hard choices," a pet RAND phrase, are made much easier to deal with by keeping the public in the dark, especially in crisis situations. For example, in 1966, according to Paul Dickson in his book *Think Tanks,* RAND suggested that, in a post-nuclear attack situation, the survivors would be better off without the old and feeble and that governmental policy should be to abandon them. I had not heard about this while I was at RAND. Even after the welter of numbing double-think I experienced there, I was shocked to read this. Dickson, a quite able journalist, quotes the conclusion of the RAND report as follows:

> *The easiest way to implement a morally repugnant but socially beneficial policy is by inaction. Under stress, the managers of post-attack society would most likely resolve their problems by failing to make any special provision for the elderly, the insane and the chronically ill."*

Such examples serve to expose one of the best kept secrets of the 60's: *Dr. Strangelove* was not really a satirical film; it was a documentary. ●

RAND's WAR *(From page 37)*

of the interview material itself:

> *The intensification of military activities by the GVN and U.S. forces have had an adverse effect on VC morale and combat effectiveness. The devastation caused by the B-52s has made a profound impression. Nevertheless the interviews indicate no widespread or deep-seated popular hatred for the GVN or the Americans as a result of air and artillery attacks. The villagers seem grateful for advance warning of attacks and sometimes seize the opportunity it offers to move to GVN-controlled areas. As long as warning is received, the villagers tend to blame the presence or actions of VC troops for provoking GVN/U.S. attacks, rather than to find fault with the attackers themselves.*

Further, by way of commentary on "urbanization," the mass bombings in the South Vietnamese countryside:

> *Fear of attacks is a major reason why the farmers have overcome a natural reluctance to leave their lands and ancestral tombs and, no longer deterred by fear of VC reprisals, have taken refuge by the hundreds of thousands in GVN-controlled areas. . . . Generally, conditions of village life and protracted insecurity appear to have made death a commonplace and to have led the villager to a fatalistic attitude. He sees himself as "a fly caught between two fighting buffaloes." He expects to suffer from the acts of both sides and he recognizes that he cannot afford to choose sides on the basis of programs or promises for the future but that his actions must be guided first of all by considerations of survival and security, regardless of his sympathies. Military activities and fear of attacks tend to disrupt farm work and reduce the villager's interest in continuing to work his fields, since he is less able to earn a living from his labors.*

As early as March 1965, when the first Goure paper appeared, there was considerable controversy at RAND on the quality of Goure's work. According to several RANDsmen, a fair number of analysts were convinced that Goure was interpreting selectively from the interviews, and that in his concrete recommendations on air involvement, he was, as one senior RANDsman put it bluntly, "pandering to McNamara's prejudices." Worse, this man added, Goure "was not careful enough for my taste to avoid the *appearance* of that." [emphasis his] The observation is particularly striking. Those at RAND have never liked to think of themselves as a social-scientific rubber stamp for the Pentagon, yet what worries these men even more is that, when RAND becomes a rubber stamp, the submission will be a visible one. What bothered the anti-Goure faction most was that RAND had become an undisguised pawn in the eyes of other officials and agencies connected with the government. Yet through 1965 and 1966, Goure's work satisfied the President and Trustees of RAND, and he remained at his post. Frank Collbohm visited Vietnam in May 1965; he remembers that General Westmoreland spoke highly of Goure's work, saying it supplied helpful intelligence information for U.S. and South Vietnamese ground operations. "I thought the quality of Goure's work was okay," Collbohm said recently. "I know there were some who disagreed, but I thought it was all right."

So did many officials in the government who requested briefings on the RAND project through 1965 and 1966. Goure himself remembers that he briefed Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, all the military and embassy officials in the field—that is, virtually everyone except Secretary of State Rusk and the President. Goure was a talented and thoroughly enthusiastic briefer—witty, articulate, *très charmant,* a man of dignified appearance and presence who was given to skillful, almost theatrical gestures and broad, sweeping claims. According to those who attended the briefings, both in Saigon and in Washington, he was a relentless optimist, "the Joe Alsop of RAND" as one official would later describe him, one whose message was that all of the military might was working and that additional strength would be even more effective, for the enemy was on the brink of collapse, and one more infusion of force would send him screaming to the peace table. Gone was even that trifle of circumspection which had led him to include in his written reports such perfunctory caveats on the interview material as, "The data do not provide information on the war as a whole or allow us to assess how the war is going." On paper, at least, Goure would not be found lacking in competent methodology. But few such cautionary innuendoes appear to have crept into his briefings, and it was in the briefings where Goure had his greatest impact.

The support given to the project by Secretary McNamara was of particular importance. A man who held firmly through most of 1965 to the thesis that the opponent would succumb to America's air might. McNamara was captivated by the extravagant promises, the largely irrelevant facts and figures, that Goure's work yielded, and he was interested in a way he never would have been with Zasloff's and Donnell's nonquantitative (hence, abstract and

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speculative) finding that the NLF was a popular and powerful political force. Goure recalls that on one of McNamara's trips to Vietnam early in 1965, the Secretary of Defense requested a paper from the RAND group. The request came at 10 p.m. one night, and McNamara wanted the paper delivered by 7 the following morning, so Goure and others stayed up all night working feverishly on it. Thereafter, McNamara was "an enthusiastic supporter of the project," as Goure would later put it. The Secretary was treated to several Goure briefings through 1965 and 1966. He was so impressed with the work that in June 1966, as Goure tells the story, he asked Goure, Could you expand your sample of interviewees if you had more financial support. Of course, Goure replied. And so McNamara intervened with the Advanced Projects Research Agency, which by then had taken over the funding of the project, and instructed that the amount of money available to the Goure team be more than doubled.

Like that of the military, McNamara's support for the project took a toll; RAND paid the cost in sacrificing professional integrity. Goure says today that, when he undertook the project, he thought in terms of a one-year interval between the submission of reports--one year in which he and others could sit back and collect their thoughts, and then circulate drafts of a final study among their RAND colleagues to ensure that responsible intellectual standards would be met. But McNamara demanded quarterly evaluations of the project and, to the chagrin of many RANDsmen, President Collbohm and the trustees allowed Goure to comply. With a paper being ground out once every ninety days, to accompany the quarterly briefing tour from Saigon to Honolulu to Santa Monica and on to Washington, the work of the project was to be exempted from RAND's strict quality control procedures. Goure's work would be circulated under RAND's official imprimatur, but it would be immune from the internal critical commentary which typically preceded the circulation of any RAND report outside Santa Monica. A number of RANDsmen confessed shock at the acquiescence to this breach of normal practice by Frank Collbohm, a man who had been admired even by his intellectual opponents in RAND for having behaved with considerable care and circumspection in the face of official, and particularly Air Force, demands. Today, Collbohm defends his decision by saying that the procedure requested by McNamara was appropriate to wartime, and that RAND had acquiesced in a similar way at the time of the Korean war. Whatever the case may be, the RAND project had metamorphosed from a careful, thorough study of NLF strength and influence into a quarterly compendium of somewhat refined military intelligence reports.

As for what concrete influence Goure's work had on policymaking through 1965 and 1966, we may only speculate. Goure's findings, of course, were read and cited widely by those who agreed with them—so much so that, at one point, Carl Rowan, a former head of the United States Information Service, wrote in a syndicated column of August 16, 1966, that the RAND study "lies at the heart of President Johnson's strategy." Wherever it lay, it is unlikely that the project actually caused certain decisions to be made; that, at least, is the overwhelming consensus of middle-level officials from that period who were questioned by this writer. But what it did do was fuel the prejudices of high government officials by invoking the guise or cover of social science, and in so doing, it reinforced and legitimized the policy inside the bureaucracy and helped make it virtually impossible to overturn. There is more than a casual connection between Goure's work and the Ikle memorandum: both are clear-cut instances of social science groveling before established power, and one elucidates a policy that the other has helped institutionalize. They are both part of the same story of active complicity in a bad policy, of self-styled independent authorities who willingly succumb to the conventional wisdom of ignorance simply to be able to stay on the inside. And yet perhaps the most frightening fact is that the RANDsmen were almost certainly correct in judging that they would have to alter their private judgments on many matters in order to remain "effective" insiders. At the core

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

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of this story remains the fact that our heads of government have always been intolerant of any advice which violates their most closely-held prejudices, and that there is no single group or force in the country today which is influential enough or powerful enough to alter that reality.

Our story has a predictable ending. By early 1967, Goure's unbridled optimism had become unfashionable inside the government. McNamara and others in the Pentagon had all but become convinced that no amount of bombing could force the opponent to capitulate. This development happened to coincide with the retirement of RAND's President, Frank Collbohm, a strong supporter of Goure. Collbohm's successor was none other than Henry Rowen, the man who had first guaranteed Defense Department support of the project. By now, however, Rowen was unconvinced by its findings, and, as RAND's incoming President, was downright embarrassed at the low-level quality of the work. Goure was removed from the project and, later, from RAND. He now teaches history at the University of Miami. The new head of the project was a man who held to Rowen's view that the war was now a mistake, but that it must be ended "honorably"—a line of reasoning that characterized most of the project's work until its demise in 1969 (and which was the basis of the Ikle memorandum cited earlier). Yet, despite the fact that the interviews are now public, that the Zasloff-Donnell-Pauker paper, as well as almost all of those written after 1967, are now de-classified, the Goure material, which is the key to the interviews' greatest impact, remains secret. By keeping the material under wraps, RAND is most likely trying, as Anthony Russo points out, to re-write history. But in doing so, RAND still protects its own. ●

HIDING THE WAR *(From page 44)*

On April 11, just nine days after the fighting had flared up again all over South Vietnam, the Pentagon made a very important announcement that was almost completely ignored in the press. Henceforth, the U.S. command in Saigon would no longer be obliged to announce on a daily basis even that bombing raids had occurred over North Vietnam. Instead the press would receive "periodic reports," the form and content and frequency of which would be left to the discretion of the American commander.

As things have turned out since then, the people in Saigon tend to say something about the bombing of North Vietnam every day, but what they say is roughly analagous to those two revealing sentences that are routinely released (and, what is worse, reported in the press) about Laos and Cambodia. For example, they will tell where some of the bombs were dropped; what — allegedly — was attacked; what the returning pilots said (to the military's PR men) about the "success" of the raids; and from what point the raids originated. Occasionally, but by no means frequently, a general approximation of the tonnage associated with a specific raid will also be released.

All of this "information" is dispensed in short sentences in the daily MACV press release. This is why daily accounts of the bombing (the stuff that reaches most people in this country regularly) are never more than a few paragraphs long. Shortly after he returned to this country from his two-week visit to North Vietnam this summer, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark said that Haiphong, after one raid, could pass for any of the German cities he had seen after World War II. Yet the day American planes did the damage which he inspected, most of the American people read about it in four paragraphs of dry news copy that ran in the general news summary from Saigon after an account of another day in the struggle for Quang Tri City.

It was no accident of either journalistic or governmental behavior. It happens every day.

Where more specific issues and problems connected with the bombing are concerned, such as the attacks on the Red River Delta dikes and on other non-military facilities, the situation is a bit more complex, but the result—almost no hard information and tons of bullshit—is the same.

The information-suppressing technique used by the government here is a bit more subtle, but just as effective as the tonnage ritual. It is based on the accurate assumption that almost all of the American press will downplay what the North Vietnamese and other eyewitnesses say for the most part, will not follow up specific charges of attacks on civilian targets in a way that forces the Pentagon to respond, and will faithfully regurgitate canned quotes day after day, scarcely bothering to check whether one day's statement differs at all from some previous day's.

Within weeks, charges of bomb damage to undefended villages, hospitals, schools, and dikes began filling the air, whereupon it was decided to soften the line just a touch. During a pre-arranged question-and-answer session at John Connally's Texas ranch, Nixon was asked about the dikes. He raised a rhetorical distinction between civilian and military targets, but he would only say that he didn't think a sustained period of strategic bombing was "necessary."

Then came the massive escalation of May and June, and by the end of that month, detailed eyewitness accounts were beginning to filter through to the West from unimpeachably professional people. Nixon was asked about these accounts at a nationally televised news conference; well aware that this form provides newsmen no chance to follow up an evasive answer with another direct question, he lied. He claimed with dexterous vagueness that the reports were "inaccurate," and then delivered the ancient line about how U.S. pilots are only supposed to bomb military targets.

The Pentagon, meanwhile, was dodging the issue by saying that "dikes and dams have not been targeted," whenever anyone asked whether they had been *hit*. Every so often an editorial writer for, say, the New York *Times*, would allude to the distinction, but the news most people in the country read and heard faithfully spewed forth the ever-available quote.

In July, the party line shifted again, this time to a grudging admission that a bomb or two may have fallen on a dike or two, but only where the facility in question (unnamed of course) was in very close proximity to a military

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target (also unnamed). What's more, the government became fond of claiming that all the damage had been slight, and that any danger of flooding in the late summer, after the rainy season, stemmed solely from the failure by the North Vietnamese to repair the dikes damaged during the massive floods of the previous year.

At the end of July, the line changed again. This time, the Administration, with Nixon himself leading the way at a news conference, went on the offensive, resurrecting such famous terms of the past as Communist propaganda, dupe, and the like. It was all topped off by the solemn release at the State Department of a brief report from the "intelligence community," 95 percent of which could have been written by anyone with access to an atlas and a Southeast Asian history book. The press faithfully reported the important part —an assertion that U.S. reconaissance planes had taken pictures showing only 12 dike installations hit by bombs; in each case the damage was said to be minor and easily reparable.

Needless to say, no pictures accompanied the report, and a simple reading of it showed that it only covered the results of two days of picture-taking, of unknown scope, in mid-July. However, the Administration's PR men knew that the tidbit about the 12 dikes would dominate the press accounts, and they were right. The gambit worked, and gradually the dikes were forgotten.

Then Ramsey Clark went to North Vietnam, and the Nixon air war propagandists geared up to their biggest coup of all. The carefully orchestrated campaign of denunciation, which came from every pro-war quarter imaginable, began with his arrival in Hanoi, and continued without interruption until the morning he testified before Sen. Edward Kennedy's refugee subcommittee, whereupon it stopped with remarkable but only casually noticed abruptness.

The sole sign of an Administration presence as Clark testified was docile Sen. Hiram Fong of Hawaii. The only Republican on Kennedy's subcommittee to show up, he carried with him a few pictures, provided by the Pentagon, which showed frightening military items, like oil drums and small anti-aircraft weapons, located near dikes. Kennedy had been trying for weeks to get pictures from the Pentagon that might show after-action damage to non-military facilities. He did not appreciate Sen. Fong's snapshots.

Kennedy had hoped that Clark's appearance might enable him, for the first time, to hold hearings—in the presence of Administration witnesses —on the impact of the air war on the civilians of North Vietnam.

He should have known better. The libelous campaign waged against Clark was designed solely to discredit the former Attorney General in advance of his return to this country. The Nixon people never had the slightest intention of making a specific reply, much less of submitting to questions before a Congressional subcommittee.

The same thing has happened with regard to the bombing of the North in general. Every day Radio Hanoi offers dates and places where atrocities are said to have occurred. Within hours of the transmissions, transcripts are available to both newsmen and government officials through the State Department, but not once has the Administration ever replied to a specific charge, and not once to my knowledge has a newsman ever forced it to provide even a prim "no comment."

Nothing is ever pinned down. Each day's war news is quickly consumed by the next day's, and so on. Hardly anyone ever looks back to add it up. When someone does, like Fred Branfman's Project Air War or the study group from Cornell, their work is largely ignored except among the cognoscenti. To the extent it gets more widely reported, it is always a one-shot deal, quickly forgotten by whatever portion of the mass audience it reaches fleetingly, and always ignored by the Administration.

Take, for example, the matter of North Vietnam's dikes. When full-scale bombing resumed in the second week of April, Nixon sought to convey to Hanoi the toughest message he could dream up. As he maintained public silence during this period, it fell to the Pentagon's Melvin Laird and the State Department's William P. Rogers to get the word across. Their

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

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message: The United States will only rule out two courses of military action as long as the other side keeps fighting —the use of nuclear weapons and the reintroduction of ground combat troops. In short, everything else was possible.

From time to time complaints have been raised about all the secrecy and the evasiveness. On the bomb tonnage matter, complaints were made last year by the major wire services and the correspondents based in Saigon, but their pro forma gripes were returned with pro forma replies and that was that.

At my own paper, the tonnage ritual produces a front page piece once a month containing the number, the latest trends, and an explanation of the secrecy system. A day or two later, an editorial will bemoan the continuing slaughter and denounce the lack of regular and adequate statistical information, but after 11 months of this, nothing has happened.

Meanwhile, over at the Nixon Administration, the whole thing is treated pretty much as a joke. How else can one explain the comment of White House flak Herbert Klein to my editor, Thomas Winship, "explaining" why the government could disgorge weekly body counts but not weekly, broken-down, tonnage totals: "Munitions statistics, on the other hand, satisfy an essential but less urgent logistics management requirement."

And then there was the letter from Jerry Friedheim to Rep. Robert Leggett: "U.S. commanders feel that such information about bomb tonnage and sorties would fill gaps in the enemy's intelligence collection efforts and confirm some data which he may already have obtained but which remains still unverifiable. These confirmations could be used by the enemy to increase the danger to our airmen because such data would provide more refined planning data for enemy defense commanders." In other words, if the North Vietnamese should find out how many bombs were actually being dropped on their country, they might somehow use the information to shoot down more U.S. planes.

There is no point in pleading with men such as these. The most a conscientious reporter can do is quote them regularly, and make sure their refusals to cooperate are placed on the record.

Clearly, American journalists are not going to get the truth about the air war from official sources, and so they must look for it somewhere else. They could find it in North Vietnam, if the North Vietnamese could arrange for regular inspection teams or even the permanent stationing of U.S. news teams in their country. Correspondents, after all, develop expertise and the ability to generate copy mainly by staying put for a spell.

The press *can* find a way to gather information which the MACV never mentions. If it does, and if the information starts to flow on a regular, day-in-day-out basis, the great mass of Americans will draw the appropriate conclusions. Far-fetched? Some of my colleagues in the media and acquaintances in the anti-war movement chuckle with knowing cynicism at the importance of information in ending the war. But I wonder. If none of this really matters, why does the Administration force us—by careful prearrangement—to play the tonnage ritual every month? ●

VIET BETRAYAL *(From page 8)*

tary resources of the U.S. and thereby lessening the damage inflicted on Vietnam, but also in maximizing the image of danger associated with Nixon's escalation, thereby increasing its political costs. This would have had immense implications domestically (as the invasion of Cambodia showed), even before the 1972 campaign got under way. At the very least it would have stimulated a constant challenge to the viability of the Nixon Administration and imposed serious constraints on its ability to prosecute the war.

Unfortunately, as the RAND report notes, the prospect of the Soviet Union and/or China stepping up their support was, even in 1969, fairly remote:

"However, Hanoi's direct leverage on Moscow and Peking is of course very small, and as long as North Vietnam is reasonably 'secure', not likely to produce new exertions on their part."

(The point about North Vietnam's security alludes to a situation that is

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not well understood by the left, which tends to measure the revolutionary solidarity of the Soviet Union and China in terms of supply levels of aid to North Vietnam. From a narrow security point of view, the question of the stability of North Vietnam is qualitatively different from the question of promoting the success, or even the survival, of a revolutionary movement that has not achieved state power. The stability of a bloc state, and particularly a border state, is an issue of national security which any general staff, revolutionary or otherwise, is bound to recognize. So the Soviet Union and China are unlikely to abandon North Vietnam altogether in the face of the American threat. But by the same token, the supplies they send to North Vietnam are not adequate measures of their support for the revolutionary struggle in the South. Their aid to that struggle is largely an effect of North Vietnam's own support for the PRG, and for the goal of a unified, independent Vietnam.)

We can appreciate from the RAND document, then, the effect that Nixon's reception in Peking and Moscow had on the options available to the Vietnamese to counter American escalation. These visits in fact gave Nixon enormous flexibility in carrying out his war plan while campaigning for re-election. It is difficult to believe that he could have achieved as much without them. Once détente became the posture in Moscow and Peking, the options of creating crises and stepping up significant support were obviously precluded. It is not that the Chinese, for example, necessarily concluded agreements with Nixon not to create diversionary crises or respond to escalations in a dramatic and politically effective fashion. It is, rather, that if that were their intention, there would have been no point in inviting Nixon to Peking in the first place. Obviously the trade and diplomatic channels that were opened on that visit would have been closed rather precipitously by any Chinese counter-offensive or stepped-up involvement in the conflict. In short, it is impossible to pursue coexistence and confrontation at the same time. They have to be pursued in sequence if they are not going to involve sacrificing revolutionary interests—like those of the Vietnamese. The betrayal of the South Vietnamese liberation struggle by Moscow and Peking is a consequence of their acceptance of a reconciliation with the U.S. without making a prior condition of that reconciliation a settlement of the war on terms acceptable to the PRG: in particular, a coalition government without the Thieu regime.

Many of these points were made in the August RAMPARTS and were subsequently criticized on the rather shaky grounds that the Vietnamese themselves hadn't raised them. As we pointed out then, the Vietnamese are constrained from public expression of their feelings by the fact that the Soviet Union and China are still providing them with material aid. We felt, however, that it was the duty of the left in this country to exert a moral and political pressure on Moscow and Peking to try to limit their maneuvers which were helping Nixon achieve his goals.

Shortly after the appearance of our article, an editorial appeared in *Nhan Dan*, the organ of the Peoples Army of North Vietnam, which clarified the Vietnamese view on these matters. As few Americans will get the chance to read the editorial—"Victory of the Revolutionary Trend"—we will quote the relevant passages:

"As the political representative of American military-industrial corporations, the clique of the biggest reactionaries and war-maniacs headed by Nixon is carrying out a new global strategy called the 'Nixon doctrine.' In the context of this strategy, an equilibrium of forces among the big powers and the division of the main components of the socialist system [a clear reference to the Soviet Union and China] *is conceived as a shield to give U.S. imperialism complete freedom of action in checking, by means of violence, the national liberation movement, first of all hurling back the patriotic struggle of the nations on the Indochinese peninsula."*

In the August RAMPARTS, we suggested that the Vietnamese offensive was a strategy to defeat the calculations of Nixon and Kissinger, by undermining militarily the settlement that they were preparing for the conference table. The *Nhan Dan* editorial tends to confirm this analysis:

"The offensive and uprising that has been going on without interruption

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

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in South Vietnam since March 30 is breaking the backbone and shattering by big chunks the 'Vietnamization' strategy. The aggressors have had to hurriedly re-Americanize the war by throwing in a huge American air-naval force, going far beyond the limits the 'Nixon doctrine' has set to the war."

The editorial makes a distinction between "genuine reconciliation among countries based on respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of all nations big or small" and Nixon's coexistence diplomacy:

"However, for the U.S. imperialists, reconciliation is but a Machiavellian policy to materialize designs of aggression, enslavements, subversion and peaceful evolution by new methods. In other words, to carry out the 'Nixon doctrine' U.S. imperialists have applied the policy of reconciliation toward a number of big powers in the hope of having a free hand to consolidate their forces, oppose the world revolutionary movement, suppress the revolution at home, bully the small countries, break the national liberation movement while not relinquishing its plan to prepare a new world war."

The editorial also distinguishes between principled coexistence and unprincipled coexistence in a period where genuine reconciliation between countries may not be possible, and confrontation may not be tactically advisable:

"A policy of principled reconciliation with the imperialist powers must aim at consolidating and strengthening the revolutionary forces, isolating and differentiating the enemy of the class, directing the spearhead of the revolution at opposing the schemes of the bellicose forces of the imperialist ringleaders."

A policy of principled coexistence is therefore possible in some situations, if its aim is to accelerate the offensive of the revolutionary forces.

"But, if out of the narrow interests of one's nation, one tries to help the most reactionary forces avert the dangerous blows just like throwing a lifebuoy to a drowning pirate, that is a cruel reconciliation beneficial to the enemy and not beneficial to the revolution."

It is clearly the responsibility of the international left to speak out in the strongest terms against the cruel reconciliations between Moscow/Peking and the enemy in Washington, and to expose a policy that betrays the Vietnamese people and their revolution. ●

NIXON CRISIS *(From page 12)*

fined itself to a few opaque hints ("the contradictions of imperialism," "the chieftains of finance capital") as to the structure, content, size, vulnerability, etc., of these differences. Following is my speculation on this:*

1. The North-South contradiction is primary and constant in white American history. It comes out right away, it persists through all other conflicts, it is always visible, it is usually conspicuous, it enters and helps organize everyone's experience, it is possibly the result of some backbrain disturbance, psychic or somatic, tribal, racial, species, or animal, but whatever its totality, it has a *presence* of uncommonly intense aura in today's stream of events.

2. The roots of this conflict, explained by everyone and no one, seem clear and mysterious at the same time. We have to gamble if we want to talk about it. I can't see how My-Lai is not a version of Wounded Knee. Has there been a single long stretch in our history in which the Vietnam war was not coming or going? The founding genocidal saga is ineradicable, irreversible, and irrepressible. Red genocide and black slavery are the parallel sub-

themes of the white conquest of America. We have no right to be startled at the violence of the current genocide-minded assault on Vietnam; it is the basic U.S. technique. Knowing this imparts a twist to the idea of the national experience and the experience of the national idea.

3. Present as soon as there is a *white America* in the egg, the North-South split always changes and never disappears. A pro-imperialist Southern elite dominated Colonial affiars, tried to hold back the mainly Northern movement toward independence, joined it at last in order to betray it, took power violently in the Constitutional Coup of '89, and ran the country from then on according to the interests of the slaveocracy and against the interests of a nevertheless rising North, until the middle of the next century, when Yankee industrialism finally took command.

4. In the long aftermath of the Civil War (this is still it), the adverse forces rematerialized along the present Northeast-Southwest axis. The rise of the Yankee dynasties through the huge modern corporations is well known. The defeated Rebel reappears in the West, soon emerges as John Wayne, throws himself as such into the tasks of insular expansion, and learns that America's manifest destiny is to continue the triumph of Western civilization, fulfilling the mission of the Rennaissance, of Marco Polo and Columbus.

5. The current institutional seat of Yankee class power is the multinational corporation with its proliferating regulatory international bureaucracy.

6. Cowboy power boomed in the antifascist alliance of World War II,

* I see the inadequacy of apologizing only once, and in a hand-waving kind of way, for what will strike a lot of people as a sophomoric indulgence of ill-informed historic fantasies. But everyone has to swallow their doubts sometime. In the end I see things in the following way not because I can prove anything, but because this is the way things keep seeming to me, proof or no proof.

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then grew monumental on Cold War business. Its current economic base consists of the "independent" oilers of the Southwest (non-Rockefeller, non-Arabian), cattle, grains, the agribusiness generally, and the military-industrial complex.

7. The Yankee sees Vietnam across the Atlantic in Europe, whose industrial democracies—plus Japan—constitute his central galaxy. Integration of the world economy, particularly of the industrial countries, particularly as the Yankee can contrive to dominate the new relationship, is the main current motive. The Yankee has long dominated Latin America without native, domestic or foreign rival (although today things may be changing); but the primary arena of Yankee operations is the North Atlantic community. Expansion on through the Pacific to the Orient is desirable on principle, and the Yankee is traditionally at the center of U.S. attempts to open China and Japan. In Vietnam, the Yankee would surely have been happy to win. But still the Atlantic system always comes first over the problematical Pacific system, if ever there is a conflict. Hence, the source of apprehension over the Vietnam war.

8. The Cowboy sees Vietnam across the Pacific in Asia, whose mysteries and teeming millions are important to his notions of the world, often as the basis of a keen sense of present menace. The Cowboy bourgeoisie is much smaller than the Yankee, is without a comparable foreign empire of commerce, is fiercely hostile to Yankee and European values, (there is an old-rich/new-rich component), and draws its social ego from its self-mystifying Wild West mythology, producing its own images of man apart from the European culture stream. John Wayne again, who refused to participate in the Freudianizing of the Cowboy during the fifties, and thus saved that whole kingdom of meanings from the methods of Yankee skepticism.

9. Like the Rockefellers who epitomize them, Yankees are as diverse politically as the Cowboys. Some main Yankee names: the Ford Foundation, the Bilderberg Group, Lindsay, Javits, Kennedy, Lodge, the Securities Exchange Commission, John Gardner and Common Cause, the International Monetary Fund. Some main Cowboy names; Nixon, Connally, Reagan, Eastland, Westmoreland, Murchison, Picosa Ranch, CINCPAC, Honolulu, Lyndon Johnson, Scoop Jackson, and Poseidon.

10. The left Yankee apostrophizes rationality and progress; the right Cowboy, lawfulness and social order. Cowboy power manifests its spirit in the movement of authoritarian consciousness which parallels the career of Consciousness IV in the sixties and today.

11. We can interpret JFK as a victim of Cowboy militarism, of a force which he intuitively opposed but understood too late, maybe never. The irony of his career is pure, clear and classical: More adventurer than zealot, he seeks the presidency because, as he said, it's where the action is; yet what does he find if not, finally, that the office is powerless? By his last summer he was at war with the right wing, the Cowboy wing, of the governing group. Johnson, Rusk, Bundy were reduced. McNamara was hammer and tongs with the Joint Chiefs to make them accept civilian discipline. Bobby was frantically trying to create a

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
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parallel FBI, a parallel CIA, a parallel State Department—all in hopes of finding out what was happening and acquire control over events.

12. Around the first of November 1963, Diem was assassinated. Events took a marked turn towards a political settlement of the war. Three weeks later, Dallas brought an end to the turnabout and restored direct Cowboy authority over the executive branch. The Pentagon shortly began implementing its preferred war plan under the cover of "peacenik" Johnson's "liberalism." And just as the left was prophesying at each step, the war grew and grew. Then came the crisis of 1968.

13. For present purposes, we need only note the Tet offensive of February, which blew out Johnson's military illusions, and the gold-outflow crisis of March, which blew out his financial illusions. When the meanings of these two blowouts merged, which was quickly, some unknown-to-me, forever-mysterious mechanism of Yankee decision-making appears to have been activated. The next thing you knew, the superheavy mainline Yankee gunslingers, Clark Clifford, Averill Harriman, and Cyrus Vance, were conferring with Johnson. Who knows what they told him? By April the bombing of the DRV was stopped (never to happen again, some dared to hope), negotiations were at last commencing, McNamara was on his way to manage the monetary crisis, Johnson had abdicated, Clifford was about to assume de facto command of the government from the Defense Department, reasserting the principles of the Yankee line, and Cowboy forces seemed scattered. Bobby's exquisitely orchestrated presidential campaign soon became unbeatable except by the means fate discovered. Upon his June assassination in Los Angeles, the elements of his New Deal-style coalition parted and control over war policy soon reverted to the Cowboy right.

[THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE NIXON CRISIS]

In brief: An American multinational Yankee bourgeoisie has lost control of the state policy apparatus to a domestic or national Cowboy bourgeoisie; and the latter has pursued stubbornly a war, which is necessary mainly in its own eyes, to the point at which a North-South conflict again threatens to spill over the banks of the electoral system. The conflict is deep because the differences are deep. The Yankee can review today nearly a decade of straight Cowboy administration. He sees in part:

—The rise of China in spite of all the costs of the Pacific Cold War campaigns.

—The inability of the U.S. military to produce a stable base in Southeast Asia.

—The decay of the alliance with Japan.

—The emergence in more than embryo of a fateful Japan-China alliance.

—The slackening of spirit of European-American relations; the deepening of the movement of European nationalism—America still strong but the prestige and role of the USSR over-all on the rise.

—Domestically, the exhaustion of known remedies. Whatever is happening to the cities is out of control. There are no believable plans afoot. Spirit is on the defensive. The people are unhappy.

McGovern is of course a plains democrat, not a Yankee (his relationship to Yankee power somewhat resembles Lincoln's); but the new-style populism that made his candidacy real cannot influence policy directly except through a coalition. Hence, the logic of "Yankee populism," full of contradictions and dangers but a logic nonetheless: the logic of *realignment.*

Realignment: the lib-to-lib, con-to-con polarization of a party system which normally pits a lib-con coalition against a con-lib one. The Republican Party "realigned" in 1964, the Democratic Party this year; the Republican liberals like Rocky, Javits, and Brooke, are as out of pocket with Nixon as the conservative Democrats with McGovern. The campaign role in which Nixon has cast arch-Cowboy Connally further makes clear what is happening.

After all this, however, I'm still much more certain that realignment is the major and long-term force acting at this moment. If McGovern wins, the military could bolt; they seem to have threatened this before—to have done it before—for less. If he does not, and militarism decides to see Nixon's reelection as a mandate, new energies will surely form in more urgent opposition. It may help in thinking the situation through, however, to know that in some very real sense the McGovern campaign is much less the preemption or co-optation than the continuation of the movement launched ten years ago with the publication of a few thousand mimeographed copies of *The Port Huron Statement,* SDS's founding manifesto. Consider the following as a strategy, then think of the pattern of development in the ten years since it was written:

"A crucial feature of the political apparatus in America is that greater differences are harbored within each party than . . . between them. Instead of two parties presenting distinctive and significant differences of approach, what dominates the system is a natural interlocking of Democrats from Southern states with the more conservative elements of the Republican Party . . . What emerges from the party contradiction and insulation of privately-held power is organized political stalemate . . . Congress becomes less and less central to national decision-making especially in the area of foreign policy . . . No one is demanding structural changes such as the shunting of Southern Democrats out of the Democratic Party . . .

"[Meanwhile], discontented superpatriotic groups . . . emerge through political channels and explain their ultra-conservatism as the best means of Victory over Communism. They have become a political influential force within the Republican Party, at a national level through Sen. Goldwater . . . But ironically, it is somewhat to the interests of the United States that such a movement should be a public constituency pointed toward realignment of the political parties, demanding a conservative Republican Party in the South and an exclusion of the 'leftist' elements of the national GOP."

This seems to be the pass things have come to. Currently, forward action is preeminantly dependent on McGovern's power to move the energies of realignment with the Kennedy House of the Yankee, Atlanticist bourgeoisie. ●

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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